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Abstract 
Autonomous robotic vehicles suffer from a lack of autonomy in that they are often 
unable to cope with the unforeseen circumstances common in the real-world. A key 
part of autonomy is being able to firstly recognise that something has gone wrong, 
then to be able to determine what the problem is, then to be able to cope with that 
problem. This research addresses these problems by proposing that autonomous 
robotic mission controllers should work in conjunction with a diagnostic system. 
In order to improve diagnostic performance it is common to use more than one 
type of diagnostic system. This research proposes and evaluates an underlying ar- 
chitecture, RECOVERY, for integrating heterogeneous diagnostic systems and their 
associated diagnostic information. It also provides novel ways of using previously 
discarded design information such as dynamic models and circuit diagrams. Novel 
methods of diagnostic search space reduction and domain-independent diagnostics 
are also presented, together with supporting work on the types of information avail- 
able on an autonomous robotic vehicle. 
The RECOVERY architecture is implemented and evaluated using an Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicle (AUV), designed and constructed during the first year of this 
research. The AUV is called RAUVER. The experimental results show that RE- 
COVERY successfully integrates the diagnostic tools and information. 
This thesis is dedicated to my friends and family. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Throughout history the idea of artificially constructed entities has fascinated mankind, 
from the Golems of Prague, through the robots of Fritz Lang's Metropolis, to the an- 
droids of Philip K. Dick's Blade Runner. Modern technology has finally enabled the 
construction of real robotic agents capable of functioning in the real world, although 
they are a long way behind their fictional forerunners. 
Many modern robots are implemented as vehicles such as space-probes, aero- 
planes, submarines, wheeled buggies or even humanoid walking robots. These 
robotic vehicles are increasingly being used to replace humans in harsh environ- 
ments, with the eventual goal being to provide them with the ability to perform 
tasks and cope with problems without any human assistance. This ability, known 
as autonomy, is the subject of a large worldwide research effort. 
This chapter introduces different types of robotic vehicles and discusses their 
advantages over humans for exploration purposes. A common weakness crucial to 
autonomy is then highlighted and the purpose of this research introduced. The 
chapter ends by detailing the thesis structure. 
1.1 Types of Robotic Vehicles 
Robotic vehicles are currently used in a wide variety of environments, many of which 
are hostile to humans. Currently, most robot craft are remotely controlled but there 
is a growing move towards fully autonomous vehicles. Examples follow. 
Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs) are a rapidly maturing technology, with 
their main applications being military and police. They are increasingly being used 
as spotter aircraft for artillery or other weapon delivery systems. Recently a UAV 
flew autonomously, including takeoff and landin , 
from North America to Australia 
19 
I 
where it is now being used for coastline surveillance. 
Although some autonomous surface craft (boats) exist most sea-based robots 
operate underwater. Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) are used extensively for 
sub-sea survey and intervention. Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are 
a rapidly maturing technology, increasingly used commercially to survey pipelines 
and other seabed features. Scientific surveys of the water column and other areas 
of interest are also conducted, whilst the military is developing their mine hunting 
capability. 
Autonomous land vehicles are uncommon at present due to the great difficulty 
involved in navigating terrain, although some advances have been made into struc- 
tured environments such as factories. Some of the most famous land robots have 
been used for exploring other planetary bodies in our solar system. 
Space has a long history of planetary robotic exploration, dating back to the 
cold-war technology boom of the mid 1950's. The Americans spent a great deal of 
time and effort on transporting men to the Moon, where they could stay for only 
a few hours. The Soviets concentrated instead on robotic exploration and landed a 
remotely controlled wheeled buggy; Lunokhod. This robot stayed on the moon for 
months, not hours, until its circuitry was destroyed by radiation. 
The most advanced land vehicle so far, Mars Sojourner, had a limited amount of 
autonomy in order to cope with the large communications time lag between Earth 
and Mars. This time lag makes remote operation difficult and so the Mars Sojourner 
could decide whether it was capable of negotiating objects in its path. This proved 
to be a successful approach. 
1.2 Exploration 
One of the most suitable applications for autonomous robotic vehicles is exploration, 
usually involving mapping, sampling and discovering interesting features such as the 
ancient sunken temples off the coast of Japan and India. 
Exploration is an extremely risky operation as it involves, by nature, venturing 
into the unknown. There is usually very little backup which, coupled with the 
possibility of loss, leads to it being a very risky investment. In compensation, the 
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rewards can be very high. 
Historical Solutions 
Until the middle of the twentieth century all exploration was done in two ways: by 
going there, or by looking through a telescope. The disadvantages of using humans 
for exploration mainly concern logistics; humans require food, water, rest, shelter 
and a relatively narrow set of environmental conditions. Historically, the lives of the 
explorers were often lost. Recently, political conditions have changed so that the 
loss of modern explorers, such as the crew of the U. S. Space Shuttle Challenger, is 
no longer acceptable. 
The major advantage of human exploration is the ability to cope with unforeseen 
problems, together with the political and social implications of 'having been there'. 
1.2.2 Robotic Exploration 
Currently there are two main areas of exploration: space and sub-sea. In these 
extremely hazardous environments manned exploration is the second wave. Robots 
push back the frontier and, in some cases, prepare the way for humans. 
The greatest disparity between the achievements of human and robotic explor- 
ers is in space. The furthest man has ventured is the Moon but a robotic space 
probe, Voyager, has passed Pluto and is heading through the Oort Cloud towards 
interstellar space. Other robots have landed on Mars and Venus, parachuted into 
Jupiter and landed on an asteroid. Currently operating robots are circling the Sun 
and Mars, whilst others are exploring the outer Solar System. When compared with 
the human presence, currently limited to the International Space Station in Earth 
orbit, it is clear that robots are the future of exploration. Given the large time de- 
lays associated with sending a signal even to our closest planetary neighbour, Mars, 
remote operation is not feasible. 
Launch costs also show huge robotic advantages, especially for long missions. 
Robotic probes, essentially small spacecraft, are fax smaller and lighter than a 
manned spacecraft with their life-support requirements. Current launch costs are 
huge and so any reduction in mass is of great benefit. 
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Underwater exploration presents significant challenges, in some ways even more 
so than space. Communications are limited to low bandwidth, unreliable acoustic 
methods, ambient pressure can be thousands of times that of atmospheric pressure 
and the environment is highly corrosive. This presents a significant engineering 
challenge. 
1.2.3 Present solutions 
Current robot explorers rely heavily on two methods: remote operation and/or pre- 
programmed instruction sets known as scripts. Remote operation has the advantage 
of the human abilities of adaptability and problem solving, but it is only viable 
when communications delays are short. Longer delays necessitate increased robot 
autonomy as with the Mars S01ourner buggy. Remote operation also ties up human 
resources for what may well be a long, repetitive task, essentially more suited to 
robotics. A good example of this is sub-sea pipeline surveying, where a human 
operator must drive the Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) along many kilometres 
of pipeline at speeds of around I knot (0.5m. s-1). 
Scripts are commonly used in space probes and underwater survey vehicles. The 
robot follows a set of instructions provided by the (human) mission programmer, 
such as 'go to x, survey area y, go to z'. A limited number of problems will have been 
foreseen and appropriate reactions included in the script. For example, underwater 
robots commonly have a line each mission script commanding them to surface in 
the event of a water leak. 
Scripts provide a limited amount of autonomy, whilst remote operation demands 
some level of autonomy for all but the smallest communications delays. 
1.2.4 Future trends 
Current autonomous robots are very much geared towards surveying, mainly because 
this removes most of the need to interact with the environment. It is easier for a 
sub-sea robot to fly a grid pattern above the seabed than to descend to the rugged 
terrain of the ocean floor and dock. This lack of intervention ability severely limits 
their usefulness. 
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For instance, NASA is planning a manned mission to Mars. In order to increase 
the probability of success they plan to send ahead a robotic construction team to 
build a base, providing shelter, fuel and communications to the arriving humans. It 
would be nearly impossible to accomplish this task using scripts due to the large 
number of unforeseen problems that are bound to occur. 
A similar approach is used underwater. Some oilfield installations have been 
created using ROVs without a single human entering the water. Although this is far 
safer than older methods it is still costly in terms of manpower and surface ships. 
1.3 A Common Limitation 
The underlying problem with autonomous robots is a lack of autonomy. Autonomy 
can be defined as 'the ability to function independently, without outside help'. 
A major limitation of current generation autonomous vehicles is frailty in the face 
of unexpected events, such as component failure or environmental interaction. Most 
autonomous robotic inission controllers are based on scripts using specifically coded 
routines to cope with such events, but for this to be effective the mission programmer 
must predict all such situations. This is clearly impractical. Embedded planners 
provide the capability to re-plan the mission but their effectiveness varies with the 
quality and scope of information provided to them: "Incorrect Mformahon results 
in unsatisfied preconditions for actions and plans. 
Towards a Solution 
In order to cope with unforeseen faults it is vital to have accurate information on 
what has gone wrong. Current generation mission controllers have no explicit fault 
diagnosis systems apart from simple rule bases, which can only recognise specific, 
foreseen faults. More powerful fault diagnosis systems provide the capability to 
diagnose unforeseen faults, although each system has its own weaknesses. 
By providing explicit fault diagnosis to the autonomous vehicle's onboard mis- 
sion controller the ability to cope with faults should be enhanced due to the extra 
information provided. 
5 
1.3.2 Benefits 
The benefits of providing accurate fault information to an onboaxd mission planner 
include: 
o Enhanced re-planning 
9 Knowing when a mission is still attainable (and when to quit) 
9 Ability to cope with unforeseen problems 
9 Increased mission robustness 
o Increased autonomy 
Any autonomous vehicle operator will gain from the benefits described above. 
Autonomous vehicles will have an increasing ability to cope with the myriad of 
problems, both internal and external, that plague any immature, high technology 
system that must interact with the real world. 
1.4 Use of an AUV for System Evaluation 
The vehicle chosen for evaluating this research is an Autonomous Underwater Vehi- 
cle, or AUV. Underwater robotics presents all the challenges that produce the need 
for autonomy but in a highly accessible environment. 
AUVs have recently become a useful tool for organisations involved in sub-sea 
operations such as area survey, environmental monitoring or Antarctic ice sheet 
surveying. An increasing number of companies provide commercial AUVs for just 
such applications. It seems likely that in the near future AUVs will become one of 
the most used autonomous robotic tools. 
An AUV also provides a cheap, realistic platform for real-world development 
without resorting to the unrealistic practice of 'corridor robots'. Land vehicles do 
use a more accessible environment but they are faced with the difficult problem of 
navigating terrain, which is outside the scope of this reseaxch. 
Although this rescýirch is aimed at all autonomous robots it is felt that using an 
AUV for evaluation will provide a realistic research platform with immediate benefit 
to the AUV communitv. 
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Figure 1.1: RAUVER, The Evaluation Vehicle 
An autonomous underw, -ater vehicle, also capable of remote and tethered au- 
tonomous operation, was designed by the author during the first year of this re- 
search. The vehicle is called RAUVER, an acronym for 'Remote / Autonomous 
Vehicle for Experimentation and Research'. During the first year the author also 
supervised RAUVER's construction. 
1.5 Aims 
The aims of this research are: 
* To aid increased vehicle autonomy by enhancing the vehicle's ability to deal 
with unforeseen events. 
* To provide detailed, accurate information on unforeseen faults to the onboard 
mission controller. 
e To evaluate the above system on a real autonomous vehicle under real oper- 
ating conditions. 
To achieve these aims this research proposes the use of on-vehicle Integrated 
Diagnostics. The proposed architecture for Integrated Diagnostics, RECOVERY, 
provides integratimi mid inethods for the use of heterogeneous design knowledge, 
heterogeneous diigiiostic sYstems and domai n- independent diagnostic knowledge. 
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RECOVERY is shown to be a detailed, working and extended implementation 
of a concept proposed in a multi-organisational study. The organisations involved 
included NASA and the US Department of Defense. 
Although the results of that study were not published until after the first year of 
this research the RECOVERY concept was already in place and found to be more 
detailed and wider ranging than the study proposal. RECOVERY's architecture and 
operation also already existed and the implementation was well under way, effectively 
making it the state of the art for Integrated Diagnostics. This is supported by the 
literature review. 
1.6 Summary of Originality 
The core of the RECOVERY system is a dynamic, relational construction model, 
loosely based on partitioned semantic networks, to tie together different types of di- 
agnostic systems and design knowledge. Using this Relational Model in conjunction 
with a focus of suspicion method the diagnostic search space may be greatly re- 
duced, particularly when both multidimensional and dynamic diagnostic techniques 
are required. 
The use of the Relational Model allows the use of domain- independent diagnostic 
knowledge and methods, which enhance the ability to diagnose completely unfore- 
seen faults. The use of domain- independent techniques is investigated. Work is also 
presented on the tYpes of knowledge available on an autonomous robotic vehicle and 
how this knowledge may be used to aid diagnosis. 
This is the first time that Integrated Diagnostics has been successfully focussed, 
implemented and evaluated on a real autonomous vehicle performing real missions. 
Two papers arising from this research are: 
9 K. Hamilton, D. N1. Lane, N. K. Taylor, and K. E. Brown. Enhancing AUV 
fault- diagno,, ý, is capabilities with the RECOVERY system. Accepted for Publi- 
cation by t1w IEEE Journal of Oceanographic Engineering, 2002. (Reference 
[46]) 
e K. Hamilton, D. M. Lane, N. K. Taylor, and K. E. Brown. Fault dtagnosis on 
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autonomous robotic vehicles with RECOVERY: An integrated heterogeneous- 
knowledge appToach. IEEE International Conference on Robotics & Automa- 
tion, Seoul, Korea, May 2001. Page(s): 3232 -3237 Volume 4. (Reference 
[45]) 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 provides some background on mission controllers, modularity and au- 
tomated diagnostics. Chapter 3 surveys and critiques the available literature on 
individual, hybrid and integrated diagnostic systems. Chapter 4 presents the RE- 
COVERY system, starting with detail on the originality and showing where this is 
evaluated, then moving through the concepts involved in RECOVERY. Chapter 5 
details the operation of the overall RECOVERY system and its individual modules. 
Chapter 6 describes the evaluation platform (RAUVER) and the evaluation loca- 
tions. Results for the novel Domain-Independent Diagnostic methods proposed in 
this research are then given and discussed. Chapter 7 gives and discusses results for 
the full RECOVERY system and its method for Search Space Reduction. Chapter 
8 draws conclusions and details further work necessary to extend and improve the 
RECOVERY system. 
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Chapter 2 
Information on Background Issues of 
this Research 
I 
2.1 Aim of this Chapter 
For a robotic vehicle to be able to autonomously perform a mission it must have 
some form of onboard mission control to direct the robot's actions. The purpose 
of this research is to provide fault information to this onboaxd mission controller 
to enhance the robotic vehicle's autonomy. In order to achieve this it is necessary 
to understand the different types of mission controllers and show how a diagnostic 
system could interact with them. 
The concept of an architecture for autonomous robotic mission control is ex- 
plained, popular examples of these architectures given and a common weakness 
highlighted. 
The relationship between faults (what is actually wrong), observations (how the 
fault appears) and diagnoses (what is thought to be wrong)is discussed. The diagnos- 
tic process is then described, particularly detecting, diagnosing and accommodating 
(or recovering from) a fault. 
This research is intended to be useful for a variety of robotic platforms, not just 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles. To achieve this it is necessary for the architecture 
to be platform independent, flexible and versatile. A powerful method of providing 
these attributes i,,, modularity which is discussed in this chapter. 
2.2 Approaches to Mission Control Architectures 
An architecture for controlling an autonomous robot "... defines how the job of 
generahng actions from percepts is organised" (Russell & Norvig [90]). In other 
words, an architecture defines how to make the robot correctly respond to sensor 
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inputs in such as way as to do what you want it to do. 
An architecture is needed as the task of making autonomous robots do what is 
required of them is generally too complicated for any individual system or module. 
Usually many different systems must work together, an architecture defines how 
they interact. The robot control architecture and the modules contained within it 
are called a mission controller. The ultimate aim of a mission controller is to get 
the robot to do xhit is recluired of it, even if that robot is faced with unforeseen 
and adverse events. 
There are many types of mission controllers; three of the most popular types and 
some hybrids are discussed later in this chapter after a brief overview of some key 
concepts. 
2.2.1 Goal Orientation 
A natural way for humans to think is to break a mission into a set of goals, each 
of which must be achieved in order to complete a mission. It is common for these 
goals to be achieved in a temporal order, with conditions given for when a goal 
is completed. For instance, it is common for a military pilot to be given orders 
detailing a set of waypoints to follow to the target area, a designated target, an 
action to be perforined on that target (bomb it) and a set of waypoints to follow 
home. Each goal niust be achieved in turn to complete the mission. 
Typical goals for AUVs may be: head to target, land, takeoff, get GPS fix, dive 
to depth, dive to altitude and other similar goals. 
Goals can have different priorities. In the above example, going to a particular 
waypoint would probably have a lower priority than dropping the bomb on the 
target. A good mission controller should be able to determine that some goals can 
be sacrificed in order to complete the more important ones. The overall purpose of 
the pilot's mission is, after all, to bomb the target. Returning home is usually a 
lower priority. 
Goals can also be constrained with a set of parameters that must not be violated. 
For instance, if wi AUV -"-ýis performing a sea-bed sample of an area it would need 
to land gently, witli ii goal similar to that shown in Figure 2.1. Constraints provide 
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more information for planners to take into account. Violated constraints may provide 
useful informatioii to a diagnostic system. 
Invocation Command from 
Mission Controller 
Goal Status to Mission 
Controller 
Goal: LandfTakeoff 
Constraints: 
Forward, Vertical, Yaw Speed < 0.1 m-s-1 
Roll, Pitch < 10 degrees 
Depth < 100m 
Timeout =1 00s 
If ALTITUDE > 5m Then Vertical Speed =1m. sl 
If ALTITUDE >1m Then Vertical Speed = 0.1 m. s' 
Complete when ALTITUDE = Om 
Fail when Timeout 
Fail when Constraint Broken 
Sensor Data 
from Vehicle 
Commands to 
Vehicle Controls 
Figure 2.1: A Constrained 'Land Gently' Goal for an AUV 
2.2.2 Robustness 
A system is said to be robust if it has demonstrated an ability to recover gracefully 
from the whole range of exceptional inputs and situations in a given environment. 
This is clearly an important quality for systems that must operate on an autonomous 
robotic vehicle, particularly the mission controller. 
2.2.3 Determinism 
Determinism is the attribute of being totally predictable under all conditions. For 
instance, the environment in which the robot operates is said to be deterministic if 
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the next statc of the environment is completely determined by the current state 
and the actions sclected by the [autonomous robotic] agents... " (Finlay& Dix 
2.2.4 World Models 
A world model is a representation of the environment in which the autonomous robot 
operates. There are clear limitations to the extent of such a model due to processor 
and memory constraints. The detail and accuracy of such a model is limited by the 
level of technology available on autonomous vehicles. 
2.2.5 Environmental Interaction 
A major contributor to the difficulty of effective mission control is that the robot 
must interact with the environment. This has proved difficult within even a rela- 
tively structured (, iivii-onment, such as a factory. When the robot must operate in 
an unstructured environment such as the Martian surface, or in the sea, the task 
becomes far more difficult. 
2.3 The Main Approaches to Mission Control 
There are currenth, three main approaches to mission control: Scripts, Reactive 
Controllers and Planners. There are also a great many hybrids combining attributes 
of these, such Reactive Planners, or Planners running above a fast Reactive 
layer. This section details the three main types of mission controller and highlights 
a common weakne-ýs. 
2.3.1 Scripts, or Finite State Machines 
A Script is a set of instructions that the robot must follow in order to complete the 
mission. Figure 2.2 shows an example script of a segment of a typical AUV survey 
mission. 
A Script is essoutuilly a Finite State Machine. A Finite State Machine is any 
system which lws ii limited number of states, and specific events that will make the 
system change froin one state to another. Figure 2.2 shows states, such as 'Dive to 
14 
1. Transit to Coordinates Xa, Ya 
(If Coordinates = XaYa then Move to Next State) 
2. Dive to Depth D 
(If Depth =D then Move to Next State) 
3. Survey Box ABCD 
4. Transit to Coordinates Xb, Yb 
5. Surface 
6. Standby 
If (Leak-Detected) Then (Emergency Surface) 
Figure 2.2: A Mission Script for a Survey AUV 
Depth D' and trmisition events such as 'If Depth == D then Move to Next State' 
which cause the robot to change to the next state, in this case 'Survey Box ABCD'. 
There are also some fault states. If a water leak is detected then the robot 
immediately changes to the 'emergency surface' state. This is the only provision for 
faults within Scripts, all faults must be foreseen and appropriate reactions planned 
before the mission begins. Because of this, Script Mission Controllers are not robust, 
as they cannot cope, with unforeseen circumstances. 
The main advmttage of Scripts is that they are very easy to develop and use 
minimal computing resources. They are a cheap, practical solution to mission control 
if the environment, is reasonably predictable. For instance, most AUVs operating 
today use Scripts because most of them conduct surveys well above the seabed in 
clear water, where there are a minimum of obstacles. 
2.3.2 Behavioural Controllers 
Behavioural (sonictimes known as Reactive) controllers are based on the Subsump- 
tion architecture developed in 1986 by Rodney Brooks of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (M. I. T. ). It is essentially a method of joining Finite State Machines 
in such a way thiit t lie robot can react to changes in its environment (Brooks [16]). 
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Subsumption uses a hierarchy of Finite State Machines. Each Finite State Ma- 
chine is called a 'behaviour', with higher level behaviour being able to override, or 
subsume, lower le, \ý(4 behaviours. 
The classic exýiinple is that of a wall following 'corridor robot'. A robot has a 
low level behaviotir enabling it to move forwards, called 'Wander'. A higher level 
behaviour, activated using a simple sensor and commanding the robot to turn 90 
degrees when it (, iwounters an obstacle, is called 'Follow Wall'. When the robot 
is activated the only active behaviour is 'Wander', so it wanders forwards until it 
meets a wall. At this point the higher level 'Follow Wall' is activated by the simple 
sensor. 'Follow overrides, or subsumes, the 'Wander' output and so the robot 
turns 90 degrees, ýit, which point there is no longer an obstacle and so 'Follow Wall' 
is deactivated. 'Wýiiider' is again the only active behaviour and so the robot moves 
forwards. 
In this way, iisiing extremely simple behaviours and a simple sensor, the robot 
can navigate a con-Idor quite successfully without large amounts of computing re- 
sources. As the bcl-iýtviours are simple finite state machines the computer can even be 
replaced with small, hardwired logic circuits consisting of only a few gates, leading 
to extremely fast reaction times. 
Note that then, is no representation of the environment, just reactions. Brooks 
states that '... the world is its own best model' in Brooks xx [16]. Subsumption 
works well for simple tasks but struggles with complex missions. As there is no 
overall mission plan individual behaviours must be 'tuned' to try to get the robot 
to react correctly. The robot is limited to reacting to its environment, dealing with 
real-world complexity by ignoring it. 
Behavioural (-() iiý rollers are useful for simple missions, or as a low-level reaction 
stage, but their usefulness for complex, real-world missions is limited. The emergent 
properties of their I)ehaviour do not allow for a high level of predictability. This 
greatly limits their usefulness in current robotic applications where a single robot 
often has a complicated mission to follow. Current commercial applications, such 
as operating in iuviis close to sub-sea structures, require an extremely high level of 
determinism to ciisiire that they do not collide with structures or stray into 'no-go' 
areas. 
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They are more suited to applications where the robot does not have a particulax 
goal but instead has a more general purpose such as 'wander the corridor without 
colliding with ol-. )Jects'. 
2.3.3 Embedded Planners 
Planners use their perception of the environment together with knowledge of how 
their actions affect that environment. They use this knowledge to try to generate a 
plan of actions that lead from the present to the desired state. The robot can then 
follow this plan of actions until the desired state is achieved. 
Planners are powerful. If an unforeseen problem occurs then the planner can 
replan to take into account the problem and complete the mission, making them 
the most robust of the main mission controllers. They are also goal orientated, with 
each step of the plan being a goal. 
Planners rely heavily on world models to calculate what effect their actions will 
have, and whether these actions will lead towards the eventual achievement of the 
desired state. This leads immediately to problems with the complexity of the real 
world and the difficulty of sensing and modelling it accurately. When taken together 
with the iterative nature of planners the end result is extremely high processor 
overheads and long run times. 
One of the best known mission controllers to use embedded planners is the 
NASA/NBS Standard Reference Model for Telerobot Control System Architecture 
(NASREM) by Ubus, Quintero and Lumia [1]. Although initially developed for use 
with a telerobotic arm on a space station it is a domain-independent architecture 
suitable for autonomous vehicles. 
2.3.4 Hybrids 
There are many hybrids between the three paradigms described above, such as a 
low-level reactive layer providing 'dodge' survival capability below a classical plan- 
ner slowly providing high level plans. Another method is the reactive planner, where 
plans are gener,, ited in advance and triggered by a reactive layer in response to ex- 
ternal stimuli. NASA has had some success with its Mer architecture, as described 
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in Schreckenghost, Bonasso, Kortenkamp and Ryan [92]. 
2.3.5 Summary of Mission Controller Abilities 
Table 2.1 shows a comparison of the abilities of the main types of mission controllers. 
AWItty Script Reactive Planner ReactivePlanner 
Replanning No No Yes No 
Fast Reaction Yes Yes No Yes 
Low Processor Overhead Yes Yes No Yes 
Cope with Unforeseen Events No Yes Yes Yes 
Robust No Yes Yes No 
Coal Orientated Yes No Yes Yes 
Easy to Specify Mission Yes No Yes Yes 
Easy to Develop Yes Yes No Medium 
Explicit Fault Diagnosis No No No No 
Table 2.1: Mission Controller Abilities 
2.3.6 A Common Weakness 
None of the above mission controllers feature explicit fault diagnosis and so their 
ability to cope with unforeseen faults is constrained. They rely on 'under informed' 
or non-existent fault diagnosis strategies. 
Scripts rely on having enough states and events to cope with problems. By 
using explicit fault diagnosis the number of events can be increased, improving the 
) coverage' of possible problems. Scripts still require the states to be predicted in 
advance but the use of explicit diagnosis means that these states may be reached 
without predicting the events. 
For example, by using explicit diagnosis a fault state and matching action for 
each component can be generated, such as 'if port-stabiliser-fin faulty (fault state) 
then reduce sp(, (, (l (action)'. Without explicit diagnosis a matching event must also 
be foreseen to trigger the change to that state; 'if vehicle rolls to port (trigger event) 
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then port-stabiliser-fin faulty (fault state)'. By using explicit fault diagnosis the 
trigger event caii be generated independently without having to foresee it. 
Reactive controllers also rely on events, although these events are usually en- 
vironmental. The use of explicit diagnosis can increase the 'reaction range' of the 
robot by providing more events. 
Embedded planners provide the capability to re-plan the mission but their effec- 
tiveness varies with the quality and scope of information provided to them: "Incor- 
rect Mformahon results in unsatisfied preconditions for actions and plans. " (Russell 
& Norvig [90]). It is therefore vital that an embedded planner is provided with 
accurate and detailed information on the problem and the vehicle's degraded ca- 
pabilities. By pi-oviding detailed fault information replanning capability may be 
greatly enhanced, increasing the robot's capability to cope with unforeseen events. 
2.4 Diagnostic System Basics 
Diagnostic systems try to identify the causes of faults. In robotic applications the 
fault is usually a faulty component such as a transistor or a thruster. 
Diagnostic systems are commonly used in industrial situations such as chemical 
plant, reactors etc and military or aerospace applications such as helicopters. They 
are also starting to appear on domestic cars. 
2.4.1 Fault, Observation and Diagnosis Spaces 
There are three inter-related spaces involved in fault diagnosis: fault space, observa- 
tion space and diagnosis space. Each space contains the totality of all possibilities in 
their respective areas. Fault space contains all faults that can occur on the vehicle, 
observation space contains all observations from the point of view of the vehicle 
and diagnosis space contains all possible diagnoses available by using the observa- 
tion space. Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between these spaces, where the fault 
space is linked to the diagnosis space through the observation space. 
The size of the fault spýice, or the range of possible faults that can occur on 
an AUV, when taken together with the unpredictable nature of the environment, 
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Diagnosis Space: 
The totality of 
possible diagnoses 
Observation Space: 
The totality of possible observations 
Fault Space: 
The totality of possible faults 
Figure 2.3: Fault Spaces and their Relationships 
is extremely large. It is practically impossible to predict (and plan for) all possible 
faults. This is borne out by practical experience of AUV operations (and almost 
every other field of engineering). Further, the range of events that can be planned 
for is limited by the scope of observation, where an observation may be gained from 
a sensor such as a temperature or attitude sensor. 
Whilst fault, space may tend towards infinity the observation space can be di- 
rectly controlled by the vehicle designer. The initial size of the observation space is 
determined by the number of sensors embedded in the vehicle but it can be expanded 
by combining observations in a similar way to the concept/percept paradigm. The 
initial size of the diagnosis space is also determined by the number of sensors. In 
a typical case the ratio of observation space to diagnosis space is 1: 1, that is, each 
sensor is responsible for a specific diagnosis. 
An example of this is a thermostat placed inside a battery; typically, the thermo- 
stat tripping will set a flag somewhere in the mission control software saying battery 
overheating. Often the ratio will be less than 1: 1 because some vehicle sensors do not 
contribute to fault diagnosis, i. e. vehicle attitude sensors will flag that the vehicle 
is outside its attitude limit, s but will not be tied to any components. This poor ra- 
tio between observation and diagnosis spaces is a feature of current mission-control 
technologies. 
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2.4.2 The Component Concept 
A component is usually defined as the lowest replaceable unit when using diagnostic 
systems aimed at providing a solution to a human operator (who must then fix 
the fault). For instance, to a field engineer the smallest diagnosable component 
of a piece of equipment may be a circuit board, but at the factory it may be an 
integrated circuit, or chip. The situation is different for most autonomous vehicles 
as they are far from human help and cannot fix themselves - the lowest replaceable 
unit is the entire vehicle. The emphasis must be on finding out what has gone wrong 
and trying to work around the problem. 
For diagnostics on autonomous robotic vehicles a component is not the lowest 
replaceable unit but the lowest diagnosable unit, the level of which is dependent on 
the size of the observation space (i. e. the number and location of sensors). This 
research uses a further classification, that of a sub-component, which may only be 
diagnosed using component-specific, rather than vehicle-specific information 
2.4.3 Redundancy 
A major part of fault detection and diagnosis is the use of redundancy. There are 
two main types of redundancy: hardware and analytical. Hardware redundancy 
utilises different sensors measuring the same data, a difference between the two 
signals (known as a residual) usually indicates a fault. For instance, if two sensors 
measure magnetic heading then the readings should be identical unless one of the 
sensors fails, in which case the signals will differ. 
An increasiligly popular approach is to use analytical redundancy, where an al- 
gorithmic model is used to provide the second signal. Although this requires the 
use of a microprocessor these are extremely common, fast and light in modern sys- 
tems. This saves the extra cost and weight of additional sensors and is an extremely 
versatile approach. 
Analytical redundancy can be broken down into two forms: direct and temporal 
(Magrabi and Gibbens [67]), which are equivalent to the static and dynamic terms 
used throughout this thesis. Static (or direct) redundancy is when the state mea- 
sured by one seilsor can be determined using the instantaneous outputs of other 
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sensors. Dynamic (or temporal) redundancy is when the state can be determined 
only by using the historical data from other sensors. 
2.5 The Diagnostic Cycle 
The diagnostic cycle is the process of moving from detecting a fault to accommo- 
dating (or recovering from) the fault. There are four stages to the diagnostic cycle: 
failure, detection, diagnosis and recovery (FDDR). Most current-generation diagnos- 
tic systems do not provide fault-recovery, these are known as FDI systems (Failure, 
Detection and Isolation). 
The diagnostic cycle can be thought of as the process of answering three ques- 
tions: 
e Is something wrong? (Failure Detection) 
o What is wrong? (Diagnosis) 
9 What can I still do? (Recovery) 
2.5.1 Failure 
A fault is defined as "... an unexpected change that leads to the corruphon of the 
overall performance of the system. " (Magrabi and Gibbens [67]). Faults largely 
break down into three types: 
Single/Multiple Faults 
A single fault is a discrete fault, caused by one component. Multiple faults, where 
many components fail, are far harder to diagnose as the symptoms may overlap or 
interact. This may produce a different, larger set of symptoms than the sum of the 
individual faults. Some systems assume that there may be multiple-single faults, 
where many single faults with isolated symptoms may appear. 
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Structural/Non-Structural Faults 
A structural fault is caused by a re-arrangement of the system's physical topology, 
for instance a transformer breaking loose and shorting against another circuit. These 
are extremely difficult to diagnose, generally requiring an explicit topological model. 
Most diagnostic systems regard the topology as fixed in order to ease the diagnostic 
burden. 
Static/Dynamic Faults 
A static fault is one that may be diagnosed using information gathered from one 
point in time, a "snapshot' of the system. A dynamic fault may only be diagnosed by 
observing the behaviour of the system over time, a 'movie' of the system. Examples 
of dynamic faults include intermittent faults, thermal drift and transient problems. 
2.5.2 Fault Detection 
Once a fault has occurred it must be detected. Some level of detection is usually 
designed into the system in order to prevent catastrophic failure. For instance, ther- 
mostats on power-conversion components signal when they are too hot for continued 
operation. Another common practice is to watch parameters using software and set 
a fault flag when a parameter exceeds some preset value. A mission controller may 
also provide a form of detection by signalling when goal constraints are violated. 
2.5.3 Fault Diagnosis 
The diagnostic systern now takes responsibility for determining what the problem 
is. This usually takes the form of a component, where a component is the smallest 
isolated item of the system that can be diagnosed (as discussed in Section 2.4.2. 
Diagnostic systems can generally determine what has gone wrong (the circuit 
board), but not usually why it has gone wrong (a power spike). 
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2.5.4 Fault Recovery 
Once the fault has been diagnosed an autonomous vehicle must then be able to decide 
how to cope with the fault, that is, how to continue the mission using whatever 
capabilities remain. Although this stage is perhaps best performed by the mission 
controller the diagnostic system can contribute. New operational models must be 
generated so that the planner can correctly calculate whether the mission is still 
attainable, and if so what actions must be taken to complete it. 
2.6 Modularity 
An increasing feature of modern design is modularity. The move towards modularity 
is particularly true of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles due to the wide range of 
mission types that they are required to perform; a modular strategy is vital in order 
to achieve efficient flexibility. An information based fault diagnosis system must 
encompass modularity or its usefulness will decline as the vehicle changes from its 
initial state. 
Two popular methods of implementing modularity are the distributed and cen- 
tralised approaches, of which the latter is the most common. 
2.6.1 Distributed Systems 
A distributed diagnosis system would have each major component capable of diag- 
nosing itself and providing this information to the overall diagnosis system. This 
would be a powerful approach, as it could provide graceful degradation and max- 
imum survivability in case of damage. Of course, it is in case of damage that the 
diagnosis system is most needed. Unfortunately the need for processing power at- 
tached to every component adds a certain overhead in terms of power, weight and 
space. Although there is a move towards such 'smart' components, it is not yet 
common enough to merit developing fully distributed diagnosis systems. 
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2.6.2 Centralised Systems 
With the centralised approach various modules can be 'plugged' into a central core. 
Most current generation AUVs favour a centralised approach with vehicles consisting 
of a core onto which other sensors or other devices may be added. At present, the 
centralised modular approach is the most practical solution, although it can lead to 
the loss of graceful degradation. The long-term aim of any diagnostic system must 
be survivability in order to provide diagnostic information no matter what the fault. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter showed the two main paradigms used for autonomous mission control; 
functional and behavioural. Behavioural approaches were shown to be unsuitable for 
current applications due to their emergent properties that severely limit predictabil- 
ity and make it difficult to specify a complex mission. The functional approach to 
mission control is more useful for today's applications, although mission controllers 
that combine both approaches, particularly NASA's NASREM architecture, have 
proved successful. 
Different types of mission controllers implemented on autonomous robotic vehi- 
cles were then discussed and a common weakness highlighted: the lack of explicit 
diagnosis. 
Background information was presented on the necessity for a modular approach 
to the design of a diagnostic system and the two main methods discussed; cen- 
tralised and distributed. Although distributed systems have advantages, such as 
graceful degradation, this approach is not yet common enough in current generation 
autonomous robots to merit focussing on a fully distributed diagnostic system. 
Background concepts of automated diagnosis were then shown. The relationship 
between faults (what is wrong), observations (how the fault appears) and diagnoses 
(what is thought to be wrong) was discussed and the size of the observation space 
shown to be crucial. 
The component concept, usually based on the level of Least Replaceable Units 
was discussed and it was shown that on autonomous robots during a mission the 
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least replaceable unit is the vehicle itself as, at present, the robot cannot fix itself. 
This leads to the focus being on finding what has gone wrong and working around, 
not fixing, the problem. 
Redundancy was shown to have two forms; hardware and analytical. Hardware 
redundancy is where two separate components (in this case sensors) perform identical 
or overlapping tasks, so that if one of them fails the residual difference in signals may 
be used to detect the fault. This is a powerful approach but it has a size, weight 
and power overhead. Analytical redundancy uses models to provide the second 
sensor signal, this is less costly in terms of size and weight but it does require more 
processing power. 
The diagnostic cycle of failure (something goes wrong), detection (realising some- 
thing is wrong), diagnosis (finding out what has gone wrong) and accommoda- 
tion/recovery (working around the fault) was then described. 
The next chapter details different approaches to diagnostics, ranging from in- 
dividual systern-specific approaches through to Integrated Diagnostic frameworks. 
The multi-organisational study; Open Systems Approach to Integrated Diagnostics 
Demonstration (OSAIDD) is discussed and its strengths and weaknesses highlighted. 
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Chapter 3 
State of the Art of Autonomous 
Diagnostic Systems 
3.1 Aim of this Chapter 
This chapter aims to show that there are many diagnostic paradigms and systems 
but little attempt to provide a framework for Integrated Diagnostics within which 
they can all operate. 
The first part of this chapter provides a brief overview of individual diagnostic 
paradigms, particularly popular approaches such as Neural Networks, Rulebases and 
Model Based Diagnosis. Examples of specific systems utilising these approaches are 
given. 
Hybrid diagnostic systems utilising two or more paradigms are then detailed. 
These hybrid systems usually try to combine the complementary strengths of dif- 
ferent paradigms but are not an attempt to provide a generalised framework for 
integrating different diagnostic paradigms. 
Approaches to Integrated Diagnostics are then detailed. Limitations of the exist- 
ing attempts, particularly the United States Department of Defense's Open Systems 
Approach to Integrated Diagnostics Demonstration (OSAIDD) by Reschi et al [40] 
are shown. 
3.2 Individual Diagnostic Systems 
This section presents a description and examples of a representative sample of the 
individual diagnostic paradigms. Although there are many different forms of di- 
agnostic system, many of which are tailored to specifically suit the developmental 
system, they broadly fall into model-free and model-based techniques (Alessandri 
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[3]). Model-free methods do not rely on using models of the system to be diag- 
nosed, an example of this is a Rulebase. Model-based methods use mathematical 
models of the system to achieve diagnosis, such as a typical Model-Based Diagnosis 
implementation. 
3.3 Model-Free Diagnostic Methods 
This section details various types of model-free diagnostic systems. 
3.3.1 Rule Based Diagnostic Systems 
The Rulebase is the simplest form of detection and diagnosis available today, despite 
which it is still the subject of research, particularly by NASA. Rulebases are a 
common, first attempt solution to providing fault detection and diagnosis for an 
autonomous vehicle. 
Rulebases are said to be first generation knowledge-based systems, where a 
'knowledge engineer' takes the knowledge of a human expert and converts this knowl- 
edge in to a form understandable by a machine. This usually consists of rules, in 
the form of if - then statements, and commonly embraces fuzzy logic to give some 
degree of generalisation. These rules use knowledge gained by outside observation 
of the system rather than a representation of the internal mechanisms, and as such 
are termed 'sha, llow' knowledge. 
Rulebases are often used for evaluating systems that must interact with diag- 
nostic systems, as they are so easy to develop. For instance, Yan, Nakamura, Arai 
and Kuwahara [106] developed a system for remote diagnostics using standardised 
message protocols. To evaluate it they used a simple Rulebase for proof-of-concept 
work rather than spending crucial time developing a powerful diagnostic system, 
such as a neural network. 
Tunstel, Howard and Seraji [100] have recently developed a fuzzy Rulebase sys- 
tem for reasoning about the safety of a planetary rover on challenging terrain. Dai n 
and Sugisaka [2S] have developed a probabilistic fuzzy Rulebase for diagnosing a 
power plant, ývith the stated goal of 'quick diagnosis'. Huang, Yang and Huang [52] 
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have developed a fuzzy Rulebase which is then modified using genetic algorithms to 
increase diagnostic performance. 
NASA has also developed an advanced Rulebase system known as SHINE (Space- 
craft Health I. Nference Engine), which is detailed later in this chapter. 
The continuing research in Rulebases shows that, despite their simplicity, they 
are a valid and useful diagnostic tool. 
3.3.2 Case Based Reasoning 
Case based reasoning uses the concept of analogy in a similar way to legal trials. All 
the cases (examples) are stored in a database, called a case base. New situations, 
such as faults, are compared with the examples in the case base and the best match 
is found. If an exact match is found then the example may be simply repeated, if 
not then the reasoning system is used to derive a response. Case based reasoning is 
useful for fault diagnosis when observations, or attributes, are missing, as a simple 
scoring method may be used for matching. 
Diagnostic systems utilising case based reasoning include Penido, Nogeuira and 
Machado [81] and Lewis [66]. 
3.3.3 Vibrational 
A popular method of fault detection and diagnosis with physical structures is vibra- 
tional analysis. In some cases the structure is excited with a specific signal, often a 
'lamb' wave, which is distorted by a structural defect. The returned signal is anal- 
ysed and the presence of the defect deduced. For instance, Cattarius and Inman [20] 
use a reference signal combined with a vibrational analysis algorithm on a helicopter 
rotor blade to recognise individual defects. They find that different defects produce 
individual signAures, which is desirable for fault detection and diagnosis. 
Another approach is to identify vibration signatures while the structure is in 
use. When meclianical structures wear they often produce a different noise to when 
in good condit ion. For instance, a car wheel bearing is near silent when healthy, 
but if it is Nvorn then it will emit ýi grinding noise which gets worse as the bearings 
deteriorate. Yeii and Lin [110] use wavelet packet transforms for analysis rather 
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than the conventional Fourier transform. Chen, Sasaki, Nakayama and Toyota [24] 
use a sound sensor mounted on a robot arm together with genetic algorithms that 
control the position of the arm. In this way they steer the sound sensor towards the 
faulty part, in their evaluation system this is a particular beaxing. 
Whilst this is a useful technique for analysing physical structures, its usefulness 
in other areas is limited. 
3.3.4 Probabilistic Diagnostic Techniques 
Probabilistic techniques are very useful for dealing with incomplete knowledge, 
which with diagnostics often relates to incomplete observations of the fault. 
Bayes' rule provides a method for estimating the probability (degree of belief) of 
a state given the probabilities of three other related states, one of which is conditional 
and the other t-, N,, o unconditional (Russell & Norvig [90]). In short, Bayes' rule allows 
the computation of unknown probabilities from known, stable ones. 
When there are a number of states it is possible to compute the probability 
assignments to all states, this is known as the joint probability distribution. This 
completely specifies the degree of belief in all states in the domain given the set of 
observations. 
If there is more than one conditional probability, derived perhaps from different 
sensor readings, it is possible to exploit a simplified form of Bayes' rule that uses the 
concept of conditional independence. This greatly reduces the number of conditional 
probabilities that must be specified when working with multiple observations. 
3.3.5 Network Approach 
Yan, Nakamunt. Arai and Kuwahara [106] propose an approach based on the Simple 
Network Management Protocol. They concentrate on specifying a global communi- 
cations protocol for autonomous robotic diagnostics, showing how this could enable 
'remote diagnosis' of problems. They evaluate their ideas using a Rulebase combined 
with active testing. 
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3.4 Model-Based Diagnosis Systems 
Model based diýignosis systems are said to be second generation knowledge based 
systems, where a model constructed from detailed in-depth knowledge, preferably 
from first principles, of the system is used. This is known as 'deep' knowledge, said 
to be gained from observing the system from the inside. 
There are many types of models available for use in diagnosis. Generally, an 
explicit model of the device is created from knowledge of the system's structure 
and the physicýil (or other) laws that govern its behaviour. The movement models 
discussed above tend to be equational, with the level of detail determined by the 
amount of design effort applied to the modelling process. 
3.4.1 Operation 
By using models the behaviour of a system can be predicted and then compared 
to the actual, measured behaviour. Any discrepancies are likely to indicate a fault, 
which the diagnosis system can then try to replicate by changing model parameters. 
If the model cýiit match, or at least approximate, the faulty system's behaviour then 
the altered variables, which are likely to represent components or subsystems, are 
candidates for the fault. 
3.4.2 Model Generation and Selection 
Ideally, it would be possible to create an effectively perfect model of the vehicle, 
correct in every detail, so that any possible faults could be tracked down by operating 
on the model. This level of modelling is outside current capabilities, even if such a 
model could be constructed the amount of time needed to operate with such a large 
number of varnibles would be prohibitive. 
An alternat i ve approach to perfect model building is realistic model building. 
The most comiiion model available to AUV engineers is a vehicle- movement model, 
often generated at the prototype stage by using towed scale-model techniques. 
There are nwny types of models available for use in diagnosis. The movement 
models discussc(l above tend to be equational, with the level of detail determined by 
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the amount of design effort applied to the modelling process. Other types of model 
include functimial, abstract and black boxes; for a guide to the selection of suitable 
model based dic, ignosis techniques see Chantler et al [23]. 
Available on-vehicle computing platforms require limiting the depth of the model 
and managing the time available for diagnosis, as in the hierarchical approach of 
Aldea [2]. In thi.,, case the simplistic model would probably have a term that lumped 
together all the hydrodynomic effects of one side of the vehicle, thus reducing the 
number of variibles and the run time. The more detailed model would have indi- 
vidual terms for every component on that, which would mean more variables and a 
higher run-tinw. 
Caccio, Indiveri and Veruggio [191 have performed valuable work on the genera- 
tion of models using the vehicle's own sensor suite, which substantially reduces the 
cost of generating the models available for diagnosis. Chantler et al [23] provide 
a thorough exiiiiiination of the suitability of various types of models to differing 
applications. 
3.4.3 Multidimensionality 
A Model based diagnosis capabilitly may be extended by using multidimensional 
models, where a dimension is a point of view from which a fault is apparent. For 
instance, a vehicle that is diving when it should be surfacing will show a fault in 
the movement dimension. Alost robotic vehicles possess a variety of onboard sensors 
using which it is possible to monitor a number of dimensions apart from movement. 
For instance, temperature sensors can monitor the thermal dimension and electric- 
current sensors can monitor the power dimension. 
A model thA covers Just one aspect of a vehicle, such as case movement, is known 
as a mono dirrici is lonal model. By modelling additional dimensions, such as thermal 
and power, and using these multiple viewpoints it is possible to greatly enhance the 
diagnosis capýihlllty- 
For instance, ', is well as looking M vehicle movement, the power consumed may 
also be monitored with this additional information used to aid diagnosis. By extend- 
ing this inforimition through tinie, it is possible to access the temporal dimension, 
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enabling the diýignosis of dynamic faults using a system such as Shen [93]. r) 
It is possible not only to generate, but also to monitor and use a heterogeneous, 
multi-dimensional model of a vehicle for fault diagnosis. 
3.4.4 Using World Models 
Current generation AUVs have an emphasis on environmental sensors as the primary 
purpose of AUý, "s is to navigate, survey and intervene. As world models mature 
and processing speed increases these environmental sensors will become increasingly 
useful for fault diagnosis as environmental effects will become diagnosable. 
For instance, modelling environmental effects such as water currents flowing 
around seabed topology consumes a great deal of processing power and is currently 
of little use to i model based diagnostic system. If an AUV were caught up in such 
currents, the diagnosis system would be likely to diagnose a fault with the thrusters 
or attitude fins leading to unnecessary mission termination. But if the model based 
diagnosis system could use the world model for diagnosis then diagnostic capability 
would be incivýised, and the likelihood of premature mission termination greatly 
reduced. 
3.4.5 Indirect Sensing 
Using models it, is possible to predict values for measurements not directly sensed 
by any sensor. For instance, an AUV may not have a hull-breach sensor to detect 
when the vehicle is flooding, but by using a model of the vehicle's hydrodynamics 
the added weight may be detected and so, indirectly, the presence of water. 
3.4.6 Examples of Model-Based Diagnosis Systems 
The General Diagnostic Engine (GDE) by de Kleer & Williams [30] was one of 
the first model based diagnosis engines. It used models of the correct behaviour of 
components, which limits the amount of information available for diagnosis 
Shen and 1, (, ltch [93] concentrate on diagnosing dynamic systems using dynamic 
models coupled with a sIN, iichronous tracking mechanism. System behaviour is ob- 
served over time and compared to the modelled behaviour. This is a lengthy process 
33 
if used with rnultiple models and theY recognise the need for a refinement of search 
techniques. 
Mostermýin iind Biswas [75] use bond graphs to constrain dynamic models as 
much as possibb, and so limit the amount of computation involved. This diagno- 
sis system depends on analysing the transients generated by faults and so cannot 
analyse steady state, or static, faults. 
Perrault and Nahon [82] have adopted a similar approach using an algorithmic 
model of the vehicle's dynamics for control. This allows them to use a synthesis of 
actuated and non-actuated degrees of freedom to allow continued vehicle operation 
with faulty thrusters. 
Other appi-welies to Model Based Diagnosis may be found in Alessandri, Cac- 
cia and Veruý-, ), ý-, )io 
[3], Caccia, Indiveri and Veruggio [19], Giovanni Indiveri's Ph. D. 
Thesis [57], Vukic, Ozbolt and Pavlekovic [103], Boppana and Fujita [10], Misra et 
al [73], Huang wid Cheng [54], Huang [53], Larsson [63], Lavo, Chess, Larrabee and 
Hortanto [64], Zhang and Li [111], Perrault and Nahon [82], Portinale [83], Jackson 
[58], Rae and Dunn [88], KoIcio, Hanson and Fesq [61], Kurien and Clancy [62], Bos, 
Van Gemund iind Witteveen [11]. 
3.4.7 Hierarchical Model-Based Diagnosis 
Aldea [2] uses hi (, rarchics of models to provide 'anytime diagnosis', where the level of 
diagnosis performed is matched to system deadlines using a tree of models of varying 
degrees of det(ill. This is a powerful approach, well suited to deadline orientated 
real-time syst enis as found in most AUVs. This system currently concentrates on 
the diagnosis of static faults. 
3.4.8 Doinain-Independent Diagnosis 
Ng and Cho,, ý- [76] propose ým expert system designed to work closely with and advise 
a human tesi eiigineer working on ýi faulty circuit. They use a structural model of 
the circuit, ])ýisc(l on a semantic network. The diagnostic system proposes points 
on the circuit, t () be measured, the engineer measures them and states whether they 
match the norniil readings. The diagnostic system then uses domain- independent 
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trouble-shooting heuristics and the structural model to guide further measurements 0 
until the fault is isolated. 
Ng and Chow have developed a Rulebase containing 74 domain-independent 
trouble-shootiiig rules/ heuristics. They find that when evaluated on a hypothetical 
circuit the human working with the diagnostic system often performed better than 
a human working conventionally with the circuit diagram. When evaluated on a 
real circuit the conventionally working human was faster as humans bring other 
knowledge and s(, nses to diagnosing a real circuit, such as audible noise, smell, hot 
circuits etc. 
3.4.9 NASA Diagnostics 
Perhaps the most powerful vindication of the use of diagnostics is the amount of 
reseaxch that ",, ASA is conducting in this area. They have developed SHINE, the 
Spacecraft Health Inference Engine, (James and Dubon [59]) which is an advanced 
Rulebase and inference engine focussed on deployment on systems with limited time 
and computing resources, such as a space probe. There is also BEAM, Beacon-based 
Exception An, -alysis for Multi-missions, which is a highly mathematical approach ". -- 
grounded in a radical approach to complex systems analysis, combining advances in 
adaptZve wavelet theory, nonlinear information filtering, neuro-fuzzy system identz- 
ficatZon and stochastic modelling. " (James and Dubon [60]). SHINE and BEAM are 
also being ti. -, (,, d 1)y Unmanned Aerial Vehicle developers such as Lockheed Martin 
and JPL (Schaefer et al [91]). 
Onboard diaL, ýnostic systems are also thought to be crucial to manned space 
missions, such ýis the manned mission to Mars programme; "DurZng a [manned] 
Mars expedition, autonomoas plant operattons [life support, transport etc] would 
allow unma? med systems to prepare for human arrival, protect crew and resources 
by rapidly ? -(, ýpoading to critical failures, and free humans from routzne operations, 
allowMg greater (:. iplonttion. " (Kurien and Clancy [62]). 
Livingstone is a diagnostic system that implements Model Based Diagnosis by 
modelling codi component as a Finite State Machine, and the whole spacecraft as 
a set of concm-i-ent, synchronous stiAe machines. This allows Livingstone to track 
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concurrent stiae changes caused by component failure. Livingstone is currently 
deployed in the Remote Agent Experiment. 
3.4.10 NASA's Remote Agent Experiment 
Advanced diagiiostic methods, such as the Livingstone diagnostic module, have 
been evaluated on NASA's Remote Agent Experiment, as detailed by Bernard et al 
[8]. The Remote Agent Experiment is deployed on the Deep Space I probe. The 
spacecraft hii-, it goal orientated mission controller (rather than a list of actions) 
which incorporates a model-based fault diagnosis module. Under fault conditions 
the diagnosis module is responsible for presenting detailed fault information to the 
mission controll(, r. With the aid of this fault data the mission controller has an 
enhanced abilitY to plan around the fault. 
An interesting aspect of the Remote Agent approach is the focus on integra- 
tion of mission control and explicit diagnosis. The model-based diagnosis system 
is conventiond, static and mono dimensional, but when combined with the onboard 
planner the al)ility of the spacecraft to cope with unforeseen faults was increased 
(Bernard et (/1 [8]). The melding of mission controllers and explicit diagnosis is sure 
to have a significant effect on the autonomy of robotic vehicles. 
A case study on the Remote Agent Experiment found: " The approach [on Deep 
Space IlRetoofe Agentj... is to separate domain-specific monitoring specification 
from the [di'agliosticj architecture chosen. This ... leads to reductng the tZme and 
cost of design ond test through the reliable reuse of monitor software" (Freschi [39]) 
3.4.11 Finite State Machines 
Diagnosis may iilso be performed using finite state automaton models, which parti- 
tion the state-space into finite regions and model the system's trajectory as it passes 
through tlic. s(, i-egions. This effectively breaks the state space into localised sets of 
if-then rules. ivi)resented as Finite State Automata Tables, which are then operated 
upon by a fwilt-detection and isolation algorithm. 
Ramkuni; ii ct al [89] provide methods by which the localised tables may be 
produced witoiiiiiticýilly from the sYstem's dynamic equations, such as standaxd 
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differential equations. This work is then extended by Xi et al [105], in which they 
highlight noii-diagnosable circumstances. 
A similar iipproach is adopted by Belhassine-Cherif and Ghedamsi [7] for dis- 
tributed syst, (, ins where the system specification is in the form of communicating, 
non-determini-ýI-ic finite state machines. 
3.4.12 Thruster Control Matrix 
Some AUVs tise, matrices of thruster forces to detect, diagnose and accommodate 
faults with vc Ii icles that have redundant control of degrees of freedom, such as having 
more than oii(ý combination of thrusters to move forward. The matrices are used for 
calculating re(linred thruster forces for movement in a given direction, in the event 
of a thruster 1)(Ang diagnosed as faulty the matrix is reconfigured to use a different 
thruster solution to attain the desired motion in spite of the faulty thruster. 
Yang, Yuli, Suk and Choi [107] [108] have tested one of these systems on the 
ODIN (Omill Directional Intelligent Navigator) AUV. Fault detection is performed 
by using thruster speed feedback and a simple model of thruster performance, any 
discrepancy iii(licates i faulty thruster. A Rulebase identifies the faulty thruster. 
This approiwh to accommodation is restricted to vehicles with redundant control 
over their cl(,, () ý (vs of freedom. 
Bayesian Belief Networks 
A Bayesian Belief Network is used to represent the dependence between variables and 
to provide ýi pj,, (, lse specificýition of the joint probability distribution. The network is 
made up of nod,, s and links, where the nodes are variables and the links represent the 
influence of wie node on iinother. A Bayesian Belief Network is both a representation 
of the joint probability distribution and a set of conditional independence methods. 
It is possible to update observations and use inference algorithms to calculate the 
probability of' ii, given state, such as 'power surge', given a set of observations. 
Bayesian Delief Networks are a Powerful diagnostic technique, examples include 
Pryztula and Tliompson [87]. MoInar [74], Hunt, von Konsky, Venkatesh and Petros 
[55] and Vicira ; md Theys [102]. 
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Kalman Filters 
A Kalman filtci- allows prediction and estimation of large numbers of states to be 
made using simple matrix techniques, as long as certain assumptions are made. 
These are tlla. i -. 
9 Each stiAo variable is real-valued 
9 Each stitto variable is Gaussian distributed 
Each seii-, ý()r is subject to unbiased Gaussian noise 
Each action can be described as a vector of real values, one for each state 
variable 
* The ne-w ýýtate is a linear function of the previous state and the action 
Alessandri. Caccia ýnid Veruggio [3] use a dynamic model of an underwater vehi- 
cle combined with a bank of Extended Kalman Filter Estimators for fault isolation. 
The emphasis is on accurate fault detection and diagnosis of thruster failure. Also 
see Magrabi aii(l Gibbeiis [67]. 
Markov Models 
A Markov model is a ýý-ay of describing a process that moves through a series of 
states, with the model describing all possible paths through the state space with a 
probability valtie for e, -ach. The Markov property is that the probability of moving 
from the curivnt state to another depends only on the current state, not any prior 
part of the traiisition path. 
Washingtoii [104] combines a Kalman filter with a Markov model for diagnosis, 
described more full. ), in the Hybrids section later in this chapter. 
3.4.13 Fa'lure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Price and Tayloi- [85] propose the use of models generated at design time using the 
Failure Mo(les ýind Effects Anal, vsis (FMEA) design discipline. The FMEA models 
are used to geiiemte sets of possible faults at design time (offline generation). This 
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combines some of the strengths of model based diagnosis with reduced online run 
time, but sacrifices the ability to diagnose unforeseen faults. 
3.4.14 Unified Geometric Approach 
Dunia and Qiii [36] use a geometric approach. A model is created of the normal 
operation of the system, under fault conditions a vector is defined from faulty to 
normal operatl()n. This system is limited to single dimensional, steady state faults. 
Dunia and Qiit then extend their geometric approach to multidimensional faults 
[35]. 
3.4.15 Neural Network 
Neural networks are a popular diagnosis technique which are increasingly being 
combined with other approaches to form hybrid systems. A neural network consists 
of individual no(-tes called neurons, or units. Units are joined together by links, which 
typically have it weight associated with them. Weights are the primary means of 
long-term storýi. (_,, 'e, with learning effected by adjusting the weight values. Each unit 
has a set of input links from other units, a set of output links, an activation level and 
a method of computing the activation level at the next time period given the current 
inputs and weights. The network effectively acts as a parallel computer, with each 
unit performing locýil cýilculations based on local inputs without any global control 
over the system. Aluch research has been performed on neural networks and there 
are many variations. 
Neural iietworks are very good for classifying patterns (pattern recognition) and 
have the ability to le; irii from data sets, either with supervised or unsupervised 
learning. When correctly trained they are capable of a level of generalisation, for 
instance being able to recognise individual handwriting after being trained on a 
variety of handwriting styles. 
Unfortuii, -, itely, their parallel nature does not lend itself to the current generation 
of computers, which (ire serial based. Typically, a serial computer may take several 
hundred iteriti()ns to calctilate the stýifc of a simple network, whereas a parallel 
implemented netind iichvork Nvill onlY take one iteration. Neural networks are also 
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difficult to analyse mitthernatically and so are often referred to as 'black boxes'. 
If a neural network is used for diagnosis a common problem is that a diagnosis is 
provided, but it is verY difficult to discover the reason for the diagnosis. 
Takal and Vra [97] concentrate on actuator failure. A neural network is used 
as a dynamic model of the vehicle's movement. Diagnosis is achieved with pre-set 
'diagnosis motion sequences' during which the vehicle performs a standard series of 
manoeuvres. A look-up table is then used to relate defective movement to defective 
components. This system has the ability to use the neural dynamic model for dead- 
reckoning control of the vehicle if a sensor fault is diagnosed. 
Other neural network approaches to diagnosis include Spina and Upadhyaya [94] 7 
da Silva, Insfran, da Silveira and Lambert-Torres [271, Vemuri, Polycarpou, Sotiris 
and Diakourtis [101], Trunov and Polycarpou [99], Tarrassenko, Nairac, Townsend, 
Buxton and Cowley [98] and Butler and Momoh [18]. 
3.5 Hybrid Diagnostic Systems 
Some researchers have used a hybrid of different diagnostic systems in order to 
increase overall diagnostic ability. Some examples follow. 
3.5.1 Hybrid Rulebase/Model/Neural Network 
Focussing on thruster failure, Deuker, Perrier and Amy [33] use a hybrid Rule- 
base/mo del/ neural network system. Fault detection is achieved with a movement 
model to detect discrepiiiicies between modelled and sensed movement. A set of 
foreseen faults is generýited before the mission using the Rulebase, which is then 
compiled into a, neural network. This limits the system to the diagnosis of foreseen 
faults only but with an increased level of generalisation due to the neural network. 
3.5.2 Hybrid Bayesian Belief Network and Neuro-Symbolic 
Hornfeld and Frenzel [51] propose using a Bayesian Belief Network in conjuction 
with incrementA neuro-symbolic methods, calling their system INDOS. They hope 
that "... the u%, ýpcctive odcuWages of symbolic and connechonist processing can be 
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combined while the limitations of each are reduced in their effects" (Hornfeld & 
Frezel [51]). Fault detection is achieved with conventional methods such as model 
based discrepancy detection. 
3.5.3 Neurofuzzy 
Patton, Chen and Lopez-Toribio [80] propose the use of a neurofuzzy model-based 
'observer' for detecting incipient (small and slowly developing) faults in non-linear 
systems. They find that the use of fuzzy logic by itself is not an efficient way to 
detect incipient faults. Neural networks are much better, but their robustness and 
sensitivity is difficult to analyse mathematically. 
They evaluate their fuzzy observers by applying them to the detection and iso- 
lation of intermittent faults in a railway traction system's induction motor. They 
conclude that "... the fuzzy observer is an effechve tool to generate resZdual signals 
for non-linear dynamic system fault diagnosis. " Patton et al [80] 
Other neurofuzzy approaches include Yen [109] and Patton [79]. 
3.5.4 Neurofuzzy Models with Bayesian Estimators 
Bossley, Brown and Harris [121 propose a system using neurofuzzy models in con- 
junction with Bi. yesWii estimators. The neurofuzzy models have the advantage 
of combining expert knowledge with empirical data, with the neural weight being 
translatable into fuzzy rule confidences without loss of the encoded data. For system 
identification this meýiiis that qualitative expert knowledge and quantitative empir- 
ical data can be used in the same system identification cycle. Bayesian estimators 
are used to train the neurofuzzy models to overcome inadequacies in the data and 
model construction algorithms. 
This systein showed good results when tested on a high-quality data set gathered 
from Florida Athintic University's Ocean Explorer AUV. 
3.5.5 Kalman Filter with Markov Model 
Washington, of NASA AMFS Research Center [104] has developed a system using 
a combination of Kaliniiii filters and Markov models. 
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A Kalman filter is an excellent tool for estimating the state of a process given 
observations (for a detailed description see Section 3.4.12), but it can only work 
in a continuous space. If more than one state is required then another approach is 
needed. Markov models ýire excellent at estimating which state the system is in from 
partial observations, as they inherently provide a probabilistic distribution over the 
set of states. 
In this system the discrete states correspond to qualitatively different modes of 
rover operation, such as 'driving normally', 'stuck wheel', etc. To each of these 
discrete states is attached a model of operation represented by a Kalman filter. 
The system has been tested on data gathered from a Marsokhod planetary rover, 
giving a promising performance. 
3.6 Comparison of Model-Fýree and Model-Based 
Diagnosis Methods 
Two of the most popular diagnostic paradigms are model-based and model-free. 
This section compares and contrasts representatives of both approaches, respectively 
using a conventional Alodel-Based Diagnostic system and a classic Rulebase. 
3.6.1 Rulebase Advantages 
Rulebases are extremely easy to develop as they essentially consist of a simple pat- 
tern matcher, making the amount of code that must be written relatively small. 
The rules are eýisy to encode as they are logical statements, well supported by pro- 
gramming languages. The operating methods are also simple as a classic Rulebase b 
simply scýiiis eacli rule in turn, highlighting rules that have matched the observed 
situation. 
The simplicity of Rulebases mininiises the overhead required of the host com- 
puter, and so minimal processor cycles are needed to scan each rule. This means 
that Rule])ased diagnostics is usuiilly fi-ir faster than other methods, assuming that 
the RuleWse is not overly large, and that a matching rule is contained. 
As rules are simple st(iteinents they are easy to modify, and as they are ý7) 
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generally stored in a list (the Knowledge Base) it is easy to add or remove rules as 
necessary. 
3.6.2 Rulebase Disadvantages 
Perhaps the biggest single disadvantage of Rulebases is that they can only diag- 
nose foreseen faults - faults that have been specifically foreseen and encoded by the 
developer. To predict all (or even most) possible faults in a system is a near impos- 
sible task, particularly if Ihat system must operate in an unstructured, real-world 
environment. 
Each rule is specifically focussed on a particular fault and situation. For a rule 
to 'match' the observed situation each parameter must match those specified by the 
developer. If the same fault was to occur in a different situation, or if parameters 
differ for some other reason, then the rule will not match even though the foreseen 
fault is occurring. Rulebases do not inherently have a high level of generality. 
Methods do exist to increase the generality of Rulebases, such as Case Based Rea- 
soning (CBR) and the popular Fuzzy Logic approach. Although these do somewhat 
increase the generality aý, iiilable tlicy reduce several of the advantages, particularly 
the low oNvrheýid and speed of operation. 
Rulebases operate on information ýibout a system that is deemed 'shallow knowl- 
edge', as the rules simply state what the operation of the system will be under 
defined, discrete sets of conditions. There is no knowledge about why something 
happens, but only a relationship betweeii symptoms and failures. For this reason a 
rule based diagnosis systein cannot provide a coherent explanation of the failure, it 
can only ,,, how -ýNIat rules were fired. 
Rulebiises also have problems with multiple faults, because "... multiple faults are 
not easy to isolate ... because when two 
faults appear, it is not always the case that 
the union of the symptoms of the two individual faults is equal to the symptoms of 
the device. " (Muisen [47]) 
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3.6.3 Model-Based Advantages 
Model-Based diagnostics hm, e the useful ability to diagnose faults that were not 
foreseen by the developer. This is a key advantage for systems that must operate in 
unstructured, real-world environments. 
A specific fault may also be repeatedly diagnosed even though the observed 
parameters may differ each time. Because of this Model-Based diagnostic systems 
inherently have a high level of generality. 
Model-Based diagnostic systems are also able to diagnose multiple faults in some 
cases, as they can perturb more than one system variable during their diagnostic 
operation. 
Indircct sensing is also possible, where the system model is used to predict pa- 
rameters that are not directly measured. This reduces the need for hardware sensors, 
so reduciiig weight and cost. 
The system model may be used to generate virtual sensor readings, useful for 
fault detection, but also useful for system control in the event of sensor failure. 
Systems exist that switch over from faulty sensors to the 'virtual sensor' provided 
by the system model. 
The system model miiy also be used for control, particularly constrained control. 
For instance, a robotic vehicle's mission controller may have to dive at a particu- 
lar rate whilst keeping within certain attitude constraints. The conventional PID 
method would mean that, the vehicle would start to dive, and limit its rate of dive 
when the attitude constraint is close to violation. This may mean that the goal 
could not be accomplished in time. The use of the system model for control means 
that the mission controller could predict the maximum allowable rate of descent and 
therefore determine whether a goal was achievable befove starting the goal. 
This ýibility is even more useful in cases where the robot's operation has been 
degraded by a fault. Assuming that, the system model has been degraded to match 
the new sYstein operation then the robot's mission controller can use the model to 
determine if the mission is still achievable, or what level of mission degradation is 
necessarv. 
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3.6.4 Model-Based Disadvantages 
Model-Based diagnostic systems are far harder to develop than Rulebases, although 
this is mainly due to the difficulty of generating and validating models rather than 
the development of the diagnostic code. The evaluation code itself consists of a 
'perturb and compare' engine that alters modelled system variables to try to match 
the observed parameters, as discussed in Section 3.4. This code is, in itself, not 
particularly complicated. 
System models, however, can be extremely hard to generate, particularly at high 
levels of detail and/or accuracy. They can also be difficult to modify, as this can 
involve as much testing and development time as generating the model in the first 
place. 
The overhead required from the host computer is also far higher than with a 
Rulebased system. This is mainly due to the large numbers of system model variables 
that may need to be perturbed during diagnosis. Where more than one variable is 
perturbed at a time (multiple faults) the number of combinations, and so the number 
of perturbations, increases dramatically. Each perturbation takes a certain number 
of processor cycles (and time) to run and at high levels of detail and/or accuracy 
the process can take an appreciable time to complete. 
3.6.5 Summary 
Both Model-Free and Model-Based sYstems have strong advantages and disadvan- 
tages which tend to complement, each other. The ease of development, low runtime 
and required foresight of a Rulebase is complemented by the developmental diffi- 
culty, high overheads but powerful diagnostic capabilities of Model-Based diagnostic 
systems. 
Havlicsek [50] recognises this and proposes a system called the Westinghouse 
Diagnsotic Systen-i (NVEDS). This uses both approaches, combining a rulebase with 
a Model-Based Diagnosis engine. The rulebase retains human expert diagnostic 
knowledge, whilst the Mod(, I-Býised Diagnostic engine extracts diagnostic informa- 
tion directly froin design knoNvIedge. He finds that "CombMing these approaches 
overcomc.,; limitations of thc individual techniques and provides a more powerful di- 
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agnostic system. " 
3.7 Integrated Diagnostics 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Integrated Diagnostics has been around since the early 1980's. It is a process by 
which large organisations hope to reduce the total life cycle costs of their systems. 
These organisations have found that a great deal of the total cost of system is 
attributed to maintenance. In an effort to reduce maintenance cost it was realised 
that it was vital to design diagnostics into the system from conception, it was felt 
that this would increase testability, reduce maintenance effort and also increase 
diagnostic accuracy. 
A formal definition of Integrated Diagnostics is given by Dean [31]: 
"Integrated Diagnostics is not a technology or a product in itself. Instead, it zs 
a systematic process whi'ch integrates and applies technologies and products during 
system development to achieve a desired result: the most effective diagnostic solution 
for a given cost. " 
Integrated Diagnostics has a logistical focus - its prime aim is to reduce the 
logistics needed to support weapons systems by reducing test time and improving 
diagnostic accuracy to prevent the replacement of not-faulty components. 
It was originally envisaged by the US DoD. The US Armed Forces (and their 
contractors) have been the prime driver,,,, ever since. Due to the sensitive nature of 
military and commercial technology the information available is limited, but a rep- 
resentative selection of papers showing how some of these organisations intended to 
introduce Integrated Diagnostics are: NlcDonnell Aircraft Company (Ofsthun [78], 
Bartz k- Sallade [4]), SikorskY Aircraft (Marcus, Mahanna & Gruessner [68]), Unisys 
Shipboard & Ground Systems Group (Price [86]), Martin Marietta Automation Sys- 
tems (Br, -, izet [15]), Giordano Associates (Nolan [77]), US Army Aviation Systems 
Command (Briissel &-- Burkhart [13]), US Naval Air Warfare Section (Lebron & Rossi 
[65]), Diissault Aviation (Courtols, k- Pouilly [26]), General Electric (Brazet [141), 
US Air Force (Dean [311), Bendix Guidance& Control Systems (McCown [71]), 
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Lockheed (Gaffney & Morones [41]). 
All of the above papers stay at the conceptual level due to the sensitivity of the 
technology. 
3.7.2 The US Navy's Integrated Diagnostics Support Sys- 
tem (IDSS) 
The US Navy was already moving towards the concept of integration with its AEGIS 
weapons system's Operational Readiness & Test System (AEGIS ORTS) - this has 
since come to be seen as a precursor to an Integrated Diagnostic System (Brazet 
[15]. Since then the US Navy has embraced Integrated Diagnostics, developing 
its own Integrated Diagnostics Support System, or IDSS, an approach based upon 
using a common set of tools for weapon systems design (Cigler [25] and Bearse 
& Carrier [5]). These tools are centred around dependency models. It has been 
a successful approach that has since been transferred to other domains, such as 
Iridiurn Telecommunication Satellites (Bearse, Dill & Lynch [6]), and automated 
test equipment (Franco [38]). 
3.7.3 QSI's TEAMS Toolset 
A similar approach to the US Navy's IDSS has been taken by Qualtech Systems 
Inc, who produce a commercial set of software tools for Integrated Diagnostics sys- 
tem monitoring and maintenance, an overview of which is given in Deb, Pattipati 
& Shrestha [32]. The toolset, which is model based, is known as TEAMS, and 
features both liuman- assistance and real-time diagnostic capability. The TEAMS 
modelling methodology, which they term multi-signal modelling, models the system 
in its failure space. All potential faults are identified and their symptoms identified, 
the cause-effect dependencies between faults, symptoms and test events are then 
modelled (Mathur, Deb &, Pattipati [69]. Proprietary algorithms are then used to 
work from observed symptoms back to the fault. These algorithms may be used 
to help a hunian repair technician, a real-time version is also available for use on 
embedded sys t ems. 
-ick of the TEANIS approach is that all faults must be anticipated - The drawl)( 
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the system cannot diagnose faults that are not in its knowledge base. However, it 
has been taken up by Sikorsky (Mathur et al [70]) and the US Naval Air Warfare 
Centre (Ghoshal et al [43]), and is currently being expanded into a 'virtual test 
bench for life cycle support', which focusses on the design modelling and analysis 
stage (Cavanaugh [22]). The success of TEAMS shows that there is a definite need 
for Integrated Diagnostic tools in the real world. 
3.7.4 US Navy Helicopter Integrated Diagnostic System (HIDS) 
The Helicopter Integrated Diagnostic System (HIDS) is a state of the art US Navy 
program which focusses on fault detection, diagnosis and prognosis of helicopter 
drive-train systems. The HIDS program aims to evaluate different diagnostic sys- 
tems, integrate them into a flight worthy system and act as a showcase IntegTated 
Diagnostics system in anticipation of a fleet-wide implementation (Hardman, Hess 
& Scheaffer [48]). The focus on mechanical drive-train faults means that HIDS is 
currently centred on vibrational analysis techniques. 
The HIDS team have located a number of vibrational sensors (accelerometers) 
at suitable pIc, I. ces on the test helicopter drive-train, with each sensor's position 
being optimised for detecting the vibrational signature of a particular mechanical 
component. All sensor data is analysed and recorded for post-mission processing. 
The method used for fault detection is Hotelling's T2 Multivariate Statistical 
Analysis, which combincs various paranieters into a single indicator of system health. 
This method has a well proven ability to reduce false alarms (Mimnagh, Hardman 
& Scheaffer [ 1-21). 
The HIDS team has also evaluated the performance of various diagnostic sys- 
tems such as classical Model-Based Diagnostics, Neural Networks, Fuzzy-Logic and 
other helicopter-specific techniques such as oil-filter debris monitoring systems . No 
information is yet available on the results of these evaluations. The next step is 
to develop and validate ýidvanced model-based analysis, data fusion and other tech- 
niques. They iii-e also phinning to add a 'Reasoner'to various levels of the diagnostic 
process (Hardman, Hes-, ý k, Scheaffer [49]). 
The HIDS program shows that Integrated Diagnostics is highly relevant to both 
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logistical operations and in-flight (or embedded) diagnostics. It is unfortunate that 
little information is available on the underlYing HIDS integration technology. 
3.7.5 Misnomers 
Some systems that claim to be Integrated Diagnostics are actually hybrid systems, 
where different diagnostic systems have been 'integrated' together (such as Cavallini 
et al [21]), or integrated into an area where previously there were none (Motorola 
have now integrated diagnostics into their embedded memory devices (Hunter [56])), 0 
but this is not a proper use of the term. 
3.8 Diagnostic Fusion 
3.8.1 Introduction 
A relatively new diagnostic field is Diagnostic Fusion, which aims to overcome the 
limitations of using a single diagnostic tool by fusing together different types. In 
this way the weaknesses of a Rulebase may be augmented by the strengths of, say, 
a neural network to provide a powerful diagnostic system. 
Fused diagnostic systems have been around for some time in the form of Hybrids 
(see Section 3.5), but there is now a push to develop underlying methods to allow 
the fusing of many types of diagnostic system, rather than simply generating an 
individual application-specific hybrid system. 
Diagnostic Information Fusion is defined as "... the method by which one would 
determine a system's 6tate for those instances where several different diagnostic 
tools, and possible other so urces, are used for state eshmahon. " Garbiras & Goebel 
[42] 
Goebel, 1,,. -i-ok & Sutherland [441 highlight some of the key problems with Diag- 
nostic Fusion: 
0 "... whca informat/mi, is expressed in different design domazns, such as proba- 
bilistic informat'llon, ... bznary information or weights, the fusZon scheme needs 
to map the different domains into a common one to be able to properly use the 
encoded data. 71 
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"The fu, ýion scheme also has to deal with [diagnostic] tools that operate at 
different sampling frequencies. 
"... if [(bagnostic] tools disagree, one has to decide which tool to believe and to 
what degree. " 
They also state a ke, v benefit: "No one /diagnostic] tool is required to deal with 
allfaults at a la. gh level of accuracy because no one method can do so. " Goebel [44]. 
Garbiras ind Goebel [42] have shown that Integrated Diagnostics can improve 
the diagnostic performance over that, of individual diagnostic tools - 
To date there have been only a few attempts at presenting a unified framework for 
Integrated Di, -, ignostics, ino., -; t of which concentrate on military weapons programmes. 
They are not focussed on the needs of autonomous robots. 
3.8.2 General Electric's IMATE System 
Goebel, Krok k, Sutherland of the General Electric Corporation have recently pre- 
sented a system called INIATE (Intelligent Maintenance Advisor for Turbine En- 
gines) that ainis to provide a framework for diagnostic fusion. It concentrates on 
providing a rcýtl-time solution aimed at fusing the diagnostic outputs of different 
types of diagnostic systems, concentrýiting on the requirements flowdown and inter- 
face issues. They do not consider an offline, post-processing version (Goebel [44]). 
In order to fuse differing diagnostic tools they place a constraint on the tool 
providers, ensuring that eitch tool provides a confidence level for each individual 
fault rather tLin a crisp 0/1 value. They do not detail their method of integrating 
diagnostic tools that operýAte at different sampling frequencies. 
They evaluate their systein on an aircraft gas turbine engine using three discrete 
diagnostic tools fused together with an algorithmic 'Intelligent Fusion Module', the 
details of which are not revcýded, presumably for commercial reasons. They also use 
secondary &ignostic information, which may be used to support but not discount 
a diagnostic finding. This information consisted of outputs from various engine 
deterioration inodels, vibration amilysis, thermal history and other fault related 
information - 1`f f*(, ctively. t his provides a degree of heterogeneous 
knowledge integra- 
tion. 
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At the time of writing the system had only been tested in simulation, which 
gave promising results. In particular, they "... achieved a more accurate dz*agnostz'c 
estimate of system health than the individual esti'mates provided by a heterogeneous 
collection of diagnostic tools, " (Goebel [44]). 
3.8.3 Neural Fusion 
An alternative, more hinited approach is proposed by Garbiras & Goebel [42], in 
which a neural network is used to fuse the outputs of different diagnostic tools. They 
focus on providing a sYsteni to recognise faults without a Pn'on knowledge of the 
system. 
To evaluate their proposal they use a two tier strategy. The lower tier consists of 
four diagnostic tools: a C. , tsc Based Reasoning (Nearest Neighbour) tool, two neural 
networks looking at difl,, iviit data aspects and a fuzzy inference engine. The upper 
tier is a neural network, four types of which are evaluated. 
They find that "The usc of jusion neural networks promdes a means to improve 
performance of indwidaal di'agnostic tools. " (Goebel [42]) 
3.8.4 The U. S. Army's Prognostic Fýramework 
The U. S. Army is developing a 'Prognostic Framework' (Su & Nolan [96], [95]) aimed 
at integrating logistical ii-iffiistructure with embedded diagnostics, so providing total 
health management for its weapons systems. The foundations of this framework are 
hierarchical modelling and the separation of test and diagnostic functions. 
The core of the prognostic framework is a 'design based model', called the Fault 
Propagation Model, consisting of relationships between faults and symptoms. This 
model is essentially a t\\ý() dimensional matrix that maps information from raw sen- 
sor data, embedded duignostic tools, pilot debriefing, etc to known faults. A set 
of 'intelligent' algorithins, collectively known as the Diagnostician, then operate on 
this matrix to isolate Euilts from given symptoms. The model maps sensor data to 
physical components rýit, licr thýin the more conventional sensor to system mapping. 
Using this model they itiv ýible to extend built-in test information to diagnosis. The 
hierarchical inodel cým be dyn,, linicallY reconfigured to reflect changes in reconfig- 
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urable systems. 
This model is currently being augmented with secondary information, such as 
historical data, trend iiialysis, failure modes etc. Although the present Diagnosti- 
cian is essentially static in operation (it can only work with 'snapshots' of the system) 
it is being upgraded to (Iyiuiniic operation by the inclusion of a 'wear/degradation' 
dimension in the Fault Propagation Model. 
They highlight the usefulness of such a system for autonomous vehicles; "An 
autonomous real-time health monitoring system which provides automatic fault de- 
tectZon, isolation, recmifi. girrab"on and reporting increases the chance for these [au- 
tonomousj missions to be successful" (Su et al [96]). 
The system is still under development and so results are not available at the time 
of writing. 
3.9 Blurring the Line: The Open Systems Ap- 
proach to Integrated Diagnostics Demonstra- 
tion (OSAIDD) Study 
3.9.1 Introduction 
Recently the line betw(vii. Integrated Diagnostics and Diagnostic Information Fusion 
has become blurred. If, is becoming cleýii- that Integrated Diagnostics needs to be 
more than a process. To realise its full potential it must become a technology. 
Diagnostic Information Fusion, the methods that must be developed to integrate 
heterogeneous diagnostic sYsteins, is one of the key technologies necessary. 
Because of this the United States Department of Defense recently conducted a 
study on the approaches token towards integrated diagnostics (see the study report 
[40]). Their ainis were I () reduce total ownership cost, shorten acquisition cycle time 
for technology insertion and increase the interoperability of their in-field systems. 
-it liti-ge organisations, such as the military, with the focus on The studY Nvýis ýiiiiwd ( 
integrating eiiihodded &i, (ý, )iiostics within the organisation's 
information structure 
and logistical fniiii(mvi'k. '1'(, n (-ýise studies of existing Integrated Diagnostic frame- 
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works were performed, covernig the three main areas of interest; defense, non-defense 
government and commercial. 
One of the key fin(-Iings from the OSAIDD study was that: "... a consZstent 
approach to integrating diagnostic functions did not exist, was feasible and should 
be advanced as a core tactic in achieving the DoD's [United States DepaTtment of 
Defensej stratepc goals. " (Freschi [39]) 
The study recommeiided the use of: "... an information- based, open systems ap- 
proach to defining and inteyrating diagnoshc functions within the components of a 
genenc architecture of hu&vare and software elements" (Freschi [39]). Their pro- 
posed architecture is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Information 
BIT Data 
Diagnostic Data 
Maintenance Data 
Test Requirements 
Product Data 
Metrics 
Network Layer (i. e. CORBA) 
Diagnostic Components (Tools) 
Technical Documents 
Test & Diagnostics 
Operator 
Program Management 
Info Management 
Engineering 
Figure 3.1: The Proposed Architecture from the Open Systems Approach to Inte- 
grated Diagnostics Demon. stnition 
The study states thifl: "The bas1c premise of the recommended techntcal ap- 
proach is the cw1cept of u forinal model of diagnostic information, which is shared 
by all participants in the , ýysfcm test and diagnosi's process. The mechanZsrn for thzs 
approach Zs an Jiiformolion loodel, which is a rigourous, formal specificatzon of the 
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informatton used with, /// the system test and diagnostic domain. Optzmzszng this pro- 
cess comes from sharing this information throughout the dzagnostic process. " (Reschi 
[391) 
The OSAIDD study is the most thorough and far reaching analysis of Integrated 
Diagnosis performed so fi-ir. 
3.9.2 Critique of OSAIDD Proposal 
The OSAIDD study focus, ý(, d on the integration of embedded diagnostics within the 
organisation's logistics system. This is presumably due to the study being spon- 
sored by the United StA(, s Department of Defense, who are interested in reducing 
maintenance costs for their huge array of weapons systems. There is little attention 
paid to the needs of fully witonomous vehicles apart from a recognition that they 
could also benefit from Integrated Diagnostics, with the on/off-product diagnostic 
partition moved towards ()ii-product. 
The requirements of ýiii autonomous vehicle operating far from human help are 
very different to that (A' it, \\-(, apons system or civilian airliner operating within a 
human- orientated logistical infrastructure. Within a logistic-orientated environ- 
ment most of the diagnostic framework may be run off-vehicle and offline but an 
autonomous vehicle re(Itures (, ý-crything to be run on-vehicle and online. 
Architecture: 
The proposed architecttir(, is highly conceptual, without a detailed specification for 
any of the architecturol con-iponents. There are no real-time aspects, essential for 
on-vehicle operation, or any consideration of reducing processor operations in order 
to conserve power. These iire fundamental requirements for an on-vehicle integrated 
diagnostic system. 
There is no provision for selection of diagnostic tool, which can depend heavily 
on the situation, as cletiuled in Goebel, Krok and Sutherland [44]. There is also 
no way to influence the selection of information for analysis, which is vital for a 
time-mistrained sYstcm. 
5-4 
Knowledge: 
The OSAIDD proposal defines key types of information for Integrated Diagnostics, 
cited iii Section 3.9, but ýt detailed analysis of the information is not provided. 
Some crucial types of infol-mation are missing. For a thorough analysis of available 
information see Chapter -1. 
Information Model: 
The m(, chanism for the r(, (, ()iiimended Information Model, as shown in Figure 3.2 is 
very va,, -, )ue. 
Product Domain 
Diagnostic Domain 
Test Domain 
Figure 3.2: The Prop, ). -ý(,, I Information Model from the Open Systems Approach to 
Integrated Diagnostics 1)(, monstration 
The study states t1w it(, (, (l to integrate information from three domains: product, 
test and diagnostic, but goes no further. There is no breakdown of the information 
in these domains, or w1wilier the information will be partitioned by physical com- 
ponent, function or systcm. 
Interface: 
The int (, i-face between diý ig, i iostic tools is based on the internationally and commonly 
used Open Systems Ini (, i connection 7 hiYer network model, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
Thi-, proposed interft-acc coiweiitrmes on the passing of information via different 
physic, il iind software fcclinoloo-les and, as such, is a good choice for Integrated 0 
Dlagno, -ýi 
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Application Layer 
Presentation Layer 
Session Layer 
Transport Layer 
Network Layer 
Link Layer 
Physical Layer Physical Layer 
Figuie 3.3: The Proposed Information Interface from the Open Systems Approach 
to Integrated Diagnostics Study 
There is no detail on liow to actually interface the different types of information 
producol by different dhi, ý,,, iioslic paradigms. For instance, a conventional Model 
Based Diagnosis systelit siniply nominates components with no probability attached, 
whereas probabilistic metliods provide a nomination and probability. 
Summary: 
The OSAIDD propo&iI LID' C(MCOptually thorough for logistical-based integration of 
diagnosi ics but misses oul, ci-ucial aspects for autonomous robotic vehicle implemen- 
tation. No details of ýmy p, af of the architecture are provided apart from critical 
classes ()[Information, which ýuv again vague. 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
This cli, ipter first revi(ýwcd Hie two iiwin types of individual diagnostic systems, 
model-I,, i,,, ed and mo(I(I-fruc, discussing and giving examples where appropriate. ýD 
Some representative exýimples of liybrld diagnostic systems were then given. 
The '(wus then mo\-(, (t to Integrated Diagnostics, a field largely supported by the 
US milttýiry about which ihere is little technical information due to the sensitive 
nature of the technol(),, -,,, N-. 
The rehite(l area of Diagnostic Information Fusion was 
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Diagnostic 
Information Session Layer 
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Network Layer 
Link Layer 
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then &-, -tissed and itýý rel(, vance to this research shown. The OSAIDD study was 
shown to recognise t1l; c Integnited Diagnostics must move from being a process to 
a technology. This is p; t) tici-ilarly crucial for autonomous robotic vehicles. 
The (bapter showed I liit there are many types of individual diagnostic systems 
but few ýittempts to provide an underlying architecture for integrating them to- 
gether. The strengths ýiiid weaknesses of the existing attempts, particularly the 
OSAIDD study, were detailed. The OSAIDD study was shown to be a thorough 
analysi, s of requiremeiiýs but NvLis focussed on logistical, not vehicular, integration. 
The proposed concept \%, ýis -ýIiown to be vague. 
The next chapter iiii, n)& the original architecture designed, implemented and 
evaluat(, (l during the c()urse of this ivseýirch. It is shown to be a more advanced, 
detailed ; ind working ýa, cliitecture tliat is conceptually similar to the OSAIDD pro- 
posal. 
5-1 
Chapter 4 
RECOVERY Concept 
4.1 Aim of this Chapter 
nom this point on the tlwsis details original contributions from this research. 
This chapter describes original contributions from the RECOVERY system and 
explains the underlying, - coiicepts. Differences from the OSAIDD study, a major 
study on Integrated Diapostics. are highlighted and justified. 
4.2 Introduction to RECOVERY 
The RECOVERY arcliltectLire and sYstein developed during the course of this re- 
search is niore detaile(l, ýi(lvýiiiced ýiiid wider ranging than the OSAIDD study de- 
tailed in Chapter 3. P, 1, ý, ýi Nvorking system, fully focussed and implemented on a 
real autonomous vehicle. 11, works on real-world missions with real data. Many of 
the OSAIDD recommendations (published mid-way through the research period) 
are expanded to a mucli more detailed level, particularly the highly critical Central 
Information Model. 
RECOVERY is (IcAgilc(I to work as a standalone module in conjunction with 
an enveloping mission controller, ýis shown in Figure 4.1. This concept has been 
successfully evaluated )ii NASA's Deep Space I probe. The mission controller is 
preferablY a goal-orientatcd planner but could also be a common Finite State Ma- 
chine controller or other type of mission controller. 
RECOVERY monitors the vehicle's sensor suite, using heterogeneous (different 
types ol') knowledge in conj iinction Nvith heterogeneous diagnostic tools to detect and 
diagnose faults. Once the fault is diagnosed the relevant fault information is passed 
to the N-chicle's missimi coni i-oller for enhanced fault recovery/ accommodation. 
RECOVERY is to be able to use commonly available design information 
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Figure 4.1: RECOVI, '. IIY concept showing (a) conventional mission controller using 
only sensor data and (b) a inission controller enhanced with diagnostic information 
such as hYdrodynamic models, circult diagrams, schematic diagrams and expert 
human knowledge. Usod t (), ý-ý-ether this information can greatly enhance diagnostic 
capability. 
4.3 Original Aspects of RECOVERY 
There ai-(, seven major ori,, -,, iual contributions 
from this research, together with sup- 
porting work. These c(aitributions ar(, -. 
*A novel, inforniiii imi 1), ised architecture for Integrated Diagnostics, capable of 
clmojiostic knowledge and tools (7) 
*A detailed, working Dyiiimic Relational Construction Model (Relational Model 
for short), Whicli fullilk ýuid expands the concept of a Central Information 
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Model as reconiiiiended by the OSAIDD study 
Methods for storing. , (,; irchmg and operating on the Relational Model ?D 
A inethod for n-ducing the search space of a multidimensional, dynamic Inte- 
gr,, ited Diagnostic syst(, m using a Focus of Suspicion approach 
A novel approach to Doniain Independent Diagnostics using the Relational 
Model. The of Domain Independent Diagnostics alongside conventional 
diagnostic pani, digiii-, is evaluated. Advantages and disadvantages of Domain- 
Independent Di; io, -ý tics are shown 
e Tho implementitl ion; iiid evaluation of the above on a real autonomous vehicle 
using real missions in reid water 
* Supporting work is given on the types of knowledge available on an autonomous 
robotic vehicle for , iidin- diagnosis. A breakdown of types of components and b 
the relationship ý bel \\-e(, i i them is proposed 
To the author's b(st kiic)\\-Icdge, at the time of writing this is the first time that 
Integrated Diagnostlc-, ' hi%, -e heen specifically focused, implemented and evaluated 
on an autonomous robot. 
4.4 Architecture 
In concept the RECOVEM'cuchitecture consists of three parts: plugged-indiagnos- 
tic tools, plugged-in (11ýigii(,. 41(, knowledge and a central Relational Model, as shown 
in Figurc 4.2. The ]RECOVERY architecture aims to provide an information-based, 
modular architecture siiii ýi We for integrating various types of diagnostic knowledge 
and diagnostic tools, includiii, (_,. - model based, model free, static, dynamic and multi- 
dimensionýil approaclies. 
RECOVERY pr()ý71(les (ominoll ground for the various types of diagnostic meth- 
ods and ImoNvIedge ti, ýmg ille central B'clational Model, which is the focus of this 
resea. rch. The Rehiti( nzil Mod(I ýjcts as ii map of the vehicle, providing a common 
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Figure 4.2: RECOVEIBY architecture concept showing that it provides common 
ground between dif h rent diagnostic tool inputs (knowledge) and outputs (diagnoses) C3 
set of components for the clia, pnostic tools to diagnose. It also acts as a data conduit C) 
for passing the col-l-(, ( ý type of dliigiiostic information to the relevant diagnostic tool. 
Figure 4.3 shows it i tioi (, detailed conceptual view of the RECOVERY architec- 
ture. RECOVERY's Relat ioiiýil Model provides a structure upon which the novel 
Domain-Independent Di(i, (, ýnostics (developed during the course of this research)can 
operate. These are ci iý -(, tl\-(, Iy a second set of diagnostic tools that may be plugged-in 
at will and so they ýii-e shown otitside the RECOVERY architecture in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3: Detalb, ( NI-. COVERY architecture concept showing the compiler seg- 
regated dat,,, ibýiý, (,, compon(, itt inap and novel domain- independent diagnostic tools. 
Blocks outlined in b, )Id an, original colitributions. 
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RECOVERY cowiuns its own compiler that can take Component Information 
Files (cont aining spe, ific (tiagnostic information on a particular component) and 
construct it heterogeiie()us database. T his database contains heterogeneous knowl- 
edge, stich as rules an(l mo(lels. Crucially, this database is segregated by component 
to allow the use of RECOVERY's novel search-space reduction method. 
For completeness, the fiill RECOVERY architecture is shown in Figure 4.4. A 
fully detailed descrij, ý! ()n ()Fthe archit(, cture and implementation follows in Chapter 
5. 
4.4.1 Modularity 
RECOVERY uses a (-(,, iitralised approach to modularity. The RECOVERY kernel 
will accept informati0ii files containing descriptions of the various vehicle compo- 
nents, their relationships i () other components and specific fault knowledge of each 
component. In this \%-ýiy, I lie knowledge file represents each significant vehicle com- 
ponent. These knowl(, (I()-(, files are similar to the Component Information Files used 
in Windows NT and Plu--; tiid Play svstems. In a similar way, diagnostic tools may 
be plugged in to the iti-chilecture. 
4.5 Heterogeneous Diagnostic Tools 
There are many diff(, i ent i \, 'pes of diýi, _ý)iiostic tool available 
for use in an Integrated 
Diagnostics sYsteiii, ranging from simple Rulebases to powerful probabilistic tech- 
niques, as detailed iii Cliýipter 3. Different types of tools have different input and 
output requirements. leading to the key questions: 
How can the ow put s of different tools be combined? 
How cýin the (,, )ý vect information be passed to a tool? 
These qiiestions are dii-ectly addressed by the use of RECOVERY's novel Rela- 
tional 'Model. detailcd hil(, r in this cliýipter, 
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4.6 Heterogeneous Diagnostic Knowledge 
Many different types ore ýivýiilable for aiding diagnosis. Types of infor- 
mation vary from siiitple rules to first- principle models, or large data sets suitable 
for training Neural N(, tw()1-ks. This section details the types of knowledge available 
for an (tutonomous n)botic vehicle iiid its, suitability for diagnosis. 
The OSAIDD stiidy proposes seveii tYpes of knowledge that are critical for di- 
agnosis: 
9 Product Dat,, -i- Component serial number, place of manufacture, etc. 
* Test Requirements. How a syst (, iii must be tested. 
Diagnostic DAýi- Information pertaining to a fault. 
e Built-In Test DiAa: Health stýitus data provided by individual components. 
* Sons()r Data: Roadings from sensors, such as depth from a depth sensor. 
e Mailitciiýiiice FAa: Wlien syst(, iii ii-iaintenance was performed and what was 
done - 
Metrics: The ni,, trI(-s used to test and evaluate a system. 
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The OSAIDD stiidy ignoressome key classes of information as given in Hamilton 
et al [46]: 
Design Knowl(, (Ige: All the information that is generated during the design 
process. 
* Domain-Indel)(, iident Nnowledge: Generic diagnostic techniques. 
Sensor Knowledge: Not just sensor readings, but information about the sensor 
itself. 
Mission Knowledge: What the vehicle was trying to achieve when the fault 
occurred. 
Fault KnowlecIge: Information on faults that have occurred before, mean time 
b(, tween failure inforiiiýttion, ctc. 
9 Historical Knowledge: What happened in the period leading up to the fault. 
Design Knowledge: 'I am a vehicle' 
One of the most types of kilowledge for in-vehicle fault diagnosis is the design 
knowledge, or the knowledge that tells the vehicle that it is a vehicle. Research 
into this area is oiigý()tng but at present it consists mainly of relationships between 
components, paranwters and seilsors. 
A great deal of \vIiiele design knowledge is often available, much of it generated 
as part of the vehicle design process. For instance, circuit diagrams, mechanical 
drawin, -)'s, data flow (liagrams, systein schematics, fault log-books, software class 
--d Ion is usually stored until needed by personnel diagraiiis (ire all iiscýiil. This inform, 
trying to diagnose ýi problem. Other knowledge, such as sensor data, is generated 
whilst the %vhicle is performing its mission. 
Thcre is also ii gi-owiiig nim-enicia to\vards Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) to be iiwoi',, )nit(, (1 hito the design cycle. If this is realised then a great deal 
of extni m the forn' of fýiilure models will become available for diagnosis. 
Work ()ii witomAill, -, the geiienition of FýIEA knowledge is detailed by Price [84]. 
Domain-1ndepenclent Knowledge 
A usefLil form of kiiowledge is generalised fault diagnosis knowledge, such as the 
procedural knowledge that engineers use to track down faults. For instance, if the 
brakes are applied on your car and there is a loud bang followed by a gTeat deal 
of shuddering, a fair assumption is that there is a brake problem. This is because 
the braking system %\-as activated just before an overall system fault (with the car) 
became apparent. This sort of general knowledge can be applied across many types 
of systems, not just- inotorcar bntkcs. Ofcourse, the problem may lie elsewhere but 
there 1, ý a good chiiii(-c thýa, the probleni is with the brakes. 
Sensor Knowledge: 'What's going on? ' 
There are generally two types of sensor present on an autonomous robotic vehi- 
cle: systemic and cn\-1ronmental. Sy-, teinic sensors, such as thermal or power con- 
sumption sensors, s(, iise the state of the vehicle. Environmental sensors, such as 
magnellometers or sonars, sense the state of the environment. All these sensors 
produce information on what is currently happening in their particulax domain but 
information is also ýi\-ailable on the sensors themselves. 
Built-In Test Data 
An extcnsion to sys, ý emic sensor da I ýi is Built-in Test Data, which is the data gen- 
erated by a system's self-test procedures. For instance, the dc motor controllers 
used on the evaluýfl ion platform continuously monitor themselves for faults such as 
an overvoltage, therinal trip or broken motor connection. This is extremely useful 
information for vehicle diagnosis, but the motor controllers represent this informa- 
tion by varying the flash rate of a LED. Other components use different methods, 
making their input 1, o an Integrated Diagnostics system difficult. 
Mission Knowle(lg-e: 'What ani I supposed to doT 
A major part, of thc 1mowledge aviiihi, ble to an autonomous robotic vehicle concerns 
its mission. Providuig, inforinotioii to the. diagnostic system on what the vehicle was 
doing id the hine of i lie fault, or wliich Pal constraints have been violated) can aid 
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diagnosis. Known environmental conclitions pertaining to the mission may also be 
of use, such as high levels of water ctirrent or the presence of hydrothermal vents. 
MetOcean data can ýilso be of use. 
Fault Knowledge: 'What's wrong? ' 
Some types of inforittation will pertain directly to faults, such as models of known 
faults, logs of faults that have already happened, mean time between failure of 
particular compoii(, i, is, or the likelihood of failure of a specific component. This 
information is extreinely valuable (is it can relate directly to a fault. If used in 
conjunction with otlier information it can increase the confidence of a particular 
diagnosis. 
Historical Knowledge: 'What'-ý happened? ' 
Much of the above i4ormation will be logged during vehicle operation. Other in- 
formation can be In-ovided to Hic vehicle before the mission, such as known faults of 
certain componentýý. the length of time for which a component has been used, likely 
time of failure, etc. 
4.6.1 Extracting Knowledge 
An ongoing research area is that of extracting knowledge. The technique of extract- 
ing expert knowle(Ige from humýins is known as knowledge engineering (Russell & 
Norvig [901), this ]-ý a difficult Lireýi ýis human knowledge is often subjective, with 
different experts c_\I, ressing the same knowledge in different ways, or using different 
methods to arrive A the same conclusions. 
A further area is thd of integrating and extracting knowledge from 
heterogeneous datiib, ises, as by Dao & Perry [29] and Buchner et al [17]. 
4.7 Relational Model 
It is clcýir that maii, v different type,, of knowledge exist, or can be usefully added, on 
an autononious robotic vehicle. In order for this heterogeneous knowledge to be used 
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for fault diagnosis. ý-()ine wýiy must be found to link it together and operate upon 
it. In particular, the selected inethodology should support modularity, machine 
leaming and the (ihi'it. v to use generalised knowledge to aid diagnosis. 
There are also m: tily different types of diagnostic tool, with different input and 
output informatioi i requirements. Common ground must be provided in order to 
combine the outpitts of these tools, and to allow the selection of the correct input 
informýitlon from the heterogeneous knowledge database. 
In RECOVERYthis facility is provided by the Relational Model, which is equiv- 
alent to the Centrýi, l Information Model proposed in the OSAIDD study. The Rela- 
tional Model specfllcý- diagnosable coiiiponents and their relationships (the topology 
of the system), in t hi. s, way it provides domain-independent diagnostics and the abil- 
ity to diagnose components that are not directly sensed. The Relational Model is 
shown in Figure 4.6. 
RECOVERY's Relational Model: 
Heterogeneous 
Diagnostic Tools 
I Tool AI 
A Model of the Vehicle 
o----lo-o 
Z)A---A-b-O 
Heterogeneous 
Diagnostic Knowledge 
I Knowledge Type AI 
Tool B Links between Diagnostic 
Other... 
Tools and Diagnostic 
Knowledge 
4.7.1 Purpose 
I Knowledge Type BI 
I Other I 
Links between Component- 
Specific Diagnostic Information 
and Components 
Figure 4.6: The Relational Model Concept 
The purpose of the I'Velational Model is: 
* To inodel iI ic ( onstruction of the vehicle by specifying relationships between 
different ty1w. s of components and parameters 
* To represeni the current stýae of the vehicle as completely as possible 
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9 To provide m Aiterface between heterogeneous diagnostic tools 
e To tie togethei heterogeneous diagnostic tools and knowledge 
9 To link compoiient-specific knowledge to specific components 
* To provide mei hods for reducing the diagnostic search space and hence min- 
imise the arnotint of time and number of processor operations required for 
diagnosis 
e To provide, i sl ructure upon which Domain-Independent Diagnostics may OP- 
erate 
The various ft iiic, ions of the Relational ý lodel are detailed in the following sec- 
tions. 
4.7.2 Modelling the Construction of the Vehicle 
Providing a model ol'the construction of the vehicle that contains all diagnosable 
components ensures that all the diagnostic tools are working in the same diagnostic 
space. Further, by modelling the topology of the vehicle it is possible to run analysis 
algorithms to enhiiice fault diagnosis to the point where faulty components may be 
diagnosed without, explicit sensing. 
What is the Relational Model based on? 
Partitioned semmt ic networks, modified to reflect the change from natural language 
to robotic diagnosis ýtpplications, have been chosen as the underlying methodology in 
the RECOVERY sYsi em. Each component and vehicle sub-system is represented by 
a complete, lietcro, ý-,, (, iieous set of knowledge tied together using an individual seman- 
tic network. These components and subsystem networks are then joined together to 
form the complete \,, (, Iilcle model. 
Why Use a Semantic Network? 
A semantic netwoi 1ý provides the necessýir, y flexibility to cope with such varied host 
platforms as atitoliomous N-chicles. They trade expressiveness for modularity and 
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ease of understaridin, ý-. As a robotic vehicle is a well defined, manufactured system 
with components operating in a hinited context this trade-off is acceptable. Semantic 
networks are also eflicient, as inference is performed by simply following links very 
few processor cyclcs' ire required (Russell [901). 
Ng and Chow [76] have also achieved some success by representing circuit dia- 
grams with semantl( networks and operating on them with a structural analyzer to 
infer topological ivlýi+ionships between network nodes. 
What Does the 11 lational Model Contain? 
The Relational N/I()d(,, l contains nodes, which have various attributes, and relation- 
ships, or links, 1-wh\ven Components and Parameters. These links are multidimen- 
sional, so two coinj)()nents may be connected, for instance, by relationships in the 
power and thermýil dimensions. Hierarchical relationships are also represented, such 
as between a subcoinponent and component, which could be a thruster gearbox 
subcomponent and ýý thruster component. 
4.7.3 Represeating the State of the Vehicle 
The Relational ýIod(, l also stores the current state of the vehicle. In order to keep 
RECOVERY poi-kihle the sensor data stored in the Relational Model is divorced 
from the vehicle's, mvii data network. A map must be created to detail which data 
from the vehicle's (Lita network is equivalent to nodes in the Relational Model. A 
'watcher' module tlicit takes vehicle status data from the vehicle's data network and 
copies it into the rcl(, vant attributes of the nodes. Extra status information is also 
generated at this thiie, such as whether a particular component is active or not. 
This information is then used for diagnosis. Figure 4.7 shows the status information 
being generated, and stored in the Relational Model. 
The sum tot, -al ()I all systemic sensor data together with the relationships stored 
in the Relatiomil -ý 1( ý Icl provides (is complete a representation of the current state 
of the vehicle iis pusAble given modelling and design constraints. 
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4.7.4 Interfacing Heterogeneous Diagnostic Tools 
The Relational M()d-I provides an interface between different diagnostic tools by 
providing a comin0ii set of diagnosable components, as described in Section 4.7.2. 
Due to time constnthits a simple form of interface, weighted nominations, was used. 
Each diagnostic tool nominates one or more components, the number of nominations 
are simply added tol-, (., ther. 
Where tools, stid i as Neural Networks, provide a belief value then a threshold is 
set, belief values the threshold are counted as a nomination, values below are 
discarded. 
4.7.5 Linking Knowledge to Components 
To encompass i-nodii1arity each component node may have component-specific di- 
agnostic knowle(ll,,,, (, Atached. Rather than imposing a single format for diagnostic 
knowledge the diffeivnces and diversity of heterogeneous knowledge types are ac- 
cepted. Each coin1wiient may have different types of knowledge attached, such as 
rules or models. E; wh type of knowledge is linked to the component node with 
an appropriate liiilý. enabling the knowledge manager to pass the correct type of 
knowledge to Hie ivll 'ant diagnostic tool. 
4.7.6 Reducii,.,, - the Search Space 1-73 
By having coiiii)()il(,, 1ý -si)ecific knowledge attached to the component it is possible to 
reduce the sciii-di simce, or the amount of knowledge that, must be processed before 
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the correct diagiiosiýý is found. 
For instince, if' i lie only type of knowledge available was simple rules which 
were stored in a siiig., (., block, then the Rulebased diagnostic tool would have to run 
through all the rul(, ý I)efore finding the one that matched the current situation. 
But if the rules , -ore partitioned into blocks related to each component, and a 
method was provide(I for narrowing the search to particular components, then the 
number of diii-iio. si ir, rules to be processed may be greatly reduced. 0 
RECOVI-, NY provides such a method using a Focus of Suspicion technique. As 
each diagnostic tool iiominates components using low-detail, fast running informa- 
tion, the componciiis inost often nominated become the focus for a second round of 
diagnosis, during which the detailed, component-specific information is analysed. 
4.7.7 Interfac*ng Heterogeneous Knowledge to the Diagnos- 
tic TooLi 
In order for IIi(, dIii , _ý ý! ý)stic tools to access the correct type of 
diagnostic information 
the links defiiwd iri Hie Relational Model are used to pass the correct information 
to them. For instýinw rules to a Rulebased tool, models to a Model-Based tool. 
4.8 Domain-Independent Relational Diagnostics 
The ability t () i ise gei i (, ralised, domaiii-independent fault diagnosis knowledge can be 
extremely ii-ý(, ftil. This knowledge, primarily gathered from human experts, can then 
be used to guide flic diagnosis and model selection process. This realistic approach 
saves a lot of devel()pinent time compared with getting the machine to learn these 
guidelines ilself. 
4.8.1 Domain Equivalence 
There is a %%'(, 1l-kiiO,, -n equivalence between domains. For instance, friction in a 
mechanical syst ci ii is (juivalent to resistance in an electrical system, or a constriction 
in a hydraulic or pictin-iatic systein. Pressure in a hydraulic system is equivalent to 
voltage in ciii (, Icctricill sýýstelii, current flo'v%, is equivalent in both. 
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By expressin- these equivalent relationships in the Relational Model, domain- C-) 
independent di(igii()ý, tic knowledge may be applied across many domains. To a cer- 
tain degree, the Imm, Iedge used to diagnose a faulty electrical power supply can also 
be used for inecliiinical transmission systems - only the names of the units change. 
4.8.2 The Need for Diagnostic Guidance 
The need for diagiio,, tic guidance results from the large solution space generated by 
the integration of' the many and varied types of information. Each model takes time 
to evaluate, the more detailed models will take substantial time. Dynamic fault 
models, which are concerned with describing the behaviour of a faulty system over 
time, can t, -ike a givA deal of processor time to look over a mission log file that 
could easily be se\, (-, nil hundred megabytes long. 
Much time cii i1 1)(, saved by embedding human diagnosis knowledge and using this 
to steer the dkigiio-ýis procedure, either by eliminating some components and their 
associated inl'()i miti ion or by highlighting others. There are well known methods for 
the elicitation of kno, Aedge from human experts developed for first generation rule 
based expert systems (described in Russell [901). 1n future, it may be possible to 
get a robot to leýivii iitid enhance diagnosis techniques by itself, but at present this 
is impracticzil. 
Domain-I i idepei i (lent Diagnostics can also provide the ability to diagnose com- 
ponents thal ýii-(, not (tirectly sensed by analysing the effect that they have on other 
components. The Ewlational Model, consisting as it does of components and their 
inter-relatioiislnj),, ý. particularly suited to this task. 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter (Ilct; iiled the original contributions from this research and introduced 
the RECOVI,. 1 ý'V o)l , (, I)t,. The RECOVERV architecture was then introduced and 
relevant coii(vpts (Ik(-ussed. These ý\-cre the types of heterogeneous knowledge avail- 
able for autonizited i0botic diagnostics, how the novel Relational Model provides 
common grotin(I for lieterogeneous diagnostic tools and knowledge, the need for 
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Seaxch Space Reduction, and finally Domain-Independent Diagnostics. 
The next chapter provides detail on each RECOVERY module and describes the 
overall operation of the system. 
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Chapter 5 
RECOVERY Operation 
5.1 Aim of this Chapter 
This chapter details the operation of the existing implementation of the RECOVERY 
architecture. First the overall operation is shown, followed by detailed descriptions 
of the individual modules with examples where appropriate. 
5.2 Overview of Operation 
In general, REM/'= follows the classic pattern of fault detection followed by 
diagnosis, as shown in Figure 5.1. Once the Relational Model has been compiled 
then RECOVERY i-tins as a background task, monitoring the vehicle and providing 
fault detection. During vehicle monitoring, status data is copied into the Relational 
Model and useful dia, gnostic information is generated. 
Sensor Data 
RECOVERY 
Generate Status 
Data 
I 
Iterate 
Detect Fault I 
Detection Info 
F61agnose Fault 
Final Diagnosis 
Figure 5.1: RECOVERY operation concept 
The overall RECOVERY openition is shown in Figure 5.2 Detection is per- 
1-5 
formed by several iiiethods ranging from simple rule triggering through residual 
generation to mission goal violation. Diagnosis Is in two stages; component level 
and sub-component l(wel. When diagnosis is complete the information is presented 
to the enveloping mission controller to allow enhanced fault accommodation. 
Once a fault is detected the entire generation, detection and component-level 
diagnostic process is run over several iterations to provide increased diagnostic data. 
A post-diagnostic stage is then run using the novel Domain-Independent Hierarchy 
Module to look for common connections between faults. A list of most suspicious 
components is produced and used to reduce the diagnostic search space using a 
focus of suspicion method. The component- specific information attached to these 
components via the Relational Model is evaluated during the component-specific 
diagnostic level. The final diagnostic output is a list of suspicious components 
ranked in order of si iý- picion. 
RAUVER, the evaluation robot, has a command and control loop that runs at 
5Hz. Because of this t tie current RECOVERY implementation is invoked at a match- 
ing 5Hz so that evci-y time RAUVER updates its status data then RECOVERY is 
invoked. 
5.3 Full Recovery Architecture 
The full PAECOVEBY architecture is shown in Figure 5.3. The modules fall into the 
following broad 
* Initiation 
9 Information Generation 
9 Fault Detection 
9 Fault Dingnosis 
o Search Space R(, duction 
The Invocation Mýinager module controls the operation of the RECOVERY sys- 
tem, decidiiig Nvheii (,, icli module should be invokcd. The following sections detail 
each module. 
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Diagnostic Tools 
Hierarchy Module 
Diagnostic Tools 
Vehicle 
Sensor Data 
RECOVERYI 
Status Data 
Generation 
Data Generatý®r 
Data copýier 
Activiity Status Ta -tu s -1 
Generator 
Relational Model I 
Information 
Available to all 
Modules 
Fault Detection 
Alarm 
System - 
Residual Watcher Status 
Information 
Constraint 
Watcher 
Detection Info 
Fault Diagnosis 
System - 
Relational Model Specific <= 
Information 
System - 
Status <= 
Information 
List of Most Suspicous 
Components 
Component- 
Relational Model Specific 
Information 
System - 
Status 
Information 
Final Diagnosis 
Figure 5.2: RECOVERY Operation 
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Status Data Compiler 
Generation 
Generator 
Data Copier 
Activiity Status 
Generator 
I 
From Data 
Manager 1 
Conventional 
Diagnostic Tools 
Rule bas7e77] 
Model-Based 
Diagnosis Engine 
Other 
Relational Model 
Node Type 
Nodal 
_ýdt 
VaLlue Information --[_ýata 
Database 
Activity Status_ 
List of L -Suspicion Index Links 
Fault Detection 
Alarm Walc7her 
Residual Watcher From I 
Mission 
Constraint Controller I 
Watcher 
Segregated 
Diagnostic 
Knowledge Database 
Master List of 
Nodes 
Component - 
Specific 
Information 
System-Specific 
Information 
Data Manager 
4ý 
To all 
modules 
From Data 
From Data 
Manager 
II hý II Final List Maker Manageýý Nominator 
or Exact Match 
Reporter 
Novel Domain- 1ý I Iteration L-- 
Independent - -LCounter 
Diagnostic Tools Invocation 
Dr Manager List of 
F Correlat Diagnostic I Tools - To all RECOVERY ierarchy Module [H 
modules & Diagnostic 
Tools 
Mission 
Controller 
Figure 15.3: The full RECOVERY architecture. The mo(lules enclosed in the dashed 
lines wv oriýgiiml (witributions from this re: search I 
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5.4 Initiat, 11on: Building the Relational Model and 
Segregated Diagnostic Knowledge Database 
The first step in using RECOVERY is to build the Relational Model and Segre- ZD 
gated Diagnostic Fiiowledge Base. These are compiled at startup and then used 
throughout t he det, ci ion and diagnosis stages. The knowledge contained in them is 
available to all mo(lules via the Data Manager. 
Heterogeneous Diagnostic Knowledge 
Component ID 
Parameter ID 
Relationships 
Activity Information 
Dynamic Rules 
Static Rules 
Equational Models 
(Other ... ) 
Component II System 
Information Files I Information Files 
RECOVERY 
Compiler 
Relational Model Segregated 
Diagnostic 
Knowledge Database 
I Data Manager I 
Information Available to All 
Modules 
Fl,,,, ui-e 5.4: RECOVERY mitialisation operation 
5.4.1 ComPon. ýIit & System Information Files 
All inforniation rclovýii it to a component is phwed in a knowledge file (a text file), 
which is then linkol into the main vehicle libniry during compilation. The main 
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vehicle library Is s(-11"'ated into different types of knowledge, such as rules, equa- 
tional models, link, - between components. This allows different types of 
diagnostic 
tool easy access to the relevant type of information. The generation of component in- 
formation can be jwri, )rined by the vehicle engineer using knowledge available from 
the component mwiii; il or, preferably, more detailed information can be obtained 
from the component manufacturer. 
The file ilso system level information sucli as the immediate relationships be- 
tween this and oth(ýi- components. For instance, the file will include details of which 
power supply a con, ponent is connected to. The full range of links is detailed below. 
5.4.2 The Compiler 
RECOVERY has ils ()wii compiler for producing a Relational Model from the Com- 
ponent Informatioii Files. This makes RECOVERY highly portable and enables 
easy modification of the model to reflect changes in vehicle configuration. 
The compiler the knowledge stored in the file into a central segregated 
diagnostic knowle(ll,,, (, &tabase, with different types of information being stored in 
homogeneous blocks. Links between components are verified before being added 
into the Relatlonýil ýI ý)(Iel. 
5.4.3 Nodal Information Database 
The Relational Al()d(, l effectively consists of multidimensional blocks of nodes and 
links. The Nodal Liformation Database is the heart of the Relational Model, where 
each node represents a component or parameter and stores several modifiable at- 
tributes. The typeýý of node currently used by RECOVERY are shown below. 
Types of Node 
o Systemic Scii. ý ()t- Component: A sensor that senses the state of the vehicle 
o Environnieni -I -)ciisor Component: A sensor that senses the state of the envi- 
roninent 
ýS 
e Power Supply C()inponent: A 'source' component that provides power to other 
components 
e Component: A -, -(, neric component of no specific type and supplied with power 
by a Power Supply Component 
* Sub-Cornpoiwnt: A component that is part of another component and is only 
dia, gnos(tble ushig the component-specific knowledge attached to that compo- 
nerit. 
9 Selised A pýjrameter that st, ores data from a sensor 
* Unsensed Pcii-ýiiii(ler: A parameter that is not sensed but is used to store a 
desired %-ýilu(, 
9 Modelled Pai; nw, ter: A parameter that stores data produced by a model 
* Alarm Rirwiwter: Used to store an alarm flag 
Attributes of Nocl(,.,,, 
Each nocle seý, (, i al ýtttribute slots which are used to store data on various aspects 
of the node: 
9 Type of Nodc- An enumerated value representing the type of node 
* Data k- Dýitii, dt: Parameter nodes store sensor data and their automatically 
generated diffelviii ial here 
o Activity St(-it",,,,: A flag generated using c ornponent- specific activity informa- 
tion showing w1wther the component is active at this moment in time 
* Suspicioii Indoxý A value reflecting the number of nominations this component 
fiýis From the various diagnostic tools 
5.4.4 Reducing the Search Space with the Suspicion Index 
Every tinie ýi (!, iii, ())nO,, -; k inodule, such ýis ýi diagnostic engine, nominates a component 
then th,, it c(mipoii, -! 1t',,, - Slispicion Index 's incremented by the Nominator module. 
The size of the inci -iit is called the -Nomination 
Increment. The Suspicion Index is 
one of t lie attribut(, s of that component's node in the Relational Model and is used 
to detei-mine whicli components should hiive their component-specific diagnostic 
knowledge evalual (. d in the sub-component diagnosis stage. 
By highli-litin" C()Inponents that have been proposed as fault candidates the ?D0 
amount of &igno,, ýtic information to be ýiiiýilYscd is reduced compared with simply 
runnino throtigh I I: c (,; il ire set of diagnostic knowledge. tD 0 
5.4.5 Master List of Nodes 
The Nodal Informittion Database is accessed using Node Identifiers (Node IDs), a 
table of which is -eiv, vAed during compilation. This is called the Master List of 
Nodes. 
Each Node, wh(, th(, v it is a component or parameter, has a unique identifier which 
is stored in a Miý, i, er List. The list is sectioned into different types of node, such 
as Pow(, i- Supply Conij)oiient, Modelled Rii-ameter, Sensed Parameter etc. Each 
section has delimilers. ýillowing easy ýwcess to cither an individual node or groups 
of homogeneous nodes. 
40: FIRST-MODELLED-PARAMETER 
41: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
42: STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
43: ROLL_MDDEL 
44: PITCH-ý, ODEL 
45: DEPTH-VELOCITY-MODEL 
46: YAW-VELOCITY-MODEL 
47: HE;, DING-MODEL 
4S: D=. -H-ý,. JDEL 
49: LAST-MC. )ELLED-PARAMETER 
A S,,, 
-), mcnt, of t 
lie Compiled Master List of Node Identifiers 
A ,,, miple ,,, (,,, )-i; ient of the compiled 
Uistcr List of Node Identifiers is given in 
Figure 'The sc,, ýiiwul begins mid ends with the section delimiters, with Modelled 
Parameter identifiers in between. 
5.4.6 List of Links 
Links do not have unique identifiers as they exist purely to specify a type of rela- 
tionship between uniquely identified nodes. Links are segregated by type, such as 
Component to Power Supply, Sensed Parameter to Sensor, etc. Homogeneous types 
of links may then be operated on, or searches performed to find links of various types 
attached to an individual node. The links currently implemented in RECOVERY 
are described below: 
Component to Component 
9 Component to Power Supply Component: This should more properly be called 
'Sink to Source Component' as it is a domain-independent link. It links any 
type of component (including a Power Supply Component) to a Power Supply 
Component. For instance, a 5V power supply may be connected to (supplied 
from) the 12V battery supply. 
* Sub-Component to Component: Indicates that the sub-component may only 
be diagnosed using component-specific information attached to the component 
9 Sensor Component to Sensed Component: Some systemic sensor components 
may directly sense the state of another component. For instance, a tempera- 
ture sensor is attached to the Port Navigation Power Supply, which would be 
represented using this type of link 
Component to Parameter 
* Sensor Component to Sensed Parameter: Shows which parameter stores the 
data gathered from a particular sensor 
Unsensed Parameter to Component: Some parameters are not sensed but 
instead hold desired values, such ýis desired thrust. This link shows which 
component the desired value is related to, such as desired thrust linked to an 
open-loop thruster controller 
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Parameter to Parameter 
* Modelled Parameter to Sensed Parameter: This shows that the modelled pa- 
rameter is intended to reflect the state of the sensed parameter, for instance 
modelled vehicle roll to sensed vehicle roll 
9 Sensor to Equivalent Sensor: Shows that two sensors can be considered equiv- 
alent, or overlapping, such as a magnetic compass and a gyro compass 
Figure 5.6 shows a segment of the compiled list of links, detailing part of the 
Sensor Component to Sensed Parameter section. The first node on each line is the 
Sensor Component, in this segment five are shown: the AOSI Compass, the Port 
and Starboard battery current sensors (called LEMs), and the Port and Starboard 
Powerstack temperature sensors. The second node on each line is the Parameter 
Node that stores the data from that sensor component. 
SENSOR-PAR : 
0: AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-HEADING 
1: AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-PITCH 
2: AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-ROLL 
3: AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-TEMP 
4: AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-MAGX 
5: AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-MAGY 
6: AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-MAGZ 
7: PORT-LEM-SENSOR PORT-LEM 
8: STBD-LEM-SENSOR STBD-LEM 
9: PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR PORT-DIODE-TEMP 
10: STBD-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR STBD-DIODE-TEMP 
Figure 5.6: A Segment of the Compiled Master List of Links 
Some sensors generate more than one parameter, for instance the AOSI Compass 
generates Heading, Pitch, Roll and more. Because of this each sensor (and other 
tYpes of nodes) may have more than one link to them. 
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5.4.7 A Segment of a Compiled Relational Model 
Figure 5.7 shows a section of the Relational Model that details the links between 
some common parameters and components. In this figure can be seen four types of 
nodes and four types of links, where the links are lines: 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
comp-psupply 
Sensor-Par 
PORT-LEM 
Mpar-Par 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR 
MINUS-FIFTEEN 
PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
PORT-NAV 
- 
POWER 
% %% -MODEL 
----------------- 
Sensor-Sensed 
PORT-NAV-POWER 
(Power Supply) 
STBD NAV POWER 
(Power Supply) 
Figure 5.7: Relational Model Segment Example 
* Node 1: Power Supply (source) Component 
9 Node 2: Systemic Sensor Component 
9 Node 3: Modelled Parameter 
9 Node 4: Sensed Parameter 
o Link 1: Between the TIFTEEN-PCONTROU and the'P ORT -LEM -SENSOR' 
component is a link showing that the Sensor is supplied by the 15V Power Sup- 
pl. v. 
o Link 2: Between TORT-LEM' and the TORT-NAV -PONVER -MODEL' is a 
link showing tliýit the the modelled PORT -NAV-POWE R31 ODEL parameter 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR Sensor-Par 
STBD-LEM 
Mpar-Par 
-------- 
I 
---------- 
STBD-NAV 
- 
POWER 
MODEL 
---- ----------- 
Sensor-Sensed 
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models the sensed PORT-LEM parameter, this information is later used for 
fault detection. 
e Link 3: Between the PORT-LEM-SENSOR component and the PORT-LEM 
sensed parameter is a link showing that the parameter is sensed by that sensor. 
* Link 4: Between PORT-LEM-SENSOR sensor component and the PORT-NAV 
-POWER power supply component is a link showing that the power supply 
is 
sensed by the P ORT-LEM -SENSOR. 
The complete Relational Model used to evaluate this research is detailed in Ap- 
pendix B. 
5.4.8 Segregated Diagnostic Knowledge Database 
The compiler also produces the Segregated Diagnostic Knowledge Database as shown 
in Figure 5.8. This stores all component-specific information in a single database, 
segregated into different types of knowledge. Each component has its own selection 
of different types of diagnostic information such as rules, equational models, etc. 
This aids search space reduction as once a component has been found suspicious 
then its specific information is readily retrievable. 
Figure 5.8: The Segregated Diagnostic Knowledge Database 
S6 
5.5 Domain Independent Tools 
RECOVERY contains two types of domain-independent diagnostics. The Correla- 
tor Module looks for correlations (mutual relationships) between components and 
parameters. The Hierarchy Module looks for common connections between compo- 
nents that have been diagnosed as faulty by the various diagnostic tools. It then 
searches the hierarchical relationships specified in the Relational Model to determine 
whether a single component could be responsible for multiple faults. 
5.5.1 The Correlator Module 
The Correlator Module (or Correlator) is one of the main RECOVERY modules 
that use domain-independent diagnostic knowledge. At present, this module uses 
the following domain- independent diagnostic information: 
Delta Index: Parameters that track faulty parameters are likely to be related 
to the fault. 
Recently Used: Components that become active (after a period of inactivity) 
just before the occurrence of a fault are likely to be related. 
Active: Components that are being used at the time of a fault are more likely 
to be related to the fault than inactive components. 
When a fault occurs the Correlator looks back through the mission log file (which 
represents the temporal dimension) and looks for the correlations described above. If 
correlations are found between various components and parameters this information 
is used to modify the Relational Model by incrementing the relevant component's 
Suspicion Index. This modification effectively highlights suspicious components or 
parameters, which are then used to guide the diagnosis engines towards sections of 
knowledge thought to be most relevant. 
Delta Index: An example of this is thermal drift of sensor readings. If a wheeled 
robot had a speed sensor and a maximum set speed and the measured speed exceeded 
maximum speed then a snapshot of the system would show only that the robot was 
travelling too fast. By looking back at the history of the vehicle, it could be seen 
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that the maximum speed of the robot was creeping up at approximately the same 
rate as the temperature. This would represent a correlation as described in item 
1 above: "Parameters that track faulty parameters are likely to be related to the 
fault". 
A correlation of this kind would be extremely useful in diagnosing the actual 
fault. This is, perhaps, a rather simplistic example. The robot is assumed to be 
travelling constantly at maximum speed, which is unlikely to be the case. Even so, 
the concept is valid as the Correlator would have noticed the association between 
temperature and sensor drift without this knowledge being explicitly represented. 
For a parameter to be nominated as tracking a faulty parameter its delta index 
(a value that relates to the parameters motion over time) must be within a certain 
amount of the faulty parameter's delta index. This amount is called the Delta 
Window. 
Recently Used: This is as discussed in Chapter 4. For instance, if the brakes axe 
applied on your car after being unused for a while, and there is immediately a loud 
bang followed by a great deal of shuddering, a fair assumption is that there is a brake 
problem. Two parameters are needed to match this type of information; the length 
of time of inactivity and the length of time before the fault that the component was 
activated. 
Active: This simply states that an active component is more likely to contribute 
to a fault than an inactive one. Note that this means a component that is supposed 
to be active, including components that are inactive through failure. 
5.5.2 The Hierarchy Module 
This again uses domain-independent knowledge in a similar way to the Correlator, 
but where the Correlator is primarily concerned with searching the mission log file 
the Hierarchy Module checks relationships between Relational Model nodes. It uses 
the following domain-independent diagnostic information: 
If several components are diagnosed as faulty and they have a common supply 
connection which is further up the hierarchy then it is the commonly connected 
component that is likely to be faulty 
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* If a commonly connected supply component has been nominated as faulty then 
the supplied components should be exonerated of suspicion. 
For instance, if multiple components are thought to be faulty and there is a com- 
mon connection then it is likely that the connection is the problem. This is readily 
apparent with power supplies; if all the active thrusters 'fail' then it is likely to be 
the Navigation Power Supply that is actually at fault. Power Supply connections 
are numerous and one of the most common forms of component information. It is 
readily available on AUV circuit diagrams, and so forms one of the most common 
types of link in the Relational Model. 
For a common source component (i. e. a power supply) to be nominated as faulty 
then a certain amount of its active supplied components must have been nominated 
as faulty. This is known as the Nomination Threshold. 
5.5.3 Invocation of Domain-Independent Diagnostic Tools 
Because it looks for links between components and parameters the Correlator is 
effectively a diagnostic tool, and so is invoked at every iteration. The Hierarchy 
Module is concerned with components that have been diagnosed as faulty. To in- 
crease the performance of this module it is invoked after all iterations are finished, 
when faulty components have the most chance of having been detected or diagnosed. 
At present it only has a single invocation and so it can only find the first level of 
common connections. Future versions of the Hierarchy Nlodule will be able to move 
several levels up the hierarchy, finding common connections between the first level 
of common connections. 
5.6 Diagnostic Tools Used 
Currently three diagnostic paradigms are integrated with RECOVERY: Rulebases, 
Model-Based Diagnosis and the novel Domain Independent Diagnosis techniques 
proposed in this research. These are represented by five different diagnostic tools: a 
Model-Based Diagnosis engine, static and dynamic rule-based pattern matchers, a 
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dom ain- independent Correlator Module and a domain-independent Hierarchy Mod- 
ule. 
The Model-Based Diagnostic engine is used to generate fault candidates, specif- 
ically, components that are thought to be faulty. This is performed using standard 
observe /perturb/ match model based diagnosis techniques as described in Section 
3.4. Currently, RECOVERY supports equational models, such as common move- 
ment models, together with static and dynamic rules. Multiple faults may be diag- 
nosed in some cases. For a model-based diagnostic engine to nominate a component 
as faulty the modelled output must be within a certain amount of the sensed output, 
this is known as the nomination window. 
There are two types of rule-based pattern matcher, static and dynamic, currently 
used with RECOVERY. Static matchers are only capable of finding faults that can 
be diagnosed with a single snapshot of the system. Dynamic matchers can find 
faults that are only apparent from studying the system behaviour over time. Due to 
the large amount of information involved in dynamic diagnosis it can take far longer 
than static diagnosis. 
The domain- independent diagnostic tools are described above in Section 5.5. 
5.7 Diagnostic Knowledge Used 
The types of knowledge integrated into RECOVERY reflect the choice of integrated 
diagnostic paradigms. Standard if-then rules are supported, these are used to repre- 
sent static faults, dynamic faults and dom ain- independent diagnostic information. 
Equational models are also supported, these are currently used only for static fault 
diagnosis. At present vehicle movement (roll only) and vehicle power consumption 
(port and starboard hulls) are modelled. 
5.8 Modularity 
RECOVERY is a modular architecture in that different, diagnostic tools and knowl- 
edge may be inserted or removed at will. The actmil implementation of RECOVERY 
Nvius linlited by time and so there is enough modularity to show that the concept is 
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valid. For instance, although each diagnostic tool may be removed easily this must 
be done by commenting out a line in the source code rather than by checking a tick 
box on the screen. In a similar way the equational models are embedded in the 
source code rather than scanned in from a text file. This is because the C compiler 
would effectively have to be duplicated in order to support mathematical functions 
etc. It was felt that this was not relevant to the focus of the research and so the 
equational models were inserted into standard C header files and compiled as part 
of the source code. 
5.9 Status Data Generation 
The first step of RECOVERY operation is to copy sensor and status data from 
the vehicle's data ring and to generate other useful information for detection and 
diagnosis. This performed in three stages; data copying, data generation and activity 
status generation. 
5.9.1 Status Data Copying and Generation 
The generation and processing of raw sensor data is left to the vehicle's own sen- 
sor suite. RECOVERY copies relevant data into the Relational Model using the 
Data Copier, this uses a map that specifies which vehicle data parameter is copied 
into which Nodal Information Database slot. Once the copying operation is com- 
plete RECOVERY automatically generates Rate of Change values using the Data 
Generator for all data parameters as this information is useful for diagnosis. 
5.9.2 Activity Status Generation 
Component activity information is generated using the activity information con- 
týuned in the Component Information Files. For instance, the activity logic for a 
thruster is 'if Speed !=0 then Thruster is Active'. Activity information is extremely 
useful for diagnosis. Extra useful diagnostic information is also generated at this 
time, such as the time of each component's kist change of activity status, both active 
to inýictive and Nice vers(i. 
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Generation of this information as a background task during normal operation 
greatly eases the processor load when performing diagnostics. For instance, to scan 
back through a mission log file and generate this can take a long time with large mis- 
sion log files. Although it is essentially simple information that takes few processing 
operations, this adds up over a mission that may take several hours. Generating it 
at each invocation spreads the load over the normal operation period when processor 
power is less in demand. This technique also reduces overall diagnostic time. 
5.10 Fault Detection 
The RECOVERY Fault Detection modules take responsibility for all fault detection 
using information provided in the component information files and by the onboard 
mission controller. Firstly, the Residual Watcher module scans all modelled and 
sensed parameters for residuals (bigger than that generally caused by noise, etc) 
using the links defined in the Relational Model. Secondly, the Alarm Watcher scans 
all alarm parameters and limited parameters (such as control stage temperature) to 
see that they are within their limits. Thirdly, the Constraint Watcher checks to see 
that the onboard mission controller has not flagged any violated constraints for the 
current goal. 
RECOVERY's detection operation is shown in Figure 5.9. 
5.10.1 Residual Generation 
The Relational Model contains links of various kinds between parameters and com- 
ponents. One of the link types defines a relationship between a modelled parameter 
and an observed parameter. Part of the RECOVERY procedure is to scan through 
all of these link types using the Residual Watcher module and check that the mod- 
elled parameters match the sensed (observed) parameters. Any discrepancy means 
that the vehicle is diverging from normA operation and the diagnostic operation is 
invoked. 
Because of the presence of noise, parameters are allowed to differ from their 
n-iodels I)v a certýiiii amount without cýnislng a fatilt to be detected, this amount is 
92 
Relational Model 
Alarms: None 
Active 
Parameter Limits: 
Max Battery Temp 
70 
Sensed Parameters: 
Battery Temp = 50 
Vehicle Roll = 12 
Modelled 
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From Mission 
Controller: 
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RECOVERY 
I Fault Detection I 
Alarm Watcher 
Residual Watcher 
To Diagnostic Stage 
Detection Information: 
Faulty' Parameter Constraint Watcher II 
(Vehicle Roll) 
Related Sensor 
Component 
(Attitude Sensor) 
Figure 5.9: RECOVERY Detection Operation 
called the Residual Detection Window. 
This scanning method provides an easy way to check for system-wide discrepan- 
cies without having to specifically code a check routine for each modelled parameter. 
5.10.2 Constraint Violation 
A common method of detection is to use Constraint Violation, where an alarm flag 
is set if a parameter exceeds a given threshold, such as a component exceeding a 
maximum temperature. RECOVERY's Alarm Watcher module also scans param- 
eters that are classed as alarms, where the constr aint- exceeded flag is set by the 
sensor's hardware (such as a thermostat tripping). 
This technique can be extended t, o constrained, goal-orientated mission con- 
trollers. If a mission constraint is exceeded, such as vehicle roll, this can be reported 
to RECOVERY's Constraint W'atcher module as all parameters are represented in 
the Relational Model. This is simplified if the mission controller is tied in to the 
Relational Model. 
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5.10.3 Passing of Information to Diagnostic Stage 
Any parameters that are found to be 'faulty', whether from alarms, residual genera- 
tion or constraint violation, have their attached sensor component's Suspicion Index 
nominated to allow for the fact that the sensor could be faulty. This information is 
available to the diagnostic stages to assist in diagnosis. 
5.11 Diagnostic Operation 
Diagnosis is performed in two stages: component-level and sub- comp onent- level - 
During component-level diagnostics the search is narrowed down to a short list of 
highly suspect components, after which Sub-Component Diagnosis runs the component- 
specific information attached to each component to try to identify the fault in greater 
detail. The Invocation Manager runs each diagnostic tool in sequence using the List 
of Diagnostic Tools. 
RECOVERY's diagnostic operation is shown in Figure 5.10. 
5.11.1 Component-Level Diagnostics 
During this stage the model-based diagnosis engine is invoked, with the detection 
information passed to the diagnosis module used to identify which models are to 
be run. For instance only models attached to faulty parameters in the Relational 
Model are passed to the diagnosis engines, so saving time and processor operations. 
The Domain Independent Correlator module is also invoked at this time in order 
to scan for relationships between faulty components and parameters. 
5.11.2 Diagnostic Iterations 
Because faults may show in different dimensions at different times, the Component- 
Level Diagnosis is run through several iterations over several seconds. The Iteration 
Counter records the number of iterations. For instance, in the Results section it 
is ýipparent that whereas a fault inýiy be instantaneously apparent in the power 
dimension, it may take several seconds to show in the movement dimension. This 
is due to the relativelly slow dynamics of AUVs. BY running Component-Level 
94 
RECOVERY I Detection Stage Detection Stage 
II 
Iterate 10 times 
Detection Information 
Run Diagnostic Tools with 
Syste m/Com pone nt-Level 
Diagnostic information 
(models etc) 
Component Nominations 
Component-Level 
Iteration Stage 
Modify Relational Model 
(Status and Suspicion 
Index) 
Modified Relational Model 
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Run Component-Specific Sub-Component Level 
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Either isolated faulty component ID or list of most suspicious components 
I Final Output Stageý] 
Figure 5.10: RECOVERY Diagnostic Operation 
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Diagnostics for several seconds the fault is given a chance to show up in all relevant 
dimensions, so increasing the knowledge available to the diagnostic system. 
5.11.3 Post-Iteration: Domain-Independent Hierarchy Mod- 
ule 
Once a predetermined number of diagnostic iterations have been performed the 
Domain-Independent Hierarchy Module is invoked in order to find patterns of faults 
that may indicate a common cause, as discussed in Section 5.5. 
5.11.4 Selection of Most Suspicious Components 
At the end of the Component-Level diagnostic stage the Final List Maker uses 
the suspicion index slots of the Nodal Information Database to produce a list of 
suspicious components, ranked in order of suspicion. This list is passed to the Sub- 
Component-Level diagnostic stage for deeper analysis. 
5.12 S ub- Component- Level Diagnostics 
After component-level diagnostics are complete the focus moves to sub-components, 
where the component- specific information attached to each component is analysed. 
The component-specific diagnostic information was compiled into a central vehicle 
library at the initial compilation stage. Each component has a delimited section, 
accessed using the unique component node identifier of each segregated knowledge 
store (static rules, dynamic rules) of the library. This allows each suspicious com- 
ponent's specific knowledge to be easily accessed by the various diagnostic tools. 
The knowledge belonging to the most suspicious component is evaluated first, if 
no match is found then the focus moves down the list to the next component. 
The static rules associated with the component are evaluated first as they are 
much faster to run than the dynamic rules. If a direct match is found the diagnostic 
process is terminated and the information passed to the mission controller. If no 
iriýitcli is found then the (11viiamic rules are evaluMed. these take a great deal longer 
to run ýis ýi lengthy inission-log file must be scanned for each rule. 
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5.13 Providing Information to Mission Controller 
If, after all the suspicious components have been evaluated, w1th no direct match 
found, the list of suspicious components produced at the end of the Component- 
Level diagnostic stage is passed to the mission controller as a 'best guess'. 
5.14 Chapter Summary 
This chapter detailed the operation of RECOVERY. Overall operation was described 
first, followed by a detailed description of the mitiallsation stage when the Relational 
Model and Central Vehicle Library are compiled. The operation of the two types of 
novel domain- independent diagnostic tool was detailed. The information generation 
and fault detection stages were then shown, followed by the operation of the two 
levels of the diagnostic stage. 
The next two chapters present results from real-world experimental evaluation 
of RECOVERY. Chapter 6 evaluates the novel dom ain- independent diagnostic tools 
in isolation. Chapter 7 evaluates the full system using all supported diagnostic tools 
and knowledge. RECOVERY's focus of suspicion method for reducing the diagnostic 
search space is then evaluated. 
Table 5.1 shows the location of the various experiments used to evaluate the 
original contributions of RECOVERY. 
claim Experiment Location 
Arclvitccture All Chapters6,7 
Relational - Model All Chapters6,7 
Operational - Methods All Chapters6,7 
Search - Spacc - Reduction SSR Section7.3 
Domolo - Indepewlcnt - Diagnostics DID Chapter6 
Real - 11'orld - Implementation All Chapters6,7 
Supportiog - 11'ork Literature SectZon4.6 
Table 5.1: Table Linking RECOVERY Originality to Experiments 
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Chapter 6 
Results: Evaluation of 
Domain-Independent Diagnostics 
This chapter and the next present results that evaluate individual sections and 
the full RECOVERY system. Experiment setup is detailed for each experimental 
section. The results consist mainly of verbatim output from RECOVERY and this 
is summarised in tabular form where appropriate. This Chapter (Chapter 6) details 
evaluation of the novel domain-independent diagnostic tools. The following chapter 
(Chapter 7) evaluates the full RECOVERY system and the Search Space Reduction 
methods in real-world conditions. 
6.1 Aim of This Chapter 
This chapter presents results that evaluate the RECOVERY-specific Domain Inde- 
pendent Diagnostic methods. 
The evaluation vehicle, RAUVER, is described and its operational fault log, 
recorded during development and deployments, is presented. The reservoirs used 
for running the RECOVERY evaluation missions are then shown. 
Details of the experimental setup and the format of the results are followed by 
experiments evaluating the Domain-Independent Hierarchical and Correlator Mod- 
ules. 
6.2 RAUVER: The Evaluation Vehicle 
RECOVERY is being developed and evaluated on the Ocean Systems Laboratory's 
owil vehicle, RAUVER; ýi 2m, twin hulled, catamaran submersible capable of either 
remote or autononious operation. RAUVER is shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: RAUVER, The Evaluation Vehicle 
RAUVER can be operated as either a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) similar 
to those used in commercial sub-sea intervention, or as a true Autonomous Under- 
water Vehicle (AUV). Designed primarily for scientific experimentation and general 
sub-sea research, and capable of carrying both wet and dry payloads to a depth of 
70m, RAUVER is an extremely useful tool. The modular design allows for versatile 
mission specific alterations to the submersible's configuration, making it possible for 
a wide range of experiments to be conducted. 
During the evaluation of RECOVERY RAUVER was used in tethered autonomous 
inode, designed for ease of development of autonomous software. The autonomous 
computing platform stays on the surface where the developer can easily monitor and 
clebug the software. Power ýiiid coin mu nicat ions between the low-level RAUVER sys- 
tenis and the autonomous computing platform are transmitted down an umbilical, 
allowing the developer to monitor the autonomous software performance even when 
RAUVER, is at depth. Using remotely supplied power also removes the constraint 
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Figure 6.2: RAUVER on Evaluation Trials in Crosswood Reservoir 
of battery runtime during development; the developer can debug twenty-four hours 
per day if desired. 
When the developer is happy with the performance of the autonomous software 
the autonomous computing platform is simply inserted into the vehicle and the power 
supply is switched from reinote power to battery power. Untethered autonomous 
operational tests may then be performed. 
6.2.1 RAUVER's Actual Fault Log 
During the development of RAUVER a manual fault log was kept, it is shown below. 
Some of these real faults were later reproduced so that RECOVERY could be eval- 
uated on actual problems. Unfortunately the majority of these failures happened 
either before RECOVERY's mission log storage routines were fully operational, or 
when RECOVERY was not, running, and so mission logs of the actual faults at time 
of occurrence are not available. 
6/5/00 Tliruster Dropout 
100 
Fault: Design fault. Surge protection circuitry causing occasional undervoltage un- 
der high loading 
Cure: circuit modified to reduce surge protection resistance (helped but still present 
occasionally) 
7/5/00 No Comms with Vehicle 
Fault: Onboard processor crash caused by bad software download whilst upgrading 
software 
Cure: Manual reset 
8/5/00 No Comms with Vehicle 
Fault: Loss of vehicle to surface serial communications, traced to loose wire inside 
junction box 
Cure: Connection tightened, junction box reassembled 
12/5/00 Water Alarm 
Fault: Slight leak found 
Cure: Vehicle hull seals reassembled 
19/5/00 Water Alarm 
Fault: Slight leak found 
Cure: Vehicle hull seals reassembled 
6/6/00 Starboard Main Thruster Dead 
Fault: Design fault. Wires pinched and shorting out against internal decking 
. 
(Note: This fault was recreated and used to evaluate RECOVERY) 
Cure: Power stack realigned to avoid pinching 
14/6/00 No Comms with Vehicle 
Fault: Onboard processor crash, cause unknown 
Cure: Manual reset performed 
22/6/00 No Comms with Vehicle 
Fault: Onboard processor crash, cause unknown 
Cure: Manual reset performed 
13/7/00 Maintenance 
Fault: No fault, scheduled upgrade of Power (Current) Sensors to instantaneous 
type 
Cure: Not Applicable 
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25/7/00 Maintenance 
Fault: No fault, scheduled upgrade of monochrome camera to colour 
Cure: Not Applicable 
25/7/00 Maintenance 
Fault: No fault, Power (Current) sensors replaced with originals as couldn't read 
instantaneous sensors properly due to system limitations 
Cure: Not Applicable 
29/8/00 Water Alarm 
Fault: Crumbled aspirin (used to trip a switch when water present) 
Cure: Aspirin replaced 
30/8/00 Water Alarm 
Fault: Aspirin came loose 
Cure: Aspirin replaced securely 
1/9/00 Maintenance Fault: No fault, compass calibration work as still only able 
to use attitude sensing 
Cure: Not Applicable 
20/10/00 Maintenance Fault: Compass removed and returned to manufacturer 
as we were unable to calibrate compass 
Cure: Not Applicable 
2/11/00 Maintenance Fault: Refitted and calibrated compass 
Cure: Not Applicable 
7/11/00 Maintenance 
Fault: Upgrade of temporary cure 
Cure: Thruster wire pinch problem permanently solved by machining more space 
for the wires. Manual reset of processor also made easier by fitting of reset switch 
in port nosecone. 
23/7/01 Water Alarm 
Fault: Probably aspirin crumble - accept until overhaul - no deep operations - mon- 
itor vehicle trim manually 
Cure: Accept for now 
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6.3 Evaluation Locations: Crosswood and Harper- 
rig Reservoirs 
The mission logs for evaluating RECOVERY were gained on missions performed in 
two local reservoirs, Crosswood and Harperrig. East of Scotland "later Plc were 
extremely helpful in granting us full access to these reservoirs. 
Crosswood Reservoir is approximately 500 metres long, 700 metres wide and 8 
metres deep. It has an intake tower sited approximately 20 metres from the bank. 
Crosswood Reservoir is shown in Figure 6.3 
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Figure 6.3: Map of Crosswood Reservoir 
Harperrig Reservoir is approximately Ikiii long, 1.5kin wide and 10 metres deep. 
It also has an intake tower sited approximately 20 metres from the bank, as shown 
in Figure 6.4 
6.4 Experiment Setup 
For all experiments In this chaptcr (tinless otherwise stated) the setup was: 
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Figure 6.4: Map of Harperrig Reservoir 
Processor: Pentium 200, B/IX 
Memory: 32MB 
Operating System: Microsoft, Windows NT 4.0 
No other programs running 
RECOVERY Settings 
Command and status polling frequency: 5Hz 
Residual detection window- ±8.0 
Doni, ain-Independent Diagnostics: 
Hierarchy Module nomination threshold: 0.6 
Correlator Delta window: ±1.0 
Correlator Recent window: 
Inactive for at least 8 seconds before failure 
Activated within 3 seconds of failure 
Model-Based Diagnosis noinimition windows: 
Boll Model: ±1.5 Degrees 
PoNver Models: ±0.5 Amps 
312 
Aunoon 
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Nomination Increment: 1 
6.5 Format of Results 
Each experiment begins with a short description of the background to the fault, 
together with information on normal and faulty operation. The relevant segment 
of the Relational Model is given, showing normal and faulty information where 
appropriate. 
The results presented are in the form of verbatim output from RECOVERY's 
log file, slightly edited for inclusion in this thesis. The full text of these log files is 
included in Appendix E 
The term 'Mission Time' refers to the time since the vehicle was last powered 
up, it is used to timestamp all data and log files. The full text output as shown in 
the appendices also has a date and time stamp generated by the host PC, which is 
used for debugging and system monitoring purposes, but this is not shown in the 
results. 
6.6 Evaluation of Domain Independent Diagnos- 
tics: The Hierarchy Module 
This section evaluates the Domain Independent Diagnostic Hierarchy Module, specif- 
ically the source/sink methods as detailed in Section 5.5. Real mission log files are 
used for the evaluation, with various parameters modified to mimic the failure of 
individual source components, in this case various RAUVER power supplies. 
There are six experiments, each of which involves failing an individual power 
supply. Each experiment consists of the following steps: 
1. Modify a mission log file to mimic the failure of a particular supply. 
2. Run RECOVERY as normal until the fault is detected. 
3. Run ýi single iteration of the Domain Independent Hierarchy Module, with no 
other diagnostic tools invoked. 
The effect i veness of the diagnostic technique is determined by correctness of 
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diagnosis. 
6.6.1 Experiment: Faulty 5Vc Power Supply 
The 5Vc power supply component supplies power to the 8 digital alarms, the AOSI 
Compass/ Attitude sensor and the 3 rate gyros. When the 5Vc supply fails all the 
alarms, which are active low, appear to be tripped and the output of the rate gyros 
drops to zero. The relevant section of the Relational Model during 5Vc supply 
failure is shown in Figure 6.5, where the shading of the Alarm parameters indicate 
that they are active. The zero output of the gyros is also indicated. 
At present the Roll, Pitch and Yaw rate gyros do not have any detection in- 
formation or models associated with them and so RECOVERY only detects the 
alarms: 
Alarm detected: 
Alarm detected: 
Alarm detected: 
Alarm detected: 
Alarm detected: 
Alarm detected: 
Alarm detected: 
Alarm detected: 
ALARM 
ALARM 
ALARM 
ALARM 
ALARM 
ALARM 
ALARM 
ALARM 
WATER at Mission Time: 211.615 
PDH at Mission Time: 211.615 
SDH at Mission Time: 211.615 
PDW at Mission Time: 211.615 
SDW at Mission Time: 211.615 
PLH at Mission Time: 211.615 
SLH at Mission Time: 211.615 
SPARE at Mission Time: 211.615 
'Faulty' parameters automatically have their associated sensor component (spec- 
ified in the Relational Model) nominated as a possible cause of the fault, and so at 
detection the Suspicion Index looks like: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 211.615 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
PORT-DIODE-50-SENSOR: 1 
STBD-DIODE-50-SENSOR: 1 
PORT-DIODE-60-SENSOR: 1 
STBD-DIODE-60-SENSOR: 1 
PORT-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR: 1 
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Figure 6.5: The 5Vc Relational Model Segment during Power Supply Failure 
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STBD-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR: 1 
WATER-SENSOR: 1 
SPARE-DIGITAL-SENSOR: 1 
As this experiment involves only one diagnostic iteration the 'Component Level 
Diagnostic Iteration: 0' line shows that this is the first (zero indexed). The Domain 
Independent Hierarchy Module is now invoked, providing the following output: 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
TWELVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
COMMS-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
FIVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.7 (nominated) 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
The 5Vc (FIVE-PCONTROL) supply has exceeded the threshold of faulty sup- 
plied components and so has been nominated. The 'fault rating' is determined by 
dividing the number of active components by the number of nominated components 
(both of which must be supplied by the relevant power supply). If the fault threshold 
is exceeded the supplied components are assumed to be functioning and the power 
supply (or other source component) assumed to be the cause of the fault. The Do- 
main Independent Hierarchy Module then denominates the supplied components, 
giving a post-denomination Suspicion Index of: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 211.615 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
FIVE-PCONTROL: 1 
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This is a correct diagnosis. The hierarchy module has correctly found that a 
common component is faulty despite the power supply having no direct measure- 
ment, and without any fault-specific information at all. This shows that domain- 
independent, generalised fault information can be extremely powerful when used 
with RECOVERY. 
6.6.2 Experiment: Faulty 12Vc Power Supply 
The 12Vc power supply component supplies power to the depth sensor, the AOSI 
compass module and the port and starboard analogue temperature sensors, as shown 
in Figure 6.6. 
TWELVE PCONTROL 
(Powe-r Supply) 
comp-psupply 
STBD-POWERSTACK- Sensor Par STBD_DIODE_ 
TEMP-SENSOR 
! 
ý)- *<ýf TEMP 
> 
PORT-POWERSTACK_ PORTý _DIOD! L> -Sensor-Par mp TEMP-SENSOR 
ý= 
TEMP 
DEPTH-SENSOR Sensor Par DEPTH 
AOSI- 
HEADING 
--------------- Mpar-Par 
ROLL_MODEL 
-------------- 
AOSIEZ3_ 
COMPASS-SENSOR 
Figure 6.6: The 12Vc Relational Model Segment 
AOSI-PITCH 
AOSIROLL 
AOSI-TEMP 
AOSI-MAGX 
AOSI-MAGY 
AOSI-MAGZ 
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On failure of the 12Vc power supply the depth sensor output drops to zero, as 
do the port and starboard analogue temperature sensors. The implementation of 
the AOSI compass module, which communicates data via an RS232 Serial Commu- 
nications link to the onboard computer, means that when it falls no more data is 
received from it. In this event the onboard computer simply retains the latest val- 
ues, which do not change until another update is received from the AOSI compass 
module. 
The only detection associated with components supplied by the 12Vc power 
supply is the modelling of the AOSI Roll parameter. There are no models of the 
depth, pitch and yaw parameters due to developmental time constraints. 
The narrow spread of detection information means that the fault can only be 
detected when the vehicle is rolling as the observed roll will not match the sensed 
roll, which will be the same value as when the 12Vc power supply failed. When the 
vehicle is sitting flat in the water, whether it be motionless, ascending, descending 
or turning, there will be no detection. Without detection the diagnosis level is not 
invoked. 
12Vc Power Supply Failure when Vehicle Rolling 
The 12Vc power supply was failed when the vehicle was rolling so that a fault would 
be detected. The Relational Model segment in Figure 6.7 shows the detected fault. 
This time the RECOVERY detection module picks up the discrepancy between 
the vehicle's modelled roll and the frozen sensed roll parameter: 
Residual detected between Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL at Mission Time: 253.88 
The associated sensor is nominated, so at detection the Suspicion Index is: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 253.88 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
The Domain Independent Hierarchy Module is now invoked, giving the output: 
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comp-psupply 
Figure 6.7: The 12Vc Relational Model Segment during Power Supply Failure 
III 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
TWELVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.25 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
COMMS-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
FIVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
Because of the lack of detection information the only component that shows a 
fault, out of the four attached to the 12Vc supply, is the AOSI compass module. 
The fault rating of 0.25 is not enough to exceed the nomination threshold and so 
the 12Vc power supply is not nominated, giving a final Suspicion Index of: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 253.88 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
This shows the necessity of having a wide scope of fault detection. The Residual 
Watcher has correctly found that the modelled output does not match the sensed 
parameter, but a wider spread of simple fault detection would have enabled the hier- 
archy module to have correctly determined the power supply fault. This vindicates 
the concept of the Relational Model. 
6.6.3 Experiment: Faulty ±15Vc Power Supply 
The ±15Vc power supply is a dual power supply, i. e. it is a single component that, 
provides two power rails. It is represented in the Relational Model as two separate 
components becýiuse it is possible for one power rail to fail while the other remains 
working. This could be caused by ýi loose wire, blown fuse etc. See Figure 6.8 
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The Port and Starboard Navigation Power Supply current (amperage) sensors, 
commonly known as Tems', require a dual supply and so are connected to both the 
plus and rninus 15Vc. At this time no other components use these power rails. 
FIFTEEN PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
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PORT-LEM-SENSOR STBDLEM-SENSOR 
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_PCONTROL (Power Supply) 
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11 %% 
PORTNAV-POWER 
%% -MODEL 
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Sensor-Sensed 
PORT-NAV-POWER 
(Power Supply) 
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Sensor-Par 
STBD-LEM 
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---------- 
STBD-NAV 
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POWER 
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STBD-NAV-POWER 
(Power Supply) 
Figure 6.8: The ±15Vc Relational Model Segment 
This test assumes that the entire power supply unit fails, in which case both the 
plus and minus fifteen volt power rails drop to zero. When this happens the output 
of both Lems also drop to zero. 
Both the Leins have detection inforination attached in the form of the port and 
starboard power models (which actually only model electric current). 
When the current drawn from the Navigation power supplies is zero the output 
from the Lems is also zero. If the ±15Vc power supply falls, forcing the Lem outputs 
to zero, when no current is being drawn fron-i the Navigation power supplies there 
will be no detection. This is because the modelled output is zero, the correct output 
is zero and the Lem output is zero. 
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±15Vc Power Supply Failure when Vehicle Moving 
If the ±15Vc power supply falls when the vehicle is moving then the fault, will be 
detected. There are two conditions: one N avigation power supply being used, or 
both: 
±15Vc Power Supply Failure when One Navigation Supply Active 
In this case the ±15Vc power supply has failed when the Starboard Navigation 
power supply is active because the vehicle is rolling to port using the starboard lift 
thruster. Figure 6.9 shows the Relational Model segment at this time. 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
comp-psupply 
Sensor_Par 
PORT-LEM 
Mpar-Par 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR 
MINUS FIFTEEN 
PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
PORT-NAV-POWER 
MODEL 
----------------- 
Sensor-Sensed 
PORT NAV POWER 
(Power Supply) 
STBD NAV POWER 
(Power Supply) 
Figure 6.9: The ±15Vc Relational Model Segment during Power Supply Failure 
with a Single Active Navigation Supply 
The discrepancy between modelled and sensed Starboard Navigation power sup- 
ply current is detected: 
Residual detected between Modelled Node: 
STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: STBD-LEM at Mission Time: 252.33 
The 'fault,. N, ' parýuncter has its attached sensor component nominated automati- 
cally, so at detection the Suspicion Index is: 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR Sensor-Par 
STBD-LEM 
Mpar-Par 
------------------ 
STBD-NAV 
- 
POWER 
-MODEL ------------------- 
Sensor-Sensed 
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Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 253.33 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
The Domain Independent Hierarchy Module is invoked, providing the output: 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
TWELVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
COMMS-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
FIVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.5 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.5 
Both the plus and minus fifteen volt power rails have a fault rating, reflecting 
the dual-supply requirements of the Lems, but neither of them have reached the 
nomination threshold. This is because with only one Navigation power supply active 
only one of the Lem outputs is incorrect, the other is still 'correctly' stuck at zero. 
The final Suspicion Index is: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 253.33 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
Again, a simple increase in the scope of fault detection would have caused a fully 
correct diagnosis, showing the usefulness of RECOVERY's Relational Model. 
±15Vc Power Supply Failure when Both Navigation Supplies Active 
With both Nw, -ip, -Mion power supplies active the fault is detected, showing up in 
the Relatiomil Model (Figure 6.10) as both Port and Starboard Navigation power 
parameters not imitching their related model parameters. 
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Figure 6.10: The ±15Vc Relational Model Segment during Power Supply Failure 
with Both Navigation Supplies Active 
The detection information is: 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at Mission Time: 31.48 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: STBD-LEM at Mission Time: 31.48 
Associated sensors components are automatically nominated, giving a Suspicion 
Index at detection of: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 31.48 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
The Domain Independent Hierarchy Module is invoked: 
Sensor-Sensed 
116 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
TWELVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
COMMS-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
FIVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 1. (nominated) 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
Note that only the plus fifteen supply has a fault rating, which is high enough to 
exceed the nomination threshold, but the MINUSFIFTEEN-P CONTROL (-15Vc 
power rail) should also have a fault rating. 
The Hierarchy module automatically denominates supplied components as soon 
as the power supply is nominated. Each power supply is checked in turn, and 
the minus fifteen supply is checked after the plus fifteen so there are no nominated 
components attached to the minus fifteen at time of checking. This is an error in the 
operation of the Hierarchy Module, which should be modified to only denominate 
after all power supplies have been checked. The final Suspicion Index is: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 31.48 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL: 1 
This is a fully correct diagnosis as the correct (dual) power supply has been 
nominated, even though it is not directly sensed and no fault-specific information was 
used. The novel domain-independent Hierarchy module has worked well, using the 
structured Relational Model to find common connections between supposedly faulty 
components. A specific fault has been found using general diagnostic information. 
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6.6.4 Experiment: Faulty 24Vc Power Supply 
The 24Vc power supply provides power to the control circuitry of the four thruster 
controllers. No sensors are powered by this supply. Figure 6.11 shows the relevant 
section of the Relational Model. 
PORT MAIN 
THRUST-CONTROL 
PORT-LIFT- 
OL THRUST-CONTR 
STBD-MAIN- 
THRUST-CONTROL 
STBD LIFT_ 
THRUST-CONTROL 
Figure 6.11: The 24Vc Relational Model Segment 
When the 24Vc power supply fails all the thruster controllers fail and so no power 
is sent to the thruster motors. The vehicle can no longer move. When the vehicle is 
not supposed to be moving no fault will be detected as the thrusters are not being 
used and no sensors are supplied by this power supply. 
24Vc Power Supply Failure when Vehicle Moving 
The limited detection information inserted into the system means that this fault 
is indistinguishable from the failure of the ±15Vc power supply. With the present 
sensor, modelling and detection suite the failure of the thrusters (caused by the 24V 
power supply) is indistinguishable from the failure of the movement sensors. 
As this is effectively the same as the 15vc evaluation with both lems the experi- 
ment was counted as being identical but this time the diagnosis is incorrect. 
6.6.5 Experiment: Faulty Port Navigation Power Supply 
The Port Navigation power supply provides power to the Port Main-Thruster, the 
Port Lift-Thruster and the Port Lamp, ýis shown in Figure 6.12. 
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I PORTLAMP-CONTROL I 
Figure 6.12: Components Supplied by the Port Navigation Power Supply 
When the supply fails there is no power available to drive the port thrusters or 
the port lamp and so the vehicle's movement abilities are severely limited. As with 
the previous power supply tests if the Port Navigation power supply is not active 
then there will be no detection as there are no sensors directly measuring the supply 
voltage. 
Because of the slow dynamic response of the vehicle's physical movement there is 
usually a delay between power and movement problems being detected. This is the 
reason that the full RECOVERY system runs over several iterations. In the current 
RECOVERY implementation and during this experiment the Domain Independent 
Hierarchy Module is run during only a single iteration, as discussed in Section 5.5.3. 
The single iteration is invoked at a time when faults are detected in both the power 
and movement dimensions. 
Supply Failure when Vehicle Moving: Power and Movement Detected 
At this time residuals are apparent with both the Roll and Port Navigation Power 
par, aineters, as shown in Figure 6.13. 
PORT NAV Mpar-Par PORT LEM 
POWER MODEL 
--------------- 
----------------- STBD NAV Mpar-Paý , <ýýýý 
POWER MODEL 
--------------- 
---------------- Mpar-Pa 
ROLL MODEL 
----------------- 
Figure 6.13: Residuals Generated in the Port Navigation Relational Model Segment 
during Power Supply Failure 
The detection information is: 
Residual detected between 
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Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at Mission Time: 440.535 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL at Mission Time 440.535 
The associated sensor components are automatically nominated, so at detection 
the Suspicion Index is: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 440.535 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
The Domain Independent Hierarchy Module is invoked, producing the output: 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
TWELVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.25 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
COMMS-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
FIVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.5 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.5 
The TWELVE-PCONTROL has ii fault rating of 0.25 as it supplies four compo- 
nents, one of which is the AOSI compass sensor, which senses Roll. The FIFTEEN 
and MINUS-FIFTEEN-P CONTROL power supplies have a fault rating of 0.5 as 
tli(,, N- both supply both Leins, of wInch the Starboard Lem sensor has been nomi- 
nated. 
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The supply that is actually faulty (PORT -NAV-P 
OWER) has a zero fault rating, 
despite the fact that 3 components supplied by it, are not working. This is because 
the supplied components do not have any sensed parameters or detection information 
associated with them. 
None of the supplies have reached the required nomination threshold. The final 
Suspicion Index is: 
fig: nurn hits post denomination 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 440.535 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
Again, this would have been a correct diagnosis if the scope of simple detection 
information had been extended. 
6.6.6 Experiment: Faulty Starboard Navigation Power Sup- 
ply 
This fault and experiment is identical to the Port Navigation power supply fault, 
but it is the matching Starboard Navigation power supply. Because of this only the 
final nomination index is shown: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 253.61 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
Again, this would have been a correct diagnosis if the scope of simple detection 
information had been extended. 
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6.7 Evaluation of Domain Independent Diagnos- 
tics: The Correlator 
The current implementation of the Correlator uses items of domain independent 
diagnostic knowledge, as detailed in Section 5.5. Experiments are performed in this 
section in order to show the action of each piece of knowledge. 
For these experiments real mission files were used without modification. 
6.7.1 Experiment: Null Movement with Thermal Drift 
This mission was conducted for another Ocean Systems Laboratory project which 
required accurate magnetic heading data. RAUVER was positioned so that it was 
within I degree of being absolutely flat then left recording data whilst motionless 
for approximately 15 minutes whilst a mission log file was generated. 
When the data was evaluated the magnetic heading was found to drift upwards 
by approximately I degree every ten minutes. On further inspection of the data 
it was found that the temperature of the compass module, which is self-measured, 
also drifted up during the mission. The conclusion was that the magnetic heading 
variation was a thermal drift. 
This type of correlation between two parameters is exactly what the Correlator is 
designed to look for using the 'parameters that track a faulty parameter are likely to 
be related to the fault' item of domain independent diagnostic information. When 
RECOVERY was run on this mission it was predicted that it would notice the 
correlation between sensor drift and temperature increase. 
In order for this interesting mission to be used for evaluating RECOVERY a 
'false' heading model was implemented, which simply output a fixed value equal 
to the magnetic heading reading at the start of the mission. When the magnetic 
heading reading increased above a certain amount, equal to a reading near the end of 
the mission, the residual was detected automatically using RECOVERY's methods 
and a single diagnostic iterMion was invoked, consisting of the Correlator only. 
RECOVERY successfully detected the residual between predicted and observed 
heading: 
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Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: HEADING-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-HEADING 
The faulty parameter's related sensor was automatically nominated, giving a 
Suspicion Index at detection of: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 689.5 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
The Correlator was then invoked, producing the output: 
Correlator Invoked at Mission Time: 689.5 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: AOSI-HEADING 
Delta-Matches: 
GYRO-YAW 
The final Suspicion Index was: 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
YAW-GYRO-SENSOR: 1 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
The Correlator has failed to notice the 'obvious' correlation between magnetic 
heading drift and temperature increase. Why? 
Figure 6.14 shows the magnetic heading, which can be seen to drift upwards 
over the length of the mission. There is also a discontinuity at approximately 120 
seconds, where the heading jumps down to just over 284.5 degrees before resuming 
its upward climb. The reason for this discontinuity is unknown. 
Figure 6.15 shows the compass sensor's temperature superimposed on the mag- 
netic heading. This highlights several key factors: the temperature information is 
sampled at a lower frequency than the heading, the temperature seems to be in- 
creasing in a near-linear manner but the heading is non-linear, the heading is far 
more noisv than the temperattire. 
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Figure 6.14: Magnetic Heading during the Null Movement Mission 
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Figure 6.15: Magnetic Heading and Sensor Temperature during the Null Movement 
Mission 
124 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 
But still, the overall trend of both parameters is upward. 
The implementation of the search for 'parameters that track faulty parameters' 
was kept as simple as possible, both to meet developmental time constraints and 
to fit in with the 'simplest, crudest, worst case' approach to RECOVERY develop- 
ment. The search consists of generating a Delta Index for each parameter and then 
comparing it to the faulty parameter's Delta, Index. 
The Delta Index starts at zero. At each t, ime interval it is incremented by one if 
the parameter has increased, decremented if the parameter has decreased and not 
modified if the parameter has not changed. If a parameter has increased at every 
sample during the mission then the Delta Index will also have climbed constantly. 
The Delta Indices are then compared to the faulty parameter, any that are close 
in value are nominated as a 'tracking parameter. This is a very crude search that 
takes no account of different rates of change, delayed tracking or different waveform 
shapes. 
At the time of detection the Delta Indices for the relevant parameters were: 
AOSI-HEADING: 12.0 
AOSI-TEMP: 18.0 
GYRO-YAW: 14.0 
The nomination threshold at this time was 2.0, which had been set during devel- 
opment to a value which generally limited the number of parameters nominated to 
about 3 to prevent flooding the system with irrelevant data. 
The nomination threshold was increased to 6.0 to enable the Correlator to nom- 
inat, e the AOSLTEMP parameter and the test was repeated. The detection infor- 
mation was identical but this time the Correlator output was: 
Correlator Invoked at Mission Time: 689.5 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: AOSI-HEADING 
Delta-Matches: 
AOSI-PITCH 
AOSI-TEMP 
GYRO-YAW 
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GYRO-PITCH 
The widening of the nomination window has enabled the nomination of the 
temperature parameter, but has also included other parameters. The final Suspicion 
Index was: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 689.5 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 3 
YAW-GYRO-SENSOR: 1 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 1 
The AOS1 compass sensor has been nominated three times: once at detection for 
sensing the faulty parameter and twice by the Correlator for being attached to the 
AOSI pitch and temperature parameters. The two gyros have only been nominated 
once each by the Correlator for sensing their respective nominated parameters. 
The Correlator is shown to be capable of automatically picking up extremely 
useful correlations using its general diagnostic information. For a human to have 
extracted these correlations out of a large mission file would have required quite some 
work, but the Correlator has automatically detected them. This fully vindicates the 
use of Domain- Independent Diagnostics in conjunction with the Relational Model. 
6.7.2 Experiment: Component Fails on Startup 
The Full System Evaluation includes the failure of a component at startup and so 
the Correlator output for this experiment is taken from the Starboard Lift-Thruster 
failure test. During this test the lift-thrusters have been inactive for several seconds 
before being activated, at which point the Starboard Lift-Thruster falls. The lack 
of power consumption is detected by comparing the Starboard Navigation Power 
Model with the observed power. The detection information is: 
Residual detected between Modelled Node: STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: STBD-LEM at Mission Time: 439.735 
The Correlator is invoked, producing the output: 
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Correlator Invoked at Mission Time: 439.735 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: STBD-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
PORT-LIFT 
STBD-LIFT 
AOSI-MAGX 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Whilst not strictly relevant to this test, the Correlator's Delta Index search has 
determined that the lift thrusters have a similar Delta Index to the current drawn by 
the Starboard Navigation Power Supply (sensed by the Starboard Lem). During this 
mission the lift thrusters were run at matching thrusts until failure and they were 
the only components drawing power from the navigation supplies. The Correlator 
has correctly noticed a relevant link between components. 
The AOSI-MAGX parameter has also been nominated during the Delta Index 
search. It is probable that this is a coincidence as it should not be affected by 
operation of the lift thrusters. 
During the search for 'components that were activated shortly before the fault' 
both lift thrusters were again nominated. In this experiment this means that they 
were inactive for at least 5 seconds before being activated, which must in turn have 
been within 3 seconds of the fault being detected. These nominations are highly 
relevant as it is one of the lift thrusters that has failed on activation. 
The final Suspicion Index for this experiment was: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 439.735 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 2 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 2 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
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During this test the Correlator again provided highly accurate nominations. 
6.7.3 Evaluation: Active Components are More Relevant 
The final item of domain independent information used by the Correlator is that 
active components are more likely to be related to a fault than inactive components. 
This is shown by the experiments conducted to evaluate the Domain Independent 
Hierarchy Module (and later experiments evaluating the full RECOVERY system), 
where it is nearly impossible to detect or diagnose a fault if components are inactive. 
It is also borne out by the author's experience in test and repair. 
6.8 Discussion of Domain Independent Diagnos- 
tic Tools 
6.8.1 The Correlator 
The Correlator is a simple module using a few pieces of generalised diagnostic in- 
formation and yet in some of the experiments above it has highlighted extremely 
relevant correlations, showing that it has a great deal of potential. 
6.8.2 The Hierarchy Module 
The performance of the Hierarchy Module depends greatly on the amount and lo- 
cation of detected faults. The current implementation of RECOVERY has limited 
detection information and so the Hierarchy Module has had limited success. De- 
tection also depends on the activity of the system, for instance if the vehicle is not 
moving then it is difficult to detect a thruster problem. However, even with such 
limited detection capabilities several totally correct diagnoses were obtained, the 
remainder would have been totally correct with some very simple extra detection. 
Where there is a wide spread of detection, such as with the 5Vc and ±15Vc 
power supplies, the Hierarchy Module works extremely well, successfully diagnosing 
components without any direct senslng, modelling or fault-specific information. This 
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shows that the, Hierarchy Module in combination with RECOVERY's Relational 
Model has great potential as a diagnostic tool. 
The performance of the Hierarchy Module will also be improved when other 
diagnostic tools provide component nominations, as in the full system tests. For 
instance, the Port and Starboard Navigation power supplies have no direct sensing 
of the port and starboard thrusters, but the thrusters may be nominated using the 
Model-Based Diagnosis tools, which use models containing the thrusters. 
The current implementation of the Hierarchy Module is very simple, using only 
two simple guidelines (as detailed in Section 5.5): 
If several components are diagnosed as faulty and they have a common supply 
connection which is further up the hierarchy then it is the commonly connected 
component that is faulty 
e If a commonly connected supply component has been nominated as faulty then 
the supplied components should be exonerated of suspicion. 
Even so it works very well. The use of more powerful diagnostic information 
should further improve diagnostic performance. 
6.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the evaluation vehicle, RAUVER, and the evaluation lo- 
cations of Crosswood and Harperrig Reservoirs. The format of the results and 
experimental setup NN,, as detailed before moving on to the evaluation of the domain- 
independent diagnostic tools. Both the Hierarchy and Correlator modules were 
evaluated in isolation shown to be able to find extreniely useful diagnostic informa- 
tion, in some cases correctly diagnosing a faulty component that was not nominated 
by any other diagnostic tool. 
The next chapter evýiluates the full RECOVERY systern using all supported 
types of diagnostic t, ool ýmd knowledge. RECOVERY's focus of suspicion method 
of seýircli space reduction is then evýiluated and the results discussed. 
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Chapter 7 
Results: Evaluation of Full 
RECOVERY System and Search 
Space Reduction 
7.1 Aim of This Chapter 
This chapter is in two parts. In the first part the full RECOVERY system is eval- 
uated on real mission files gathered during RAUVER operations. In the second 
part the focus is on evaluating RECOVERY's Search Space Reduction method and 
comparing it to a classic Rulebase. Each section is followed by a discussion. 
7.2 Evaluation of the Full RECOVERY System 
These experiments use the full RECOVERY system and are primarily used to show 
that it is a fully operational implementation of the proposed Integrated Diagnos- 
tic architecture, using heterogeneous diagnostic tools and knowledge on a real au- 
tonomous robot. 
There are five different diagnostic tools integrated into the current implementa- 
tion, these are: 
A Model-Based Diagnostic Engine 
A Static Rulebase 'matcher' 
A Dynamic Rulebase 'matcher' 
A Domain-Independent, Correlator 
AD omain- Independent Hierarchy Module 
There are also four different tYpes of information: 
Stntic rules 
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Dynamic rules 
Domain-Independent rules 
Algorithmic models 
These experiments use real, unmodified mission log files. Details of system op- 
eration for the first and last iterations are shown, full diagnostic output is included 
in the appendices. 
The metric for these tests is correctness of diagnosis. 
7.2.1 Experiment Setup 
For all experiments in this chapter (unless otherwise stated) the setup was: 
PC Setup 
Processor: Pentium 200MMX 
Memory: 32MB 
Operating System: Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 
No other programs running 
For all experiments in this chapter RECOVERY settings were: 
RECOVERY Settings 
Command and status polling frequency: 5Hz 
Residual detection window: ±8.0 
Domain-Independent Diagnostics: 
Hierarchy Module nomination threshold: 0.6 
Correlator Delta window: ±1.0 
Correlator Recent window: 
Inactive for at least 8 seconds before failure 
Activated within 3 seconds of failure 
Alodel-Based Diagnosis nomination windows: 
Roll Model: ±1.5 Degrees 
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Power Models: ±0-5 Amps 
Nomination Increment: I 
Models Used 
For all results decoupled axis movement models were used as they are simple to 
generate and suitable for use at the low speeds used here (Caccia, Indiveri & Veruggio 
[19]). The simplicity of the models also means that they are crude and so a worst- 
case test for the RECOVERY system. 
7.2.2 Format of Results 
The first experiment is used to illustrate full RECOVERY operation and so the re- 
sults are given as verbatim excerpts from the diagnostic output files. The amount of 
editing is kept to a minimum. To keep the amount of text down only the outputs for 
the first and last iterations are shown. For the remaining experiments the diagnostic 
outputs are summarised in table form. 
The full text is available in the appendices. 
7.2.3 The Mission 
The mission segment detailed in this section is taken from a realistic scenario based 
on a survey and sample mission. The AUV's mission is to follow a waypoint sequence 
at a depth of a few metres in order to stay out of the splash zone. At each waypoint, 
the vehicle surfaces for a CPS fix before diving and then proceeding to the next 
waypoint. At the last waypoint, a final CPS fix and status transmission is performed 
before the vehicle dives to undertake the survey. 
In this mission it is necessary to sample the water column with various sensors, 
often using a 'vertical lawnmower I pattern, where the vehicle starts a sample at the 
surface and dives to the seabed whilst sampling the water column. An ambient 
sample is then taken with the vehicle in standbY mode. The AUV then repeats the 
water column sample whilst returning to the surface for a position fix, then moves 
to the next sample point before repeMing the process. This mission segment details 
a single leg of this survey method: 
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Figure 7.1: RAUVER Dives towards the loch-bed during RECOVERY Evaluation 
Mission. Picture taken from directly below RAUVER using a support ROV 
* Coal 0: Surface and hover for GPS fix. 
9 Goal 1: Submerge to fully flood instrunients. 
9 Goal 2: Dive vertically to survey-end depth. 
* Goal 3: Standby (drift) while ambient readings taken. 
e Goal 4: Ascend vertically to surface. 
* Goal 5: Hover at surface until standby. 
During the vertical sample process, the vehicle attitude must be kept within 
certain pitch, roll and heading constraints in order for the environmental sensors to 
work properly. 
7.2.4 Experiment: No Fault 
This test was performed to show that RECOVERY can distinguish between normal 
and faulty operation. RAUVER was run through the full mission several times 
without any component, faihires being induced. 
No faults were detected showing that RECOVERY operation is correct. This is 
effectively a correct diagnosis. 
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7.2.5 Experiment: Vehicle Disturbed by Environmental Event 
During this test RAUVER was floating without moving as in Coal 3 (Standby/drift 
while ambient readings taken). It was then given a shove in order to see how 
the currently systemically-orientated RECOVERY would cope with an unexpected 
environmental event such as a playful dolphin or a large wave. 
The graphs are shown for the full mission with the time of failure marked. RE- 
COVERY finishes its detection and diagnostic operation within approximately two 
seconds of these failure points, but in the current implementation RECOVERY acts 
as a mute watcher with no control over the vehicle, and so the mission (and therefore 
the graphs) carry on until mission end. 
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Figure 7.2: Environmental Disturbance: Depth 
20 
Figures 7.2 to 7.5 show depth, pitch, roll and yaw during this mission segment. 
RAUVER can be seen to be gently rocking (due to surface wave action) before the 
environmental event is initiated at approximately 286 seconds (Mission Time). The 
event forces a considerable change in pitch, roll and heading, with a minor change 
in depth. 
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Figure 7.3: Environmental Disturbance: Roll 
First Iteration: Detection 
RECOVERY correctly detects the event at Mission Time 286.985 due to the residual 
between modelled and sensed roll parameters. The scant model coverage means that 
the discrepancies in pitch, heading and depth are undetected: 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 286.985 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
As usual, the sensor providing the residual is automatically nominated. 
First Iteration: Domain Independent (Correlator) 
The Correlator is invoked, producing the output: 
Correlator Invoked at Mission Time: 286.985 
Delta-Correlations: 
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Figure 7A Environmental Disturbance: Pitch 
Bad-Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Delta-Matches: 
AOSI-MAGZ 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
(none) 
It has found a coincidental delta match with the AOSI-MAGZ parameter. 
First Iteration: Model-Based Diagnostics 
M 
The Model-Based Diagnosis Engine is now invoked. As the residual was only de- 
tected with the roll model this is the only one to be evaluated: 
Model-Based Diagnosis Engines invoked at: 286.985 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
(none) 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
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Figure 7.5: Environmental Disturbance: Magnetic Heading 
(none) 
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It has found that the level of roll could be produced by either of the lift thrusters 
malfunctioning. 
First Iteration: Suspicion Index 
At the end of the first iteration the Suspicion Index is: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 286.985 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 2 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 1 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 1 
The lift thrusters have been nominated by the Model-Based Diagnosis Engine 
whilst the AOSI compass has two nominations, once for generating the discrepant 
parameter and once for the coiiicidentýil deltýi match between the roll and magnetic 
x parameters. 
137 
AOSI Heading 
Seventh Iteration: Detection 
Although the environmental event lasted for several seconds in total it only forced 
the roll parameter outside acceptable levels for short periods. RECOVERY runs 
over ten iterations which covers approximately two seconds. In this experiment 
the roll parameter was back in the acceptable window after the seventh iteration, 
meaning that there was no detection and hence no diagnostics for iterations eight to 
ten. For this reason the last iteration containing detection and diagnosis (seventh) 
is detailed here rather than the final (tenth) iteration. 
Again, the only detection is provided by the residual between sensed and mod- 
elled roll. 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 288.52 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 7 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 15 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 7 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 7 
Seventh Iteration: Domain Independent (Correlator) 
The Correlator produced: 
Correlator Invoked at Mission Time: 288.52 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Delta-Matches: 
AOSI-MAGZ 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
(none) 
The Correlator Ims again found a deltýi match between AOSI-ROLL and AOSI-J\4AGZ. 
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Seventh Iteration: Model-Based Diagnostics 
The Model-Based Diagnosis Engine is again invoked only on the Roll model and finds 
that the discrepant roll could be produced by either lift-thruster malfunctioning: 
Model-Based Diagnosis Engines invoked at: 288.52 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
(none) 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
(none) 
Seventh Iteration: Suspicion Index 
At the end of the seventh iteration the Suspicion Index is: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 288.52 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 7 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 16 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
The lift-thrusters have been nominated by the Model-Based Diagnosis Engine. 
The AOSI compass has been repeatedly nominated for generating both the dis- 
crepant roll and magnetic x parameters. 
Post Iteration: Domain Independent (Hierarchy) 
As iterations eight, to ten were not active the post-iteration section is now detailed. 
The Domain- Independent Hierarchy Module produced: 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
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STBD-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0.5 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 0.5 
TWELVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.25 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
COMMS-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
FIVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
The Port and Starboard Navigation power supplies have the highest Fault Rating 
as they only supply two thrusters, lift and main. As in both cases the lift thruster has 
been nominated this leads to the Fault Rating of 0.5. The TWELVE-PCONTROL 
(12Vc) power supply has the next highest rating as it supplies the AOSI compass. 
None of the power supplies have been nominated as they do not have enough 
active supplied components diagnosed as faulty. This is a correct diagnosis. 
Post Iteration: Suspicion Index 
As no power supplies were nominated the Suspicion Index is unchanged from that 
of iteration seven: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 288.955 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 10 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 16 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
Component-Specific Diagnostic Level 
RECOVERY now enters component-specific diagnostics, where the component- specific 
information attached to each component via the Relational Model is evaluated. Be- 
fore this the Suspicion Index iiiiist have the sub-components (components that may 
onlY be diagnosed using component-specific information) added. In this case the 
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Port and Starboard Lift-Thrusters have five sub-components and so these are in- 
serted after the relevant component: 
Component-Specific Diagnostic Level Entered 
Adding Related Sub-Components to Suspicion Index: 
Final Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 288.955 
Sub-Component Diagnostics Level 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 16 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
PORT-LIFT-THRUST_CONTROL: 0 
PORT-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
PORT-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
PORT-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL: 0 
STBD-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
STBD-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
The sub-components were not within the scope of the component-level diagnos- 
tics and so they have no nominations. The sub-component diagnostic stage steps 
through the list from the top to the bottom and so the zero rating of the sub- 
components does not matter. 
The information attached to each suspicious component is now evaluated. At 
present the only information attached to the components consists of dynamic rules, 
or rules that specify systein behaviour over time: 
Dynamic Rule Testing of Component: 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER Started 
PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL Started 
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PORT-LIFT-MOTOR Started 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH Started 
PORT-LIFT-GBOX Started 
PORT-LIFT-PROPELLER Started 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER Started 
STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL Started 
STBD-LIFT-MOTOR Started 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH Started 
STBD-LIFT-GBOX Started 
STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER Started 
Scan finished (no match found) 
Exiting diagnostics 
In this case there is no information relevant to an environmental effect and so 
no relevant diagnosis is found. The final diagnosis is the final Suspicion Index 
(given above), in which the AOSI Compass sensor had the highest Suspicion Index 
due to repeatedly sensing the event. This is a reasonable result as the current 
implementation of RECOVERY is totally focussed on systemic problems. This 
experiment illustrates the need for diagnostic tools that can diagnose environmental 
problems. 
7.2.6 Faulty Lift-Thruster Experiments 
At the beginning of Goal 4 (return to surface) a Lift-Thruster fault is forced which 
drops the thrust from the relevant Lift-Thruster to zero. This causes a severe roll 
as the other Lift-Thruster is still operating normally, as shown in Figure 7.6. The 
resultant power loss and increased roll does not match modelled normal operation 
behaviour so invoking the RECOVERY diagnostic system. 
This fault is equivalent, to a tripped thruster controller due to wire squeeze/short, 
as occurred during early RAUVER operations and shown in the RAUVER fault log 
(Section 6.2-1. In these experiments the wires are made to 'short out' when the 
veliicle moves below a certaiii depth, which will squeeze the pressure hull and so 
reduce the amount of room ýivýiilable for components and Nvires. 
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Normal Operation 
Both Port and Starboard Lil 
Thrusters working. so Lift-ThrL 
balanced resulting in roll-fr( 
vertical motion 
Starboard Lit 
Vecto 
Resultant Thrust V 
Faulty Operation: 
(Starboard Lift-Thruster Failure) 
Only Port Lift-Thruster working, so 
lift-thrust is unbalanced resulting 
in a large amount of roll when 
moving vertically 
Thrust Vector 
Port Lift-Thrust Vector 
Starboard Lift-Thrust Vector 
(Now Zero due to Port Lift- 
Thruster Failure) 
Resultant Thrust Vector 
Figure 7.6: RAUVER During Normal and Faulty Ascent 
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This fault is forced using RECOVERY's utility software a short time after the 
vehicle has moved below the 'squeeze' depth. As it is a known fault it was attached 
to each thruster's component-specific information in the form of a dynamic rule. As 
the evaluation location (Crosswood Reservoir) is relatively shallow at 8 metres the 
squeeze depth was set to 5 metres. 
Two tests are performed: faulty Port Lift-Thruster and faulty Starboard Lift- 
Thruster. The correct diagnosis for these tests is a faulty lift-thruster controller, 
either Port or Starboard depending on the test. 
7.2.7 Experiment: Faulty Port Lift-Thruster 
In Figures 7.7 to 7.11 the left, or 'a' part shows normal operation whilst the right, or 
W part shows faulty operaion. Figure 7.7a (Depth) shows RAUVER's depth during 
the normal, no-fault mission, with the start of each mission goal shown. Figure 7.7b 
shows depth during the faulty Port Lift-Thruster experiment. The 'Goal I' line 
refers to the beginning of that goal - so Goal I runs from that line to the Goal 2 
line. 
The depth profile hardly changes between missions because RAUVER can still 
ascend at near-normal speed using only one thruster due to their vectored nature. 
RAUVER's pitch (Figure 7.8 (Pitch)) is also nearly identical during both normal 
and faulty operation as the lift thrusters are near the centre of the vehicle. 
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Figure 7.7: Faulty Port-Lift Thruster: Depth 
In Figure 7.9b (Roll) the large change in roll caused by the failure of the Port 
Lift-Thruster cmi be seen during Goal 4 as the vehicle tries to ascend to the surface. 
The fault is also apparent in Figure 7-10b (Port Navigation Power) as the power 
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Figure 7.8: Faulty Port-Lift Thruster: Pitch 
consumed is far below that normally consumed by the thruster, but Figure 7-11b 
(Starboard Navigation Power) is operating at near-normal figures. 
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Figure 7.9: Faulty Port-Lift Thruster: Roll 
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Figure 7.10: Faulty Port-Lift Thruster: Port Navigation Power Consumption 
Because of the slow physical response of the vehicle the fault first becomes appar- 
ent in the power dimension. A residual is detected between the sensed and modelled 
power consumption of the Port Navigation power supply and so the diagnostic stage 
is invoked: 
Residual detected between 
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Figure 7.11: Faulty Port-Lift Thruster: Starboard Navigation Power Consumption 
Component Detect Correlator Models Total 
Delta Recent Roll PNP SNP 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 2 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR 
Table 7.1: Faulty Port Lift-Thruster: First Iteration Nominations 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM 
Table 7.1 details the nominations produced during the first diagnostic iteration. 
The Port Lem Sensor is nominated once during detection as it generated the residual 
parameter. The Correlator's Delta Search then finds that both lift-thrusters have 
recently been activated and so nominates them. The Model-Based Diagnosis Engine, 
running the Port Navigation power model (and no others as they are not connected 
to the residual) parameter finds that the sensed power consumption can be matched 
with either the Port Lift-Thruster or the Port Lamp Controller. 
The total number of nominations for each component is shown at the far right 
of the table (7.1). 
Approximately a second after the fault is detected by the power model it be- 
comes apparent in the movement dimension and is picked up by the roll model, 
this is repeated until the fimil iteration. During the final iteration the fault is still 
generating two residuals: 
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4ý, 4§ý r q§b \15 ýb ý5 qj, gý C6\ No q, ý, - ob 
(a) Mission Time (Seconds) 
Component Detect Correlator 
Delta Recent 
Models 
Roll PNP SNP 
Total 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 1 1 19 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 1 14 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR 1 10 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 1 9 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR 9 
AOSI-COMPASS-SENSOR 1 5 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL 4 
PORT-TEMP-SENSOR 4 
Table 7.2: Faulty Port Lift-Thruster: Final Iteration Nominations 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Table 7.2 details the nominations produced during the final diagnostic iteration. 
The total on the far right of the table shows the total number of nominations received 
over this and all preceding iterations. The Port Lem and AOSI Compass Sensor have 
both been nominated during detection for producing residuals. 
The Correlator's Delta Search has matched the AOSI Roll and Gyro Pitch pa- 
rameters and so the Pitch Gyro Sensor has been nominated once. As the Port 
and Starboard Lift-Thrusters have now been active for longer than the Correlator's 
Recent Components search will allow they are no longer nominated. 
The Model-Based Diagnosis Engine nominates the Port Lift-Thruster using both 
the Roll and Port Navigation Power models, the latter of which also nominates the 
Port Lamp Controller. 
As all ten iferAions mv complete RECOVERY now invokes the Domain-Independent 
Hierarchv Module to check for common source connections between nominated com- 
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ponents. The Port and Starboard Navigation power supplies both have all their 
supplied components nominated and so the power supplies have a fault rating of I. 
This exceeds the nomination threshold and so they are both nominated. 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 1. (nominated) 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 1. (nominated) 
If a power supply is nominated the supplied components are all denominated 
as it is assumed that it is the power supply which is at fault. This changes the 
Suspicion Index to: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 254.565 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 10 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 9 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 5 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
PORT-NAV-POWER: 1 
STBD-NAV-POWER: 1 
The Port and Starboard Lift-Thrusters and Lamp Controllers have all been de- 
nominated and replaced with the Navigation power supplies. This denomination 
technique worked well when the Hierarchy Module was tested in isolation in Chap- 
ter 6. Unfortunately, when tested in the full system it has exonerated the very 
component that is at fault. 
The Component-Specific Diagnostic Level is now entered. The relevant sub- 
components would now be added, but none of the nominated components have any 
sub-components and so the Suspicion Index is unchanged. 
Evaluation of comp onent- specific information attached to each nominated com- 
ponent proceeds: 
Dynamic Rule Testing of Component: 
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PORT-LEM-SENSOR Started 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR Started 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR Started 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR Started 
PORT-NAV-POWER Started 
STBD-NAV-POWER Started 
Scan finished (no match found) 
RECOVERY only scans the components that have been nominated. The infor- 
mation (a static rule) detailing the wire-squeeze fault is attached to a non-nominated 
component and so it is not evaluated. This means that the known-fault of wire- 
squeeze is not found. 
Due to the denomination effect of the domain- independent Hierarchy Module 
the faulty Port Lift-Thruster component is not even on the suspicious list anymore 
- it has been exonerated. The output to the mission controller consists of only 
the Suspicion Index when no exact match is found and so the exoneration of the 
faulty component is a serious issue. This shows that although denomination is an 
attractive idea the risks far outweigh the benefits. 
Justification of Removal of Denomination 
Following the above findings the denomination method was disabled for the remain- 
der of the experiments. No other changes were made to the RECOVERY system 
during the evaluation of this research. 
It was felt necessary and justifiable to remove the denomination for several rea- 
sons. Exoneration is not a fundamental concept of RECOVERY, it is a possible 
bonus that has been experimentally shown not to be worthwhile. Keeping it in 
would have removed other, more fundamental and important benefits such as Search 
Space Reduction (evaluated later in this chapter). 
Although some other aspects of RECOVERY were found to be wanting they 
Nvere retained, as they were fundamental concepts (such as domain-independent 
diagnostics). In these cýises poor performance contributed to the research, as it 
highlighted areiis of further Nvork. Denomination is not fundamental and keeping 
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it would have contributed nothing to the research apart from distracting from the 
important, fundamental RECOVERY issues. 
The identification of denomination as reducing overall RECOVERY performance 
shows the crucial need to evaluate systems in the real world on real data. Although 
much research, thought and discussion went into the design of RECOVERY, denom- 
ination was found to be a performance reducer very quickly once it was applied to 
real data. It also shows the need for flexibility of design, for even the best thought- 
out systems will miss aspects of real-world operation. 
Note: The remainder of the experiments in this chapter will be per- 
formed without denomination. No other RECOVERY system changes 
were made during the evaluation of this research. 
7.2.8 Experiment: Faulty Port Lift-Thruster Without Hi- 
erarchical Denomination 
The faulty Port Lift-Thruster experiment was repeated with the denomination tech- 
nique disabled. The Navigation power supplies are still nominated, but without 
denomination the Lift-Thrusters and Lamp Controllers are still in the Suspicion 
Index: 
Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 254.565 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 10 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 19 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 14 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 9 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 9 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 5 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
PORT-NAV-POWER: 1 
STBD-NAV-POWER: 1 
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It is notable that the Port Lift Thruster, which is actually faulty, is at the top of 
the Suspicion Index. This is achieved even though so far only Domain-Independent 
tools and crude models have been used, none of which explicitly state the fault in 
the same way as a Rulebase. 
The combination of RECOVERY's Domain-Independent Diagnostic Tools and 
the Model-Based Diagnosis Engine has resulted in the correct diagnosis of a faulty 
component without that fault being explicitly foreseen and encoded. 
The Component- Specific Diagnostic Level is again entered and the relevant sub- 
components attached to the Suspicion Index, in this case to the Port and Starboard 
Lift-Thrusters (they are the only nominated components with sub-components): 
Component-Specific Diagnostic Level Entered 
Adding Related Sub-Components to Suspicion Index: 
Final Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 254.565 
Sub-Component Diagnostics Level 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 19 
PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL: 0 
PORT-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
PORT-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
PORT-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 14 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 9 
STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL: 0 
STBD-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
STBD-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 9 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 5 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
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PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
PORT-NAV-POWER: 1 
STBD-NAV-POWER: 1 
The Suspicion Index, and hence the amount of component-specific information 
to be processed, is far longer than that produced when denomination was active. 
The crucial point is that this time it contains the faulty component. 
RECOVERY now starts analysing the component-specific information attached 
to each of the components and sub-components. The information is passed to the 
relevant diagnostic tool, in this case the Dynamic Pattern Matcher. The component 
with the highest Suspicion Index is analysed first, followed by the next highest and 
so on: 
Dynamic Rule Testing of Component: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER Started 
PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL Started 
Exact Match Found 
Exiting diagnostics 
This time RECOVERY has determined a match between the known 'wire squeeze' 
fault (represented with a dynamic rule) contained in the Port Lift Thruster Control 
sub-component. This sub-component is determined to be faulty. The knowledge 
attached to the component could also have contained detailed algorithmic models of 
the thruster, or other detailed information, but developmental constraints prevented 
this. 
Even without the component-specific information being evaluated the overall 
Port Lift-Thruster component had the highest Suspicion Index and in the event of 
no exact match being found would still have had the highest probability of being 
faulty. This is a correct diagnosis. 
7.2.9 Experiment: Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster 
This is a repeat of the faulty Port Lift-Thruster experiment performed in Section 
1.2.8 but instead with the Starboard Lift-Thruster failing mid-mission. The exper- 
imental ,, et, up is identical. 
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Figure 7.12 (Depth) displays depth during both normal (Figure 7.12a) and fault. v 
(7.12b) operation. As in the faulty Port Lift-Thruster experiment the change in the 
depth profile due to lift-thruster failure is minimal due to the vectored nature of the 
lift-thrusters. Figure 7.13 also shows that the pitch is, again, relatively unchanged 
as the lift-thrusters are positioned approximately in the centre of the vehicle. 
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Figure 7.12: Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster: Depth 
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Figure 7.13: Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster: Pitch 
Figure 7.14 shows the large negative roll produced by the failure of the Starboard 
Lift-Thruster. (The failure of the Port Lift-Thruster produced a positive roll. ) 
This time Port Navigation power consumption (Figure 7.15) shows no loss in 
power whereas Starboard Navigation power consumption (Figure 7.16) has a clear 
discrepancy between normal and faulty operation. 
Because of the slow physical movement of RAUVER the fault first becomes 
apparent in the power dimension, with a residual being generated between the sensed 
and modelled Starboard Navigation power supply consumption: 
Residual detected between 
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Figure 7.14: Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster: Roll 
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Figure 7.15: Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster: Port Navigation Power Consumption 
Modelled Node: STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: STBD-LEM 
Table 7.3 details the nominations during first-iteration detection and diagnostics. 
The Starboard Lem is nominated once at detection for producing the Starboard 
Navigation Power residual. 
The Correlator's Delta Search has matched both Port and Starboard Lift-Thruster 
demands with the Starboard Lem (power consumption) parameter. This is highly 
relevant as during this mission it is only the lift-thrusters that have been drawing 
significant amounts of power from the navigation supplies. Both lift-thrusters have 
been found by the Delta Search as they are set to identical values during this mis- 
sion. The Delta Search has also matched the AOSI Magnetic X parameter, which 
is coincidental. The AOSI Compass is nominated as it generates this parameter. 
The Correlator's Recent Components Search has found that both Port and Star- 
board Lift-Thrusters have been Lictivated within 3 seconds (as detailed in the ex- 
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Figure 7.16: Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster: Starboard Navigation Power Con- 
sumption 
Component Detect Correlator 
Delta Recent 
Models 
Roll PNP SNP 
Total 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 3 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 2 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL I 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR I 
AOSI-COMPASS-SENSOR 1 
Table 7.3: Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster: First Iteration Nominations 
perimental setup in Section 7.2.1). This is another highly relevant discovery. 
The Model-Based Diagnosis Engine has found that the faulty level of power con- 
sumption could be produced by either the Starboard Lift-Thruster or the Starboard 
Lamp Controller. 
Approximately a second after the fault was first detected in the power dimension 
it became apparent in the movement dimension due to the extreme roll of the vehicle. 
During the final iteration the fault is still producing two residuals, one between 
sensed and modelled Starboard Navigation Power and AOSI Roll: 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: STBD-LEM 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
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(a) Mission Time (Seconds) 
Component Detect Correlator 
Delta Recent 
Models 
Roll PNP SNP 
Total 
AOSI-COMPASS-SENSOR 1 3 33 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 1 32 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 1 22 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL 1 17 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR 1 10 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 1 7 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR 1 4 
Table 7A Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster: Final Iteration Nominations 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Table 7.4 details the nominations generated during the final component-level 
diagnostic iteration. The totals at the far right of the table show total nominations 
for this and all preceding iterations. The Starboard Lem and AOSI Compass Sensors 
have both been nominated during detection for generating residuals. 
The Correlator's Delta Search has matched the Starboard Lem parameter with 
both Port and Starboard Lift-Thruster demand parameters and the AOSI Magnetic 
X parameters. The AOSI Roll parameter has been matched with the Port and 
Starboard Lamp Control demand parameters (identical throughout the mission), 
the AOSI Temperature and Magnetic X Parameters (coincidental) and the Gyro 
Pitch parameter (also coincidental) - 
The Correlator's Recent Component Search has not found any matches as no 
components were activated close to this final iteration. 
The Model-Based Diagnosis Engine has nominated both Port and Starboard Lift- 
Thrusters using the Roll model as the malfunctioning of either thruster could have 
caused the vehicle's roll. The Starboard Navigation power model has nominated the 
Starboard Lift-Thruster and the Starboard Lamp Controller for similar reasons. 
Unlike the faulty Port Lift-Thruster experiment the faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster 
component does not have the highest Suspicion Index at, this point. This is due to 
the high number of coincidental nominations by the Correlator of AOSI generated 
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parameters. The AOSI Compass component generates seven parameters. the high- 
est ratio of any component on RAUVER. This means that it has a high likelihood 
of being nominated by irrelevant Correlator matches. 
The faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster is high on the list with the second highest 
Suspicion Index. This still represents a significant achievement. 
As the component-level diagnostic iterations are finished the post-iteration Domain- 
Independent Hierarchy Module is invoked to check for common connections between 
nominated components: 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 1. (nominated) 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 1. (nominated) 
As with the faulty Port Lift-Thruster experiment both Navigation power supplies 
have been nominated as all their active supplied components have been nominated. 
Denomination has been deactivated and so they are simply added to the Suspicion 
Index. Related sub-components are then also added, producing a final component- 
level Suspicion Index of: 
Component-Specific Diagnostic Level Entered 
Adding Related Sub-Components to Suspicion Index: 
Final Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 442.135 
Sub-Component Diagnostics Level 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 33 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 32 
STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL: 0 
STBD-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
STBD-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 22 
PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL: 0 
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PORT-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
PORT-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
PORT-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 17 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 7 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 4 
PORT-NAV-POWER: 1 
STBD-NAV-POWER: 1 
The component-specific diagnostic level is now entered and RECOVERY starts 
analysing the component-specific information attached to each component via the 
Relational Model. The information is passed to the relevant diagnostic tool, in this 
case the Dynamic Pattern Matcher, starting with the component with the highest 
Suspicion Index: 
Dynamic Rule Testing of Component: 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR Started 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER Started 
STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL Started 
Exact Match Found 
Exiting diagnostics 
An exact match has been found with the known 'wire squeeze' fault attached to 
the Starboard Lift-Thruster's Control sub-component. This is a correct diagnosis, 
confirming that a highly suspicious component is actually faulty. This information 
would then be provided to the mission controller allowing it to accurately replan the 
mission. 
7.2.10 Discussion of Full System Evaluation 
The Relational Model proved to be a successful and versatile method for integrat- 
ing different diagnostic tools and knowledge, whilst also providing an underlying 
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methodology for the novel domain-independent diagnostic tools. It has proved to 
be a powerful and versatile device which shows a great deal of promise. 
The use of multiple dimensions, tied together by the Relational Model, also 
proved successful, with faults successfully being detected and diagnosed by different 
models. Combining the different diagnostic outputs across the dimensions resulted 
in the faulty component almost always having a higher suspicion index than other 
components. 
Using different techniques for fault detection and diagnosis works well, with 
the use of simple rules and equational models being greatly enhanced when used 
in conjunction with the Relational Model. Unfortunately, the paucity of sensor 
information resulted in some faults being undetectable in some conditions. Some 
faults also appeared to be identical and so were misdiagnosed. Without any method 
of diagnosing environmental effects the overall performance of the system is also 
limited. 
The novel domain-independent diagnostic tools worked well in conjunction with 
the conventional tools, often providing useful information and increasing the suspi- 
cion index of the faulty component. The use of the Hierarchy Module's denomination 
ability was found to be too high risk in real conditions and so was discarded. The 
Correlator was found to produce both relevant and irrelevant information. When 
the Correlator output was combined with the other diagnostic tool outputs the rel- 
evance aided overall system performance while the irrelevant simply contributed 
to the background 'noise'. The Correlator was found to occasionally miss impor- 
tant correlations due to having an overly narrow match window, although when 
this window was slightly widened the Correlator detected the relevant match at the 
cost of increased irrelevant nominations. But overall the novel domain- independent 
tools worked well under real conditions, particularly when the extremely simplistic 
implementation is taken into account. 
The realisation that a specific fault may become apparent at different times in 
different dimensions came during the early stages of testing, leading to the develop- 
ment of the multiple iterations now used by RECOVERY This was shown to work 
well in practice with faults being detected in different dimensions. 
The breakdown of the components into component and sub-component types was 
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successful, reducing the need for the system to trawl through masses of component- 
specific information until a certain component could be picked out - 
Overall, the full RECOVERY system works extremely well under real conditions. 
It successfully integrates the outputs of different diagnostic tools, including the novel 
domain-independent techniques developed during this research. It also successfully 
integrates heterogeneous diagnostic knowledge as used by the different diagnostic 
tools. 
7.3 Evaluation of Search Space Reduction 
This section evaluates RECOVERY's Search Space Reduction methods and com- 
pares the results and operation with a classical Dynamic Rulebase. 
RECOVERY contains a heterogeneous knowledge base partitioned into component- 
specific regions. RECOVERY links these component-specific regions to specific com- 
ponents using links in the Relational Model so that when a component is nominated 
as suspicious then only the information attached to that component needs to be 
evaluated. This provides a method for reducing the amount of search space, or the 
amount of knowledge to be analysed, compared with analysing all the knowledge in 
the database. 
A classical Rulebase does not have Search Space Reduction, it simply runs 
through the knowledge base evaluating one rule at a time until it either finds a 
match or runs out of rules. The time to find the correct rule will depend on the 
position of the rule in the knowledge base: it will take less time to find a rule at the 
beginning than the end. 
A real mission log file as used in the Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster experiment 
earlier in this chapter (Section 7.2.9) is used as the basis for the test. RECOVERY 
detection algorithms are run as standard until a fault is detected, at which point 
either the full RECOVERY system or a simple Rulebase are invoked. 
In these tests RECOVERY's component-specific knowledge base is limited to dy- 
namic rules and the saine Dviiainic Pattern Matcher Tool is used for both RECOV- 
ERY and Rulebase evaluation. A single 'correct' rule is inserted into the knowledge 
Nise M various locations. Each test is repeated three times to show repeatability and 
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to determine any inconsistencies due to the non real-time Windows TNT4.0 operating 
sYstem. 
The metric for these tests is the time taken to find the correct rule. 
7.3.1 Experiment Setup 
Size of Rulebase: 62 Dynamic Rules 
Rule at Start: Position I 
Rule at End: Position 62 
RECOVERY: Settings are as detailed in Section 7.2.1 at the beginning of this chap- 
ter. 
Denomination Disabled 
Mission Log File: Full-System Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster 
7.3.2 Experiment: RECOVERY Versus Rulebase with Cor- 
rect Rule at Start and End of Knowledge Base 
These tests were performed on the Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster Full System Eval- 
uation mission log file, during which the component attached to the correct rule 
(Starboard Lift-Thruster Controller) was rated third in the suspicion index (see 
Section 7.2.9) and so was the third rule to be evaluated by RECOVERY. Improved 
times would be gained with a more accurate diagnosis. 
Table 7.5 shows the time taken for a Classical Rulebase and the full RECOVERY 
system (incorporating Search Space Reduction) to find the correct dynamic rule. 
When the rule is at the start of the knowledge base the Rulebase is faster than 
RECOVERY due to RECOVERY's overhead. When the rule is at the end of the 
knowledge base the Classical Rulebase takes far longer to run as it must simply run 
each rule until it finds the correct one. In this case RECOVERY's slight overhead 
is grossly offset by the reduction in the size of the search space and so the amount 
of time taken for diagnosis. 
The use of RECOVERY's search space reduction methods brings the diagnostic 
time down from 51 seconds with a, classic rulebase to 8 seconds with RECOVERY. 
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System Rule RunI Run2 Run3 
Position (Seconds) (Seconds) (Seconds) 
Rulebase Start 2 2 1 
RECOVERY Start 9 8 8 
Rulebase End 51 51 51 
RECOVERY End 8 8 8 
Table 7.5: Time in Seconds to Match a Dynamic Rule using a Simple Rulebase 
versus RECOVERY's Search Space Reduction 
7.3.3 Discussion of Search Space Reduction 
RECOVERY's Search Space Reduction method has proven to be extremely useful. 
The amount of information to be evaluated, and so both the time and power required 
for diagnosis has been substantially reduced over conventional methods. 
Justification of Experiment 
A classical Rulebase evaluating dynamic rules was used to compare with the RE- 
COVERY method. When a classical Rulebase evaluates static rules the time taken 
to evaluate each rule is generally very low as the amount of information to be eval- 
uated is small - it is an information poor technique. A dynamic rule takes a lot 
longer than a static rule to evaluate as the entire mission file must be scanned for 
each rule - it is an information rich technique. 
It would have been possible to scan the entire mission file once and evaluate each 
dynamic rule in turn at each step, this would have been faster than scanning the 
entire mission file for each dynamic rule in turn. This technique was not used for 
two reasons: 
1. A classical Rulebase, as used in most industrial or real-world situations, 
works by scanning each rule in turn and so this method was used for the comparison 
Rulebase. 
2. RECOVERY's Search Space Reduction technique has a large overhead when 
compared with, say, a classical static, Rulebase. It is accepted that RECOVERY's 
Search Space Reduction (with the current diagnostic tools) cannot match the speed 
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of a static rulebase - the overhead is not worth it. 
But RECOVERY does have an advantage when working with large amounts of 
information. To show this a form of information was needed that took an appre- 
ciable amount of time to evaluate. Ideally, detailed equational models would have 
been used, but models take time to develop and developmental time was extremely 
constrained. Instead, dynamic rules were used because they take very little time to 
develop but take an appreciable amount of time to evaluate. 
In effect, RECOVERY is being compared with a non search-space-reduct ion 
technique working in an information rich environment. The key point is to show 
that Search Space Reduction has great advantages in information-rich environments 
- the form the information takes is not important. 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
If looked at from a purely time-constrained point of view then if the search space is 
small, or if the knowledge available is information poor, then RECOVERY's over- 
head is generally not justified (although RECOVERY does provide other advantages, 
as discussed elsewhere). 
But as the size of the search space increases, and as the knowledge becomes 
information rich, then RECOVERY's overhead becomes increasingly justified as it 
provides a means to drastically reduce the search space. 
It should be noted that in the above experiment the search space is drastically 
reduced, from 62 dynamic rules down to 2, even though RECOVERY has not placed 
the correct faulty component at the top of the list. (The above experiment is 
based on the Faulty Starboard Lift-Thruster Experiment, which produced the final 
Suspicion Index shown in Section 7.2.9). 
The evaluation of RECOVERY's Search Space Reduction method can be sum- 
marised as follows: 
The larger the search space the greater the advantage of RECOVERY's Search 
Space Reduction method. 
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7.4 Discussion: The Limits of RECOVERY 
The evaluation of RECOVERY has shown some limits and advantages, these will 
be discussed in this section. They break down into two forms: developmental and 
philosophical. 
7.4.1 Developmental Limits 
The current implementation of RECOVERY is research orientated and as such needs 
more development to overcome limits that are not inherent in the RECOVERY 
architecture. 
The use of memory has not been optimised and the code is not written in the 
most efficient manner. There is no coherent time management strategy, which would 
be vital for use as a real-time online system. Although the system is modular it is 
not fully plug and play; if a new diagnostic tool is to be added then the code 
must be recompiled, although new items of supported information may be added at 
will. More types of both diagnostic knowledge and diagnostic tools also need to be 
supported. 
The use of integer increments for the Suspicion Index is also overly primitive, 
particularly for interfacing probabilistic to other types of diagnostic tools. 
7.4.2 Philosophical Limits 
The RECOVERY architecture has some limits implicit in its design. The Relational 
Model can show only a limited number of relationships between nodes. The overall 
effectiveness of the system depends on the accuracy and scope of the Relational 
Model, which is unlikely to be totally accurate. 
The Relational Model is presently unable to encompass the environment outside 
the robot, which is perhaps the biggest constraint on its effectiveness. Although 
the Relational Model is quite effective when representing a structured, man-made 
systein such as a robot it cannot contain the complexity of the outside world. 
Even if the number of nodes and types of relationships are extended it is unlikely 
to be able to reflect the true complexity of the real world, but it is still useful for 
164 
representing the most useful types of diagnostic relationships. The discrete. decou- 
pled dimensional approach to multidimensionality also limits the overall usefulness 
of the system. It would be far more useful if the dimensions were coupled in a more 
realistic manner. 
7.5 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter presented the evaluation of both the full RECOVERY system and its 
method for Search Space Reduction. Both experiments showed strengths and weak- 
nesses which were discussed after the experimental results were presented. This was 
followed by a short discussion on the limits imposed on the RECOVERY imple- 
mentation by the constrained development time, and also the limits implicit in the 
philosophy of RECOVERY's architecture. 
When presented with an environmental fault the various systemic ally- orient at ed 
diagnostic tools most often diagnosed the relevant sensor as being faulty, this is 
acceptable as none of the tools or models encompass the environment. 
The use of denomination (or exoneration) was shown to be a high-risk strategy 
when presented with real failures, this practice was discontinued for the remainder 
of the experiments. Overall the full RECOVERY system was shown to work well 
on systemic faults, with the novel domain- independent diagnostic tools producing 
useful outputs on real faults. 
RECOVERY's Focus of Suspicion method for search space reduction was shown 
to be extremely useful, with the advantages increasing with the size of the search 
space. 
The next and final chapter draws conclusions about this research. Further work 
and ways to move the research forward are then described, followed by an overall 
summary of achievements. 
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Classical Expert System Knowledge Base 
(Rules Unsegregated) 
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Figure 7.17: RECOVERY'S segmented knowledge database and a classical rule 
knowledge base showing that using RECOVERY's focus of suspicion method can 
reduce the search space. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions & Further Work 
8.1 Aim of this Chapter 
This chapter reviews the original contributions from this research and presents con- 
clusions for each contribution. This is followed by further work needed to extend 
and improve system performance. 
8.2 Conclusions 
A fully working integrated diagnostic architecture (RECOVERY) was developed and 
tested on a real autonomous underwater vehicle (RAUVER) under real operating 
conditions. 
The evaluation vehicle, RAUVER, was designed by the author during the first 
year of this research, including all mechanical, electrical, electronic and software 
systems. During the first year the author supervised and coordinated the vehicle 
build. 
The developmental stage of RAUVER highlighted some design faults, several of 
which were used as the basis for experimental evaluation of RECOVERY. In these 
experiments RECOVERY either successfully diagnosed the problem or highlighted 
extremely relevant information. 
The adoption of a practically orientated development technique, together with 
the crude, simplest form of diagnostic tools and information forced by the time limit I 
has led to a successful working system of immediate practical benefit. 
Several companies and other organisations have expressed interest in developing 
and commercialising RECOVERY. 
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8.2.1 Conclusions on the use of a Real Autonomous Robotic 
Vehicle (RAUVER) for Evaluation 
The use of a real autonomous vehicle and real mission data rather than a simulation 
led directly to some alterations, discoveries and constraints: 
The slow physical response of RAUVER led to the faults becoming apparent 
in different dimensions at different points in time. This led to the extension of 
RECOVERY from a single diagnostic iteration to several iterations followed by a 
post-iteration segment, a technique that worked well. 
The need to keep processing power to a minimum became apparent when specl- 
fying the onboard processor and power systems for RAUVER. The tight constraints 
on physical space inside the pressure hulls has led to the only realistic choice being 
a PC104+ industrial computing card, the maximum speed available at the time of 
writing is a Pentium 30OMHz. This card consumes 8 Watts of power. The low bat- 
tery powers available at present mean that every Watt saved is significant, leading to 
some advanced vehicles such as the Autonomous Systems Institute 'SAUV' vehicle 
reverting to x486 processors to conserve power. 
Because of these practical constraints it is not possible to simply throw more 
powerful processors at the problem. RECOVERY code was optimised during devel- 
opment to bring diagnostic times down to within 10 seconds from initial detection 
to diagnosis using a Pentium 20OMHz processor. 
The use of real mission data meant that there was no possibility of adjusting 
mission parameters to show the system in a favourable light. In some cases the 
noisy data caused RECOVERY to misdiagnose, forcing system alterations to limit 
the amount of irrelevant correlations produced, which later had the effect of missing 
crucial data. 
RAUVER has a limited number of sensors onboard, as dictated by both devel- 
opment time and available money, a common situation when developing a vehicle. 
This meant that sensors could not simply be added into a simulation, RECOVERY 
development and evaluation had to make do with what was available. This led to 
the reýilisation of just how 'blind' a robot, ic vehicle really is and so to the adoption 
of the procedure of maximising available information for diagnosis. 
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Some of the sensors also proved to be noisy, leading to problems with model 
accuracy and the degradation of detection performance. 
All these points assisted in the practical mindset adopted during RECOVERY 
development. 
The use of extremely crude models for detection and diagnosis has shown that 
even these simple models can be extremely useful in a real, practical situation. 
The use of RAUVER introduced some constraints on evaluation., Initially the 
Domain- Independent Hierarchy Module was to be evaluated by installing switches 
and selectively disabling combinations of power supplies. It became clear that this 
was not going to be possible due to the extremely limited development time available, 
the limited space and tight wiring constraints imposed by RAUVER construction 
(no room for the switches), and the unwillingness to repeatedly open RAUVER 
pressure hulls due to the possibility of a leak. It was hoped that the RAUVER 
maintenance overhaul period would fall well before RECOVERY evaluation and so 
allow at least some evaluation hardware to be installed, together with a GPS module 
for enhanced missions, but this was not possible due to time constraints on other 
Ocean Systems Personnel. 
This was offset by the opportunity to use some real faults for RECOVERY 
evaluation. 
8.2.2 Conclusions on the Literature Review 
The literature review showed that the use of automated diagnostics for autonomous 
missions is strongly supported by NASA for both unmanned and manned missions, 
especially for missions that have a high chance of failure. Integrated diagnostics is 
a field of study that is meriting research by large, cutting-edge organisations such 
as NASA, General Electric and the United States military. These and other organ- 
isations conducted the Open Systems Approach to Integrated Diagnostics Demon- 
stration (OSAIDD) study. This study was undertaken during the first year of this 
research, with results published during the second year. 
RECOVERY is effectively a fully working and extended implementation of the 
vague conceptual specification produced by the OSAIDD study. RECOVERY's 
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Relational Model was shown to fulfill and extend the specification laid down in the 
OSAIDD study for a central informational model. 
8.2.3 Conclusions on the Full RECOVERY System Evalua- 
tion 
RECOVERY was shown to successfully integrate different types of diagnostic tools 
and diagnostic knowledge. RECOVERY successfully diagnosed faults using a Model- 
Based Diagnosis Engine in conjunction with novel Domain-Independent Diagnostics 
acting on RECOVERY's Relational Model. 
The diagnostic capability (and so mission robustness) of an AUV can be increased 
by adding cheap, internal sensors to provide additional diagnostic viewpoints. 
Clear benefits are attainable by using different types of diagnosis and multi- 
dimensional viewpoints together with a mixture of domain-specific and domain- 
independent information. With these methods it is possible to diagnose specific 
faults using general information. 
It is essential for some method to be found to evaluate performance of tools 
under different conditions so that some measure of relevance can be found. This 
information should be part of the 'plug' for the tools: 'invoke me under these con- 
ditions but not others'. It should also apply to diagnostic knowledge, for instance 
the roll model is only useful when the vehicle is submerged as it does not take into 
account wave action. 
Much useful heterogeneous information is generated as part of the usual AUV 
design process, most of which is not generally used for automated diagnosis. For in- 
stance, RAUVER documentation consists mainly of paper copies of circuit diagrams 
and component data sheets, none of which would normally be used for diagnostics. 
Any system that tries to make use of this information needs to be modular to cope 
with the wide variety of configurations available to AUVs. 
The use of embedded diagnostics is also useful. If no diagnostic system had 
been present in RAUVER during these faults then the only fault detection would 
have been alarms and vioLited mission constraints. The diagnosis, such as it was, 
would be limited to 'roll too high' with no ability to determine that it was actually 
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a thruster at fault, let alone a particular thruster. 
Using a simple systems such as a classical Rulebase the programmer would have 
had to foresee many specific events and encode them as rules, such as 'if vehicle 
rolls to port when vehicle moving vertically then port lift thruster is faulty'. Whilst 
this is useful for the more common, foreseeable faults it is of limited use for real 
autonomy as every situation must be predicted. RECOVERY showed that it could 
diagnose specific faults using only general system information. 
The ability to diagnose specific faults using non fault-specific commonly available 
information, coupled with the ability to significantly reduce the search space, shows 
that the design and run-time overhead of the RECOVERY system is worthwhile. 
When coupled with an autonomous mission controller such as a planner, or even 
a mission script, it has the potential to enhance robotic autonomy by providing 
enhanced fault information. 
8.2.4 Conclusions on RECOVERY's Search Space Reduc- 
tion Method 
RECOVERY proved able to provide a high Suspicion Index for the faulty component 
under most conditions. 
RECOVERY's Focus of Suspicion method for Search Space Reduction was shown 
to be able to greatly reduce the diagnostic search space, and so the amount of 
information to be analysed. This can greatly reduce the time (from 51 seconds 
down to 8 with a reasonable sized search space), number of processor operations and 
electrical power required to arrive at a diagnosis, even if the information consists 
only of rules. 
8.2.5 Conclusions on the use of Do main- Independent Diag- 
nostics 
Domain-Independent Diagnostics work in at least two areas: General Correlations 
and Hierarchical Diagnostics. These work on both the behaviour of faulty param- 
eters and the outputs of different types of diagnostic tool. The Relational Model 
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should enable other types of Dom ain- Independent Diagnostics to be developed. 
The use of denomination is risky and should be avoided in order to prevent the 
exclusion of a faulty component from the diagnostic search space. 
To increase the amount of diagnostic knowledge and to enable Domain-Independent 
Hierarchical diagnostics to work properly every parameter should have detection in- 
formation attached to it, even if this information is simple maximum/minimum 
limits. 
If a source component, such as a power supply, does not have direct sensing of 
voltage then subcomponents must be active and detectable at the time of the fault 
in order to diagnose the failure of the power supply. 
Overall the domain- independent diagnostic tools work very well in conjunction 
with RECOVERY's Relational Model. 
8.3 Further Work 
This section discusses ideas for enhancing and extending RECOVERY's perfor- 
mance. 
8.3.1 Practical Work 
The system must be tuned to reduce processor overheads, memory requirements and 
run-time in order to minimise power consumption and diagnostic time. This will 
make it more attractive to heavily constrained autonomous robots. 
8.3.2 Diagnostic Performance Metrics 
This thesis does not provide figures of merit for RECOVERY performance, apart 
from the time reduction of the Search Space Reduction methods. This is because 
RECOVERY is at a very early stage of development and so it is preferable to talk 
through each success and failure, explaining the issues involved and highlighted. A 
raw figure of merit would not show this. 
But figures of merit, and other diagnostic performance metrics, are essential if 
RECOVERY is to be compared to other systems in the future. They are particularly 
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important for convincing other organisations of the benefits of a particular system 
as they provide objective summaries of system performance. 
Standard diagnostic metrics exist for conventional systems, these are the rates 
of Fault Detection, Fault Isolation and False Alarms. These are insufficient in scope 
for evaluating the next generation of Integrated Diagnostics, particularly embedded 
(or fielded) systems such as RECOVERY. James Bohr [9] addresses these issues and 
provides and extended metric set. David Doel [34] proposes a systems-engineering 
approach. 
8.3.3 Mission Control 
The mission controller should be linked into the Relational Model so that the com- 
ponents used are the same throughout both diagnostic and mission control areas. 
Extra links could be added to show which goals use which components. This would 
aid in detection, diagnosis and mission replanning. 
8.3.4 Fault Accommodation 
RECOVERY's operation should be extended to encompass fault accommodation as 
well as detection and diagnosis. Although it is the mission controller's responsibility 
to determine whether to replan or abort the mission, the diagnostic system needs to 
be able to cope with degraded vehicle performance in case of mission continuation. 
This means being able to alter the models used for detection and diagnosis so that 
RECOVERY is not in a continuous state of diagnosis during a degraded mission. 
Various techniques exist for automatically generating and modifying models (as 
discussed in Chapter 3) these could be added to RECOVERY in a 'post- diagnostic 
accommodation' stage. 
The models currently used for detection and diagnosis could also be used for ve- 
hicle control. For instance, the models could be used to calculate the thrust required 
to lift the vehicle at a particular rate (currently done with a simple PID controller). 
When the models are degraded the performance of the vehicle is automatically com- 
pensated for. In the 'dead lift-thruster' example used for evaluation the models 
could be used to solve the constrained movement problem of lifting within a certain 
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amount of roll. 
8.3.5 Integrating Diagnostic Tools 
Far more research is needed on the subject of integrating, particularly as to how 
different diagnostic tools should be weighted, how secondary diagnostic information 
should be weighted, and how diagnostic tool outputs should be weighted under 
different operating circumstances. 
One promising method of interfacing tools with different characteristics is context- 
dependent voting. For instance, some tools work very well when the system is under 
steady state conditions but badly when the system is in flux. Other tools have the 
opposite characteristics. By combining information on the how the performance of 
tools changes with system context, together with information on the current context 
of the system, diagnostic performance should be much improved. 
A 'cheap' but powerful solution to this problem is to use fuzzy context weighting. 
Homayoun Seraji et al of NASA/JPL use this method in a forthcoming paper to 
adjust the weighting of different sensors on a 'landing site judger' for a Mars lander. 
For instance, radar works best when at low altitude, video cameras work very poorly 
during dust storms, etc. By using context-specific fuzzy weighting of these sensors 
they have greatly improved the performance of the system responsible for judging 
the suitability of landing sites. 
Some form of formal metric needs to be developed that can determine the rele- 
vance of the different integrated diagnostic tools under different conditions. 
Goebel, Krok and Sutherland [44] cite the difficulty of integrating probabilistic 
diagnostic methods, such as Neural Networks, with non-probabilistic, such as Model- 
Based Diagnosis methods. They propose that the output of all tools should be 
constrained to a non-linear 'belief' value, ranging from 0 to 1. This system could 
easily be adopted on RECOVERY, but questions remain on interfacing. In the 
meantime the use of Suspicion Index nomination weighting should be investigated. 
There is a great deal of commonalitly between integrating (fusing) diagnostic 
tools and sensor fusion. RECOVERY can be seen as fusion architecture, fusing 
sensors, diagnostic tools, and diagnostic knowledge. Sensor fusion is currently a 
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major research area and the techniques and knowledge gained should be applied to 
the fusion of diagnostic tools and knowledge. 
8.3.6 Machine Learning 
The Correlator can effectively generate new relational links between nodes although 
it does not actually do this at present. This is a powerful ability which should be 
further investigated as it raises the possibility of being able to learn from previous 
faults. 
8.3.7 Multiple Robots 
There is a strong research push towards using multiple cooperating robots. This 
has interesting implications for automated diagnosis as it provides the possibility 
of using multiple, external points of view. This should greatly enhance the diag- 
nostic capability by providing a much-expanded observation space. RECOVERY's 
Relational Model could be extended to encompass observations from outside the 
vehicle. 
This provides a method of diagnosing problems in the environment. For in- 
stance, if several vehicles in group are suffering from drift then it is likely to be an 
environmental effect such as a water current and not a sensor fault in a particular 
vehicle. 
8.3.8 Distributed Modularity 
The use of multiple robots, together with the ongoing push towards 'intelligent' 
components running their own processors, means that in the future diagnostic sys- 
tems such as RECOVERY will be needed that can cope with distributed modularity. 
This will be made more difficult by different robots and systems running at different 
speeds and different times, some on real-time and some on other operating systems. 
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8.3.9 Active Testing 
RECOVERY currently acts as a passive observer, unable to control the vehicle. 
Many faults require active diagnosis to solve them, such as providing an input to a 
suspect component and observing the output. For instance, if it is thought that a 
given thruster is faulty then tests could be used to discount possibilities such as the 
vehicle being entangled in a rope, etc. 
8.3-10 Extending the Relational Model 
The Relational Model's links currently only state that there is a relationship of a 
certain type between two nodes, without giving any more information. Information 
should be added to each link to describe its attributes. For instance, a link between a 
power supply and a supplied component could contain information on the resistance 
of the lead (an issue in high-power circuits), further increasing the information 
available for diagnosis. 
At present the Relational Model breakdown is based on least replaceable units, 
but for diagnosis, as opposed to fixing by a human operator, this may not be the 
best technique. Other techniques should be investigated to determine the best level 
of breakdown into components and subcomponents. 
The types of nodes and links in the Relational Model should also be extended 
to reflect a more diverse selection of components, parameters and relationships. 
8.3.11 Extending Diagnostic Knowledge 
RECOVERY should support more types of diagnostic knowledge. At present it sup- 
ports algorithmic models, static rules, dynamic rules and Domain-Independent rules. 
Other types of available knowledge are: training sets for neural networks, Mean Time 
Between Failures, characteristics graphs (as in most semiconductor datasheets) and 
so on. 
For instance, RAUVER has a problem with its water detectors decaying and 
providing a false alarm every few months, as shown in the RAUVER Fault Log 
(Section 6.2.1. This information is clearly useful for diagnosis but is not currently 
implemented in RECOVERY. 
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The present knowledge space is segmented into two layers: system-specific (roll 
model) and component-specific (a thruster model). Another layer may be type- 
specific knowledge as several components of the same type are often used within 
a system (RAUVER has two sets of identical thrusters). Further research into the 
most efficient segmentation of the knowledge space should be conducted. 
Due to developmental time constraints RECOVERY currently supports only 
static and dynamic rules at the component-specific stage. This was found to be 
more than enough for demonstrating the effectiveness of RECOVERY's Search Space 
Reduction method. The use of equational models at this stage would have amplified 
the effectiveness of the Search Space Reduction method and would also have allowed 
the use of hierarchic al- detail diagnostic operation. 
8.3-12 Extending Diagnostic Tools 
Differing types of Diagnosis Tool, such as Bayesian Belief Networks or Neural Net- 
works should be added to study how the system is enhanced with these powerful 
methods. 
8.3.13 Introducing a Real-Time Diagnostic Strategy 
In order to meet real-time constraints a coherent time-management strategy should 
be implemented. Aldea [2] demonstrated a successful system using a hierarchy of 
models, with the most detailed models taking the longest to run. The system could 
decide which model to run depending on how much time was available for diagnosis. 
This could be extended to cover all the information stored in the knowledge space, 
not just models, so allowing RECOVERY to meet deadlines. 
8.3.14 Extending Domain-Independent Diagnostics 
The Domain-Independent Hierarchy Module should be extended to run over several 
iterations, enabling it to move up more than one step in the Relational Model 
source/sink hierarchy. For instance, at present the Hierarchy Module can only move 
one step up the hierarchly, from faulty alarms to nominating the 5V power supply 
(which supplies them). If the batteries were faulty and so more than one power 
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supply seemed faulty the Hierarchy Module would not be able to move another step 
up the hierarchy to the batteries (which supply all the power supplies). 
Some limit would be needed on the number of iterations, a provisional limit 
would be to stop when no more components are being nominated. If a fixed number 
of iterations was used there would be a risk that hierarchical diagnostics would be 
terminated before reaching all the way up the fault chain. 
Further work is also needed on the technique of denomination. Denominating 
exonerated components could further reduce the search space, but this is currently 
too high a risk due to the crudity of the Domain-Independent diagnostic techniques. 
Currently only a few items of Domain-Independent diagnostic information are 
used. This should be increased to cover other equivalent relationships. For instance, 
a resistor in an electrical circuit is equivalent to a constriction in a hydraulic pipe 
or to friction in a gearbox. 
8.4 Overall Summary of Research 
This research has attained a number of achievements, as listed below. 
e The design of a novel integrated diagnostic architecture and its implementation 
as a fully working system known as RECOVERY. 
As far as is known RECOVERY is ahead of any other system for integrated di- 
agnostics. The fact that the multi-body OSAIDD study, encompassing NASA, 
US Dol), General Electric, etc, only made vague conceptual recommendations 
in 1999 strongly supports this. 
9 RECOVERY is a full working system that has been successfully implemented 
on a real AUV, used to diagnose real faults discovered in real-world conditions. 
The implementation of RECOVERY highlighted previously unknown possi- 
bilities for integrated diagnostics, such as search space reduction, domain- 
independent diagnostics and the ability to diagnose non directly-sensed com- 
ponents. 
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9 RECOVERY was shown to be more than a method of overlaying diagnostic 
tool outputs. It is also structured to allow the use of novel domain-independent 
diagnostic tools and successful techniques for search space reduction. 
* The ability to use cheap commonly available (and commonly discarded) design 
knowledge, such as hydrodynamic models, for fault diagnosis was shown. 
e RECOVERY was shown to be able to successfully diagnose real problems 
without fault-specific information. 
,D RECOVERY's architecture allows diagnosis of components that are not di- 
rectly sensed. 
* RECOVERY's method of search space reduction shows clear benefits over 
conventional systems, with the benefit increasing with the size of the search 
space. 
e RECOVERY is of immediate practical benefit to the autonomous robot com- 
munity. 
* Embedded integrated diagnostics can enhance mission controller performance 
by providing enhanced information on unforeseen problems. 
* Further academic research based on RECOVERY is already being proposed. 
e The commercialisation and research prospects show that RECOVERY has 
much potential. 
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Appendix A 
Glossary of Terms 
A. 1 Diagnostic Terms 
e AUV: Autonomous Underwater Vehicle. An underwater robot that can act 
without outside intervention. Most commonly a torpedo shaped survey sub- 
marine at present, but AUVs capable of interacting with submerged objects 
(intervention) are in development. 
* Central Information Model: Proposed by the OSAIDD study as the key com- 
ponent in an underlying architecture for Integrated Diagnostics. 
e Diagnostic Information Fusion: A branch of Integrated Diagnostics which con- 
centrates on providing underlying methods for combining the outputs of dif- 
ferent diagnostics systems. 
41 Diagnostic Tool: A diagnostic system. 
e Dimension: An area in which a fault is apparent, for instance a fault that 
causes an aeroplane to roll is apparent in the movement dimension. 
e Dynamic: A fault that can only be diagnosed by looking at the state of a 
system over time. 
* FDDR: Fault Detection, Diagnosis and Recovery. Also known as FDDA, or 
Fault Detection, Diagnosis and Accommodation. The overall diagnostic pro- 
cess where a fault is detected, diagnosed and recovered from. 
9 FDI: Fault Detection and Isolation. A diagnostic system that can diagnose a 
fault but not recover from it. 
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* Finite State Machine: Any program (or other device) that has a finite set of 
states. In the context of this thesis it means a pre-programmed mission in 
which the mission programmer has tried to anticipate all possible outcomes. 
* Generality: The ability to generalise from specific examples. 
9 Heterogeneous: Encompassing different types of diagnostic tool. 
* Homogeneous: Encompassing only a single type of diagnostic tool. 
* Incipient: A slowly developing fault. 
e Integrated Diagnostics: A process by which large organisations, particularly 
the US Military, aim to reduce life cycle costs of their systems by reducing 
maintenance through improved diagnostics. It has a logistical focus at present. 
e MetOcean: A branch of meteorological forecasting focussed on the state of the 
ocean. 
e Model-Based Diagnosis: A form of diagnostic system that uses models of the 
system under investigation. 
* Monodimensional: A model or process that deals with only a single aspect of 
a system, for instance movement, or power consumption. 
e Multidimensional: A model or process that deals with more than one aspect 
of a system. 
Observability: Price [84] defines observability as "There should be sufficzent 
observation points that inconsistent results to tests can be detected ... and that 
sufficient data can be gathered to be able to perform diagnosis to the most ac- 
curate level desired... ". Diagnostic systems generally concentrate on observing 
(sensing) system parameters, it is essential that there are enough observations 
for these systenis to work properly. 
9 OSAIDD: The Open SIN'stems Approach to Integrated Diagnostics Demonstra- 
tion Study. A far reaching multi-organisational study that determined the way 
forwards for Integrated Diagnostics. 
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9 Prognosis: The expected outcome of a fault. 
* ROV: Remotely Operated Vehicle: Human controlled underwater robot, usu- 
ally supplied with power and control from the surface via a cable or tether. 
* Rulebase: A form of expert system that uses a knowledge base of rules in an 
'if-then' form. 
* Static: A fault that can be diagnosed from looking at the state of a system at 
a single instant in time (a snapshot). 
* Topology: The relationship between nodes in a network. 
* Waypoint: A common method of specifying a route that an agent (AUV, etc) 
must follow. 
A. 2 RECOVERY- Specific Terms 
o Activity Status: A data slot in the Nodal Information Database that store a 
flag denoting whether that particular component (node) is active at that time. 
9 Activity Status Generator: The module that determines the activity of each 
component using information provided in that component's information file. 
* Alarm Watcher: The module that scans all alarm parameters to see if they 
are activated. Also scans all parameters that have max/min limits associated 
with them to see if they are outside their limits. 
* Compiler: The module that takes the Component Information Files and com- 
piles the information contained into the Relational Model and the Segregated 
Diagnostic Knowledge Database. 
9 Component- Specific Information: Information relevant to a particular compo- 
nent. 
9 Component Information File: Information file containing diagnostic data rel- 
evant to a specific component. Also used to store system information, such as 
the relationships betweeii components. 
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* Constraint Watcher: The module that watches for information passed from 
the mission controller about any parameters that have exceeded goal-specific 
limits. 
* Correlator: A RECOVERY diagnostic tool that searches for correlations be- 
tween faulty and other parameters. 
9 Data & dt Values: Data slots in the Nodal Information Database that store 
parameter values and their generated differentials. 
9 Data Copier: The module that copies data from the robotic vehicle's data ring 
and stores it in the appropriate Nodal Information Database data slot. 
* Data Generator: The module that automatically generates differentials of all 
data copied from the vehicle's data ring. Also generates Activity Status of 
each component. 
* Data Manager: Manages the retrieval of information from the Relational 
Model and Segregated Diagnostic Knowledge Database. Also passes the infor- 
mation to any module that request it. 
Domain- Independent Diagnostics: Diagnostic tools that exploit the equiva- 
lence between domains and so are not limited to a single domain. For instance, 
resistance in the electrical domain is equivalent to a constriction in a hydraulic 
system. RECOVERY provides methods for domain-independent diagnostics. 
9 Fault Detection: The suite of detection tools that detect faults. 
9 Final List Maker: Produces a list of suspicious components ranked in order of 
suspicion. 
9 Focus of Suspicion: Alethod by which the diagnostics search space is reduced. 
9 Hierarchy Module: A RECOVERY diagnostic tool that searches for common 
connections between nominated components. 
9 Invocation Manager: Determines which module should be invoked, and invokes 
them. 
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Iteration Counter: Counts the diagnostic iterations and provides this informa- 
tion to the Invocation Manager. 
List of Diagnostic Tools: Stored in the Invocation Manager to allow it to 
invoke the diagnostic tools. 
9 List of Links: Master list of links, containing endpoint identifiers (Node IDs) 
for each link. 
* Master List of Nodes: Master list of Node Identifiers, used to index and access 
information in the Segregated Diagnostic Knowledge Database. 
e Mission Controller: The module responsible for determining the actions of the 
robot. 
9 Nodal Information Database: Part of the Relational Model. Contains multiple 
data slots for each node. 
Node Type: A data slot in the Nodal Information Database that stores the 
type of that node, such as component, parameter, etc. 
Nominator: The module that, increments the Suspicion Index data slot of 
nominated components (nodes). 
RECOVERY: The architecture (and also the implementation) developed dur- 
ing the course of this research to provide an underlying architecture for Inte- 
grated Diagnostics. It is a more detailed, fully working independently gener- 
ated example of the model proposed by the OSAIDD study. 
9 Relational Model: The central and key component of the RECOVERY archi- 
tecture, similar to the Central Information Model proposed by the OSAIDD 
study. 
* Residual Watcher: The module that, checks for residuals between modelled 
and sensed parameters. These are linked in the Relational Model. 
9 Search Space Reduction: The method by which the diagnostic search space is 
reduced. 
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* Segregated Diagnostic Knowledge Database: Stores all diagnostic knowledge, 
such as rules or equational models. Segregated by component to allow for 
Search Space Reduction. 
e Status Generation: The group of modules responsible for copying and gener- 
ating vehicle status data. 
* Suspicion Index: The key data slot in the Nodal Information Database, it 
provides a way to reduce the search space. 
e System-Specific Information: Information that describes the system, such as 
hydrodynamic models of the vehicle and the relationships between compo- 
nents. 
Thruster: A component used for movement and positioning of an AUV. The 
RAUVER vehicle used in this research has 2 main-thrusters (for forward move- 
ment and yaw control) and 2 lift-thrusters (for vertical movement and roll 
control) - 
* Vehicle Data Ring (Sensor Data): The robotic vehicle's data store, often a 
network ring. 
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Appendix B 
Full Relational Model of RAUVER 
1 Graphical Representation of the Relational 
Model 
This section shows a graphical representation of the full Relational Model of RAU- 
VER used to evaluate this research. The relevant text input to the compiler is 
shown at the bottom of each figure, the diagrams are manually generated from that 
information. 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Key to Diagrams 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Nodes 
A parameter that is sensed by a Compon A generic component of no 
sensor particular type 
(Battery-jernp) 
A parameter that is not sensed and 
Sub-Component A component that forms part of 
so is assumed to be the same as the 
a larger component 
Unsensed demanded value Parameter (Thruster Speed) 
Power A 'source' component that 
Supply supplies power to other 
If ------------ A parameter that is modelled by a 
components 
Modelled diagnostic model 
(Port Nav Power Supply) 
Parameter (Vehicle Roll) 
----------- 
A parameter that is set to TRUE or A sensor that senses vehicle 
Alarm when it's sensed value exceeds 
EY 
systemic parameters 
Parameter a particular limit (Battery-Temp-Sensor) 
(if Battery-Temp > 70 
degrees... 
--------------- 
Environmental A sensor that senses 
Sensor parameters external to the 
--------------- vehicle 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
Links 
comp-psupply 
No 
Component to Power Supply 
(Port-Th ruster-Com pone nt to 
Port-Nav-Power-Supply) 
Sensor-Par Sensor to Sensed Parameter 
(Battery-Temp-Sensor to 
Battery-Tem p_Para meter) 
SubComp-Comp 
10 
Sub-Component to Component 
(Thruster-Gearbox-SubComp to 
Thruster-Comp) 
Mpar-Par Modelled Parameter to Parameter 
(Model led-Vehicle-Roll to 
p- Sensed-Vehicle_Roll) 
Sensor-Sensed 
No Sensor to Sensed Component Par_Comp Unsensed Parameter to Component 
(Battery-Temp-Sensor to Battery) (Thruster-Speed_Parameter to 
Thruster-Component) 
Figure B. 1: Key to Relational Model Diagrams 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Port Main-Thruster 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
To Port-Nav_ 
Power-Supply 
Port-Main 
Par_Comp- 
comp-psupply 
Port-Main-Thruster 
(Component) 
SubComp-Comp 
r- ----r----I Port Main- Port Main IThruster_Brush 
Thrust_Control 
L-- ---i--T-- 
comp-psupply 
To TwentyFour- 
PControl 
(Power Supply) 
I----If----- I- -ý--I 
Port-Main 
- 
Port Main 
-I 
Port 
- 
main 
- Thrust-Motor Thrust -Propellor Thrust-Gearbox 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT-MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT-MAIN-MOTOR PORT_MAIN-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER-BRUSH PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP 
- 
COMP PORT-MAIN-GBOX PORT_MAIN-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT-MAINPROPELLER PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
H parameters to components 
LINK PAR-COMP PORT-MAIN PORT-MAINTHRUSTER; 
#components to power supplies 
LINK COMP 
- 
PSUPPLY PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORTMAIN-THRUST-CONTROL 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
Figure B. 2: Port Main-Thruster Module 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Stbd Main-Thruster 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
To Stbd_Nav- 
Power-Supply 
. -I- ---N., Par-Comp 
Stbd-Main 
--- --le 
comp-psupply 
Stbd_Main- 
Thruster 
(Component) 
SubComp-Comp 
F---- 
Stbd-Main- 
Thruster-Brush 
----i 
---- -1 
Stbd Main 
Thrust-Control 
- IF - --, j 
Comp-psupply 
- -- -----I---- --I 
Stbd-Main_ Stbd_Main 
-I 
Stbd-Main- 
L Thrust Motor Thrust-Propellor Thrust Gearbox 
ro TwentyFour-' 
PControl 
(Power Supply), 
H sub components to components 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD-MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD_MAIN_MOTOR STBD_MAIN_THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD-MAIN_THRUSTER-BRUSH STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD_MAIN_GBOX STBD_MAIN_THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STB D-MAI N-PRO P ELLER STBD-MAIN_THRUSTER; 
H parameters to components 
LINK PAR_COMP STBD_MAIN STBD_MAIN_THRUSTER; 
H components to power supplies 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER STBD-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD 
- 
MAIN 
- 
THRUST 
- 
CONTROL 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
Figure B. 3: Starboard Main-Thruster Module 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Port Lift-Thruster 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
To Port-Nav- 
Power-Supply 
comp-psupply 
-% Port Lift Thruster 
<, 00, Port-Lift Par_Comp (Component) 
SubConop-Comp 
P rt Lift -Lift 
Port Lift 
77 
Port Lift Port Lift P rt LThr'uste-r 
Brus! j 
I 
Thrust Contr rust Motor Thrust Propellor Thrust Gearbox 
0 
Tý 
L0- 
tj ý_j 
ý7 
comp-psupply 
o TwentyFour- 
PControl 
Power Supply) 
H sub components to components 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL PORTLIFT-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT_LIFT_MOTOR PORT-LIFT_THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT-LIFr-THRUSTER-BRUSH PORT 
- 
LIFT 
- 
THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP 
- 
COMP PORT 
- 
LIFT 
- 
GBOX PORT 
- 
LIFT 
- 
THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP PORT_LIFT-PROPELLER PORT_LIFT-THRUSTER; 
H parameters to components 
LINK PAR-COMP PORT-LIFT PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
// components to power supplies 
LINK COMP 
- 
PSUPPLY PORT-LIFT_THRUSTER PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT 
- 
LIFT 
- 
THRUST CONTROL 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
Figure BA: Port Lift-Thruster Module 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Stbd Lift-Thruster 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 110/11/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
To Stbd-Nav- 
Power-Supply 
comp-psupply 
o-ý ""'>- Par ,I 
Stbd-Lift-Thruster 
Stbd_Lift 
_Comp-IFt (Component) 
---. 0 
SubComp-Comp 
Stbd-Lift- Stbd-Lift 
- Thruster-Brush Thrust-Control 
Comp-psupply 
To TwentyFour-' 
PControl 
(Power Supply), 
I -, --- --i Stbd-Lift- I Stbd Lift Stbd Lift I 
Thrust Motor [Lhru st Propellor rust Gearbox Th 
L 
H sub components to components 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD_LIFT_THRUST_CONTROL STBD_LIFT_THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD-LIFT_MOTOR STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD_LIFT_THRUSTER_BRUSH STBD_LlFr-THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD_LIFT_GBOX STBD_LIFT_THRUSTER; 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
// parameters to components 
LINK PAR-COMP STBD_LIFT STBD-LlFr-THRUSTER; 
H components to power supplies 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD_LlFr_THRUSTER STBD_NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD_LIFT_THRUST_CONTROL 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
Figure B. 5: Starboard Lift-Thruster Module 
1 --i 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
AOSI EZ-Compass-3 Compass/Attitude Sensor Module 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
To Twelve 
PControl 
(Power Supply) 
AOSI-HEADING 
AOSI-PITCH 
Comp-psupply 
I--- 
-*< 
ýOS 
ROLL 
AOSI EZ3 ensor Par AOSI-TEMP COMPASS-SENSOR 
-- __l/ 
AOSI-MAGX 
AOSI-MAGY 
AOSI-MAGZ 
Links: 
SENSOR_PAR, 
LINK SENSOR_PAR AOSI_EZ3_COMPASS_SENSOR AOSI-HEADING; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR AOSI_EZ3-COMPASS_SENSOR AOSIPITCH; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR AOSI_EZ3_COMPASS_SENSOR AOSI_ROLL; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR AOSI_EZ3_COMPASS_SENSOR AOSI-TEMP; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR AOSI_EZ3_COMPASS_SENSOR AOSI_MAGX; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-MAGY; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI_EZ3_COMPASS_SENSOR AOSI-MAGZ; 
H COMP-PSUPPLY, 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR 
TWELVE_PCONTROL; 
Figure B. 6: AOSI EZ-Compass-3 Compass/ Atticlute Sensor Module 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Individual Sensors to Alarm Parameters 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
c 
Sensor Par ALARM PDW 
- - 
c 
Sensor_ Par 
Sensor Par -- >. _ 
Sensor Par 
- 
Sensor Par 
- 
Sensor Par 
_ 
Sensor_Par 
Sensor Par 
H alarms 
LINK SENSOR-PAR PORT_DIODE-50_SENSOR ALARM-PDW; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR PORT-DIODE-60-SENSOR ALARM-PDH; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR PORT_NAVSUPPLYHOT_SENSOR ALARM-PLH; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR STBD_DIODE-50_SENSOR ALARM-SDW; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR STBD_DIODE_60_SENSOR ALARM-SDH; 
LINK SENSOR 
- 
PAR STBD 
- 
NAVSUPPLY 
- 
HOT 
- 
SENSOR ALARM-SLH; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR WATER-SENSOR ALARM-WATER; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR SPARE_DIGITAL_SENSOR ALARM-SPARE; 
Figure B. 7: Sensor Components to Alarm Parameters 
193 
RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Individual Sensors to Sensed Parameters 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
c 
Sensor- Par-* < 
c 
Sensor- Par- 
<: jE ý 
Sensor Par -* 
T < 
ff > 
- T 
Sensor Par 
_ 
DEPTH SENSOR Sensor Par DEPTH 
> 
---------------- 
PITCH 
- 
GYRO Sensor Par -* 
< 
GYRO PITCH 
> 
SENSOR 
Sensor Par-+ <ý: 
ý 
- 
Sensor Par-111. 
- 
fl sensor to par for sensed paramers 
fl tells you which component does the sensing 
LINK SENSOR-PAR PORT_LEM_SENSOR PORT-LEM; 
LINK SENSOR_PAR STBD_LEM-SENSOR STBD_LEM; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR PORT 
- 
POWERSTACK-TEMPSENSOR 
PORT-DIODE-TEMP; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR STBD 
- 
POWERSTACK 
- 
TEMP-SENSOR 
STBD-DIODE-TEMP; 
LINK SENSOR 
- 
PAR DEPTH 
- 
SENSOR DEPTH; 
LINK SENSOR 
- 
PAR YAW 
- 
GYRO 
- 
SENSOR GYRO-YAW; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR GYRO-PITCH; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR ROLL-GYRO-SENSOR GYRO-ROLL; 
Figure B. 8: Sensor Components to Sensed Parameters 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Individual Sensors to Sensed Components 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
PORT LEM 
SENSOR 
PORT 
- 
DIODE- 
Sensor Sensed 
50-SENSOR 
PORT 
- 
DIODE- 
11 PORT-NAV-POWER 60-SENSOR P, II (Power Supply) 
PORT NAVSUPPLY 
HOT-SENSOR 
PORT POWERSTACK 
TEMP-SENSOR 
STBD 
- 
LEM- 
SENSOR 
STBD DIODE 
50-SENSOR 
Sensor-Sensed 
STBD 
- 
DIODE- STBD-NAV-POWER 
60-SENSOR (Power Supply) 
STBD NAVSUPPLY 
HOT-SENSOR 
STBD-POWERSTACK- 
TEMPSENSOR 
H sensor to sensed component 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED PORT-LEM-SENSOR PORT_NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED PORT_DIODE-50_SENSOR PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR_SENSED PORTDIODE-60-SENSOR PORT_NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR_SENSED PORT_NAVSUPPLYHOT_SENSOR PORT_NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR_SENSED PORT 
- 
POWERSTACK_TEMP-SENSOR 
PORT_NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR 
- 
SENSED STBD 
- 
LEM 
- 
SENSOR STBD-NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR 
- 
SENSED STBD 
- 
DIODE 
- 
50 
- 
SENSOR STBD 
- 
NAV 
- 
POWER; 
LINK SENSOR 
- 
SENSED STBD-DIODE-60-SENSOR STBD-NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED STBD-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR STBD-NAV-POWER; 
Figure B. 9: Sensor Components to Sensed Components 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Unsensed Parameters to Components 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
PORT 
- 
LAMP Par-Comp PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
-- ---. Oe 
STBD-LAMP >- Par-Comp STBDLAMP-CONTROL 
H parameter to component for unsensed parameters 
LINK PAR_COMP PORT_LAMP PORTLAMP-CONTROL; 
LINK PAR_COMP STBD_LAMP STBDLAMP-CONTROL; 
Figure B. 10: Unsensed Parameters to Components 
RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Modelled Parameters to Sensed Parameters 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
---------------- 
PORT NAV Mpar Par PORT LEM 
POWER-MODEL 
---------------- 
---------------- -- 
STBD NAV % Mpar Par STBD LEM 
POWER MODEL 
----------------- 
---- ------ 
ROLL MODEL Mpar-Par AOSI ROLL 
------ 
----------- 
// modelled to sensed parameter links 
LINK MPAR 
- 
PAR PORT 
- 
NAV 
- 
POWER 
- 
MODEL PORT 
- 
LEM; 
LINK MPAR-PAR STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL STBD-LEM; 
LINK MPAR-PAR ROLL-MODEL AOSI_ROLL; 
Figure B. 11: Modelled Parameters to Sensed Parameters 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Twelve and Twenty Four Volt Control Power Supplies to Components 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
PORT MAIN 
THRUST-CONTROL 
comp-psupply 
TWENTYFOUR- 
PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
PORT LIFT 
THRUST-CONTROL 
STBD MAIN 
THRUST-CONTROL 
STBD LIFT 
THRUST-CONTROL 
comp-psupply 
STBD 
- 
POWERSTACK- 
TEMP-SENSOR 
TWELVE 
PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
PORT 
- 
POWERSTACK 
TEMP-SENSOR 
DEPTH-SENSOR 
AOSI-EZ3- 
COMPASS-SENSOR 
LINK COMP 
- 
PSUPPLY DEPTH-SENSOR TWELVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR TWELVE 
- 
PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP 
- 
PSUPPLY STBD 
- 
POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR TWELVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY AOS-EM-COMPASS-SENSOR TWELVE-PCONTROL 
LINK COMP IPSUPPLY PORT- MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL TWENTYFOUR 
-PCONTROL; LINK COMP 
-PSUPPLY 
PORT 
-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL 
TWENTYFOUR 
- 
PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP- PSUPPLY STBD- MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL TWENTYFOUR 
-PCONTROL; LINK COMP 
-PSUPPLY 
STBD 
-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL 
TWENTYFOUR- PCONTROL; 
Figure B. 12: Twelve and Twenty Four Volt Power Supplies to Supplied Components 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Fifteen Volt Control Power Supplies to Components 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/11/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
FIFTEEN PCONTROL 
(Power Supply) 
comp-psupply 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR STBD-LEM-SENSOR 
comp-psupply 
MINUS-FIFTEEN PCONTROL II 
(Power Su-pply) 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-LEM-SENSOR FIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-LEM-SENSOR FIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP PSUPPLY PORT LEM SENSOR 
MINUSFIFTEEN 
- 
PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP PSUPPLY STBD LEM SENSOR 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
Figure B. 13: Plus/Minus Fifteen Volt Power Supplies to Supplied Components 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Navigation Power Supplies to Components 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis 
experiments 
PORT MAIN 
THRUSTER 
PORT NAV POWER COMP-PSUPPly PORT LIFT 
(Power Supply) THRUSTER 
PORT LAMP 
CONTROL 
STBD 
- 
MAIN- 
THRUSTER 
STBD NAV 
- 
POWER comp-Psupply STBD-LIFT- 
(Power Supply) THRUSTER 
STBD LAMP 
CONTROL 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT_LIFT-THRUSTER PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORTLAMP-CONTROL PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER STBD-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD_LIFT_THRUSTER STBD_NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-LAMP-CONTROL STBD-NAV-POWER; 
Figure B. 14: Navigation Power Supplies to Supplied Components 
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RECOVERY Relational Model: 
Five Volt Power Supply (Control) to Components 
Author: Kelvin Hamilton 
Date: 10/1/2002 
Generated from RECOVERY compiler output from Thesis experiments 
FIVE-PCONTROL 
comp-psupply 
STBD 
- 
DIODE- 
60-SENSOR 
PORT 
- 
DIODE- 
60-SENSOR 
PITCH 
- 
GYRO- 
SENSOR 
YAW 
- 
GYRO- 
SENSOR 
STBD 
- 
DIODE- 
50-SENSOR 
ROLL GYRO 
SENSOR 
WATER-SENSOR 
STBD NAVSUPPLY 
HOT-SENSOR 
PORT DIODE 
SO-SENSOR 
SPARE DIGITAL 
SENSOR 
pORT_NAVSUPPLY- 
HOT-SENSOR fl component to power supply links 
L; LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT_DIODE_50_SENSOR FIVEPCONTR 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-DIODE-50_SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-DIODE-60-SENSOR FIVE_PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD_DIODE_60_SENSOR FIVE_PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT_NAVSUPPLY-HOT_SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP 
- 
PSUPPLY STBD_NAVSUPPLY_HOT_SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY WATER_SENSOR FIVE_PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY SPAR E-DIGITAL-SEN SOR FIVE_PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY YAW-GYRO-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY ROLL-GYRO-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
Figure B. 15: Five Volt Power Supply to Supplied Components 
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B. 2 Text Input to the RECOVERY Relational 
Model Compiler 
This section shows the raw text input to the RECOVERY Relational Model com- 
piler. 
Full RECOVERY C++ code is included on the attached cd-rom. 
B. 2.1 Master List of Nodes 
This is the master list of nodes. All types of nodes are included here, with the type of node followed 
by the individual node identifier. The SECTION-START and SECTION-END identifiers are used 
to segregate the types of nodes. 
// RECOVERY file 
// Construction model nodes (components and parameters) 
// Adding a node here? 
Add generation info into 
construction model functions 
NULL-NODE SECTION_START; 
UNSENSED-PAR RUNTIME; 
NULL-NODE FIRST-PARAMETER; 
NULL-NODE UNKNOWN-PARAMETER; 
UNSENSED-PAR PORT-MAIN; 
UNSENSED-PAR STBD-MAIN; 
UNSENSED-PAR PORT-LIFT; 
UNSENSED-PAR STBD-LIFT; 
UNSENSED-PAR PORT-LAMP; 
UNSENSED-PAR STBD-LAMP; 
SENSED_PAR DEPTH; 
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SENSED 
SENSED 
SENSED 
SENSED 
SENSED 
SENSED 
SENSED 
PAR AOSI 
PAR AOSI 
PAR AOSI 
PAR AOSI 
PAR AOSI 
PAR AOSI 
PAR AOSI 
HEADING; 
PITCH; 
ROLL; 
TEMP; 
MAGX; 
MAGY; 
MAGZ; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-STATUS; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LAT-DEGREE; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LAT-MINUTE; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LAT-SECOND; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LAT-HEMISPHERE; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LONG-DEGREE; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LONG-MINUTE; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LONG-SECOND; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-LONG-HEMISPHERE; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-HEADING; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-VELOCITY; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-MAG_VARIATION; 
SENSED-PAR GPS-MAG-VARIATION-DIRECTION; 
SENSED-PAR GYRO-YAW; 
SENSED-PAR GYRO-PITCH; 
SENSED-PAR GYRO-ROLL; 
SENSED-PAR PORT-DIODE_TEMP; 
SENSED-PAR STBD-DIODE-TEMP; 
SENSED-PAR PORT-LEM; 
SENSED-PAR STBD-LEM; 
SENSED-PAR ALTITUDE; 
// vehicle alarms 
NULL-NODE FIRST-ALARM; 
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ALARM-PAR ALARM-WATER; 
ALARM-PAR ALARM-PDH; 
ALARM-PAR ALARM-SDH; 
ALARM-PAR ALARM-PDW; 
ALARM-PAR ALARM-SDW; 
ALARM-PAR ALARM-PLH; 
ALARM-PAR ALARM-SLH; 
ALARM-PAR ALARM-SPARE; 
NULL-NODE LAST-ALARM; 
// modelled parameters 
NULL-NODE FIRST-MODELLED-PARAMETER; 
MODELLED-PAR PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL; 
MODELLED-PAR STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL; 
MODELLED-PAR ROLL-MODEL; 
MODELLED-PAR PITCH-MODEL; 
MODELLED-PAR DEPTH-VELOCITY-MODEL; 
MODELLED-PAR YAW-VELOCITY-MODEL; 
MODELLED-PAR HEADING-MODEL; 
MODELLED-PAR DEPTH_MODEL; 
NULL-NODE LAST-MODELLED-PARAMETER; 
NULL-NODE LAST-PARAMETER; 
// components 
NULL-NODE FIRST-COMPONENT; 
NULL-NODE UNKNOWN-COMPONENT; 
// ****** first test position 
thrusters 
- comp followed by subcomp 
COMP PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
SUB-COMP PORT-MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL; 
SUB-COMP PORT-MAIN_MOTOR; 
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SUB-COMP PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER-BRUSH; 
SUB-COMP PORT-MAIN_GBOX; 
SUB-COMP PORT-MAIN-PROPELLER; 
COMP STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
SUB-COMP STBD-MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL; 
SUB-COMP STBD-MAIN-MOTOR; 
SUB-COMP STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER-BRUSH; 
SUB-COMP STBD-MAIN-GBOX; 
SUB-COMP STBD-MAIN-PROPELLER; 
COMP PORT-LIF 
SUB-COMP PORT, 
SUB-COMP PORT, 
SUB-COMP PORT, 
SUB-COMP PORT 
SUB-COMP PORT 
T-THR1 
-LIFT, 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
USTER; 
-THRUST-CONTROL; 
-MOTOR; 
-THRUSTER-BRUSH; 
_GBOX; 
-PROPELLER; 
// this is the test node for rulebase 
COMP STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
SUB-COMP STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL; 
SUB-COMP STBD-LIFT-MOTOR; 
SUB-COMP STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER_BRUSH; 
SUB-COMP STBD-LIFT-GBOX; 
SUB-COMP STBD-LIFT_PROPELLER; 
// lamp components 
COMP PORT-LAMP-CONTROL; 
COMP STBD-LAMP-CONTROL; 
// power supplies 
PSUPPLY-COMP PORT_BATTERY; 
PSUPPLY-COMP STBD_BATTERY; 
PSUPPLY-COMP PORT_NAV_POWER; 
PSUPPLY-COMP STBD-NAV_POWER; 
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// ******** middle position of components 
PSUPPLY-COMP 
PSUPPLY-COMP 
PSUPPLY-COMP 
PSUPPLY-COMP 
PSUPPLY-COMP 
PSUPPLY-COMP 
// comms 
TWELVE_PCONTROL; 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
COMMS-POWER; 
FIVE-PCONTROL; 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
COMP SURFACE-COMMS-UNIT; 
sensors 
all sensors her, 
analogue sensor 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
e; including simple thermostats and trips 
section 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR; 
STBD-LEM-SENSOR; 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR; 
STBD-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR; 
YAW-GYRO-SENSOR; 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR; 
ROLL-GYRO-SENSOR; 
GPS_SENSOR; 
ENVIRO-SENSOR-COMP DEPTH_SENSOR; 
ENVIRO-SENSOR-COMP AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR; 
ENVIRO-SENSOR-COMP CTD_SENSOR; 
// digital sensors 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
SYSTEM-SENSOR-COMP 
PORT-DIODE-50-SENSOR; 
STBD-DIODE-50-SENSOR; 
PORT-DIODE-60-SENSOR; 
STBD-DIODE-60-SENSOR; 
PORT-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR; 
STBD-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR; 
WATER_SENSOR; 
SPARE-DIGITAL-SENSOR; 
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// circuit boards 
COMP LAMP-CONVERTOR-PCB; 
COMP DIGITAL-INPUT-PCB; 
COMP DIGITAL-POT-PCB; 
COMP ANALOGUE-IO-PCB; 
COMP CONTROL-PCB; 
// ******* last test position *** 
// this is the test node for rulebase 
COMP STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
NULL-NODE LAST-COMPONENT; 
NULL-NODE SECTION-END; 
B. 2.2 Port Main-Thruster Module 
This is an individual component file showing all the links for the Port Mam-Thruster Module. The 
other module files follow the same format. 
RECOVERY knowledge file 
Rauver Vehicle, Ocean Systems Laboratory 
Port Main Thruster Semantic Model 
K. Hamilton 25/10/2000 
Defines the links between nodes 
Link type, endpointl, endpoint2, proposed endl, proposed end2 
// sub components 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
to c 
PORT 
PORT 
PORT 
PORT 
PORT 
mpon 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
-MAIN, 
-MAIN, 
-MAIN, 
ents 
-THRUST-CONTROL 
-MOTOR 
PORT-MAI] 
-THRUSTER-BRUSH 
_GBOX 
PORT-MAIN. 
-PROPELLER 
PORT, 
PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
N_THRUSTER; 
PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
-THRUSTER; 
-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
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// parameters to components 
LINK PAR-COMP PORT-MAIN PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
// components to power supplies 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
known faults and dynamic models 
FaultConditionl FaultCondition2 FaultCondition3 Candidate 
if thruster active and power lower than model then propeller off 
if thruster active and power higher than model then gbox jammed or prop stuck 
B. 2.3 Port Lift-Thruster Module 
RECOVERY knowledge file 
Rauver Vehicle, Ocean Systems Laboratory 
Port LIFT Thruster Semantic Model 
K. Hamilton 25/10/2000 
Defines the links between nodes 
Link type, endpointl, endpoint2, proposed endl, proposed end2 
// sub components 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
to c 
PORT 
PORT 
PORT. 
PORT, 
PORT. 
ompon 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
-LIFT, 
-LIFT. 
ents 
-THRUST-CONTROL 
-MOTOR 
PORT-LIF' 
-THRUSTER-BRUSH 
_GBOX 
PORT-LIFT 
-PROPELLER 
PORT, 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
T-THRUSTER; 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
-THRUSTER; 
-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
// parameters to components 
LINK PAR-COMP PORT-LIFT PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
// components to power supplies 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
207 
// known faults and dynamic models 
B. 2.4 Starboard Main-Thruster Module 
RECOVERY knowledge file 
Rauver Vehicle, Ocean Systems Laboratory 
STBD Main Thruster Semantic Model 
K. Hamilton 25/10/2000 
Defines the links between nodes 
Link type, endpointl, endpoint2, proposed endl, proposed end2 
// sub components 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
LINK SUBCOMP-COMP 
to C, 
STBD 
STBD 
STBD 
STBD 
STBD 
mpon, 
-MAIN, 
-MAIN, 
-MAIN. 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
ants 
-THRUST-CONTROL 
-MOTOR 
STBD-MAII 
-THRUSTER-BRUSH 
_GBOX 
STBD_MAIN 
-PROPELLER 
STBD 
STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
9-THRUSTER; 
STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
-THRUSTER; 
-MAIN_THRUSTER; 
// parameters to components 
LINK PAR-COMP STBD-MAIN STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER; 
// components to power supplies 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER STBD-NAV_POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
// known faults and dynamic models 
B. 2.5 Starboard Lift-Thruster Module 
// RECOVERY knowledge file 
// Rauver Vehicle, Ocean Systems Laboratory 
// STBD Main Thruster Semantic Model 
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K. Hamilton 25/10/2000 
Defines the links between nodes 
Link type, endpointl, endpoint2, proposed endl, proposed end2 
// sub compoi 
LINK SUBCOMP. 
LINK SUBCOMP, 
LINK SUBCOMP 
LINK SUBCOMP 
LINK SUBCOMP 
aents to components 
-COMP 
STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL 
-COMP 
STBD-LIFT-MOTOR STBD-LIF 
-COMP 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH 
-COMP 
STBD-LIFT-GBOX STBD-LIFT 
-COMP 
STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER STBD 
// parameters to components 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
I-THRUSTER; 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
-THRUSTER; 
-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
LINK PAR-COMP STBD-LIFT STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER; 
// components to power supplies 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER STBD-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-LIFT-TýIRUST-CONTROL TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL; 
// known faults and dynamic models 
B. 2.6 AOSI EZ Compass 3 Sensor Module 
RECOVERY knowledge file 
Rauver Vehicle, Ocean Systems Laboratory 
K. Hamilton 26/10/2000 
Defines the links between nodes 
Link type, endpointl, endpoint2, proposed endl, proposed end2 
L 
SENSOR-PAR, 
LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI 
LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI 
LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI 
LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI 
LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI 
inks: ****** 
-EZ3-COMPASS 
-EZ3-COMPASS 
-EZ3-COMPASS 
-EZ3-COMPASS 
-EZ3-COMPASS 
-SENSOR 
AOSI-HEADING; 
-SENSOR 
AOSI-PITCH; 
-SENSOR 
AOSI_ROLL; 
-SENSOR 
AOSI-TEMP; 
-SENSOR 
AOSI_MAGX; 
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LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-MAGY; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR AOSI-MAGZ; 
COMP-PSUPPLY, 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR TWELVE-PCONTROL; 
B. 2.7 System-Level Links 
Here are links that are not for any particular module. 
// RECOVERY information file 
// Model Links - RAUVER vehicle 
// K. Hamilton 1/11/00 
// modelled to sensed parameter links 
LINK MPAR-PAR PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL PORT_LEM; 
LINK MPAR-PAR STBD-NAV-POWER-MODEL STBD-LEM; 
LINK MPAR-PAR ROLL_MODEL AOSI_ROLL; 
// for correlator evaluation (null movement thermal) only 
//LINK MPAR-PAR HEADING-MODEL AOSI-HEADING; 
// component to power supply links 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-LAMP-CONTROL PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-LAMP-CONTROL STBD_NAV_POWER; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-LEM-SENSOR FIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-LEM-SENSOR FIFTEEN_PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-LEM-SENSOR MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-LEM-SENSOR MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY 
PORT 
STBD 
PORT 
STBD 
PORT 
STBD 
DIODE-50-SENSOR FIVE 
DIODE-50-SENSOR FIVE 
DIODE-60-SENSOR FIVE 
DIODE-60-SENSOR FIVE 
NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR 
NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR 
PCONTROL; 
PCONTROL; 
PCONTROL; 
PCONTROL; 
FIVEJCONTROLý 
FIVEJCONTROLý, 
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LINK COMP-PSUPPLY WATER-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY SPARE-DIGITAL-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY DEPTH-SENSOR TWELVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR TWELVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY STBD-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR TWELVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY YAW-GYRO-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
LINK COMP-PSUPPLY ROLL-GYRO-SENSOR FIVE-PCONTROL; 
// parameter to component for unsensed parameters 
LINK PAR-COMP PORT-LAMP PORT-LAMP-CONTROL; 
LINK PAR-COMP STBD-LAMP STBD-LAMP-CONTROL; 
sensor to par for sensed paramers 
tells you which component does the sensing 
LINK SENSOR-PAR PORT-LEM-SENSOR PORT_LEM; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR STBD-LEM-SENSOR STBD-LEM; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR PORT-DIODE_TEMP; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR STBD-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR STBD-DIODE_TEMP; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR DEPTH-SENSOR DEPTH; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR YAW-GYRO-SENSOR GYRO-YAW; 
LINK SENSOR PAR PITCH-GYRO SENSOR GYRO PITCH; 
LINK SENSOR-PAR ROLL-GYRO-SENSOR GYRO_ROLL; 
// alarms - may 
LINK SENSOR-PAR 
LINK SENSOR-PAR 
LINK SENSOR-PAR 
LINK SENSOR-PAR 
LINK SENSOR-PAR 
LINK SENSOR-PAR 
LINK SENSOR-PAR 
need 
PORT. 
PORTý 
PORT. 
STBD, 
STBD, 
STBD. 
WATEI 
to add another link type 
-DIODE-50-SENSOR 
ALARM-PDW; 
-DIODE-60-SENSOR 
ALARM-PDH; 
-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR 
ALARM-PLH; 
-DIODE-50-SENSOR 
ALARM-SDW; 
-DIODE-60-SENSOR 
ALARM-SDH; 
-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR 
ALARM-SLH; 
I-SENSOR ALARM-WATER; 
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LINK SENSOR-PAR SPARE-DIGITAL-SENSOR ALARM_SPARE; 
// sensor to sense, 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED 
COM] 
PORT, 
PORT, 
PORTý 
PORT 
PORT 
Donent 
-LEM-SENSOR 
PORT-NAV-POWER; 
-DIODE-50-SENSOR 
PORT-NAV_POWER; 
-DIODE-60-SENSOR 
PORT-NAV-POWER; 
-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR 
PORT-NAV-POWER; 
-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR 
PORT-NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED STBD-LEM-SENSOR STBD_NAV_POWER; 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED STBD-DIODE-50-SENSOR STBD-NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED STBD-DIODE-60-SENSOR STBD-NAV-POWER; 
LINK SENSOR-SENSED STBD-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR STBD-NAV-POWER; 
B. 2.8 Known Faults 
Here are the known faults, represented as both static and dynamic rules, that were used for 
evaluation purposes. 
INFORMATION 
STATIC RULES 
Usage: 
RULE component parameter min max equals; 
thrusters 
- comp foll, 
RULE PORT-MAIN. 
RULE PORT-MAIN. 
RULE PORT-MAIN, 
RULE PORT-MAIN, 
RULE PORT-MAIN, 
RULE PORT-MAIN, 
: )wed by subcomp 
-THRUSTER 
DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
-THRUST-CONTROL 
DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
-MOTOR 
DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
-THRUSTER-BRUSH 
DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
_GBOX 
DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
-PROPELLER 
DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-MAIN-THRUST-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
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RULE STBD-MAIN-MOTOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER-BRUSH DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-MAIN-GBOX DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-MAIN-PROPELLER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-LIFT-MOTOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT LIFT THRUSTER BRUSH DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; ---I 
RULE PORT-LIFT-GBOX DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-LIFT-PROPELLER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LIFT-MOTOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LIFT-GBOX DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// lamp components 
RULE PORT-LAMP-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LAMP-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// power supplies 
RULE PORT-BATTERY DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-BATTERY DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-NAV-POWER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-NAV-POWER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE TWELVE-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE COMMS-POWER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE FIVE-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE FIFTEEN-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE MINUSFIFTEEN PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// comms 
RULE SURFACE-COMMS-UNIT DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
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sensors 
all sensors here DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; including simple thermostats and trips 
analogue sensor section 
RULE PORT-LEM-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-LEM-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE YAW-GYRO-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE ROLL-GYRO-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE GPS-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE DEPTH-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE CTD-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// digital sensors 
RULE PORT-DIODE-50-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-DIODE-60-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-DIODE-60-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-DIODE-60-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE PORT-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE STBD-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE WATER-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE SPARE-DIGITAL-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// circuit boards 
RULE LAMP-CONVERTOR-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE DIGITAL-INPUT-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE DIGITAL-POT-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE ANALOGUE-IO-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
RULE CONTROL-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// DYNAMIC RULES 
// Usage: 
// DYNAMIC-RULE component parameter min max equals; 
214 
// thrusters 
// - comp followed by subcomp 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-MAIN-THRUSTER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// **** this comp 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT, 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT, 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT, 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT 
onent 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
has a unique value 
THRUST-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 5.0 -10.0; 
MOTOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
THRUSTER-BRUSH DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
GBOX DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
PROPELLER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-MAIN-THRUSTER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// **** this comp 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD 
onent 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
-MAIN 
has a unique value 
THRUST-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 5.0 -10.0; 
MOTOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
THRUSTER-BRUSH DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
GBOX DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
PROPELLER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// **** this component has a unique value 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT_LIFT_THRUST-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 5.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-LIFT-MOTOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-LIFT-GBOX DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-LIFT-PROPELLER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// **** this comp 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD, 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD, 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD. 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD. 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD. 
onent 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
-LIFT 
has a unique value 
THRUST-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 5.0 -10.0; 
MOTOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
THRUSTER-BRUSH DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
GBOX DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
PROPELLER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
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// lamp components 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-LAMP-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-LAMP-CONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// power supplies 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-BATTERY DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD_BATTERY DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-NAV-POWER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-NAV-POWER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE TWELVE-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE COMMS-POWER DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE FIVE-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE FIFTEEN-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// comms 
DYNAMIC-RULE SURFACE-COMMS-UNIT DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
sensors 
all sensors here DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; including simple thermostats and trips 
analogue sensor section 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-LEM-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-LEM-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE YAW-GYRO-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE ROLL-GYRO-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE GPS-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE DEPTH-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE CTD-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// digital sensors 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-DIODE-50-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
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DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-DIODE-50-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-DIODE-60-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-DIODE-60-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE PORT-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE STBD-NAVSUPPLY-HOT-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE WATER-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE SPARE-DIGITAL-SENSOR DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
// circuit boards 
DYNAMIC-RULE LAMP-CONVERTOR-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE DIGITAL-INPUT-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE DIGITAL-POT-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE ANALOGUE-IO-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
DYNAMIC-RULE CONTROL-PCB DEPTH -10.0 50.0 -10.0; 
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Appendix C 
RAUVER Information 
CA RAUVER Specification 
In ROV mode RAUVER uses a multicore tether to receive power and communicate 
with the surface via a standard industrial RS485 serial communications link, this 
is then converted to RS232 for use with a standard PC. All power conversion is 
performed on board RAUVER using low noise toroidal transformers to bring the 
voltages down to 12/24Vdc, this is then passed to the motor controllers and light- 
ing. A separate power supply provides control system voltages, this split system 
maximises control system noise immunity from the PWM motor controllers and any 
other switching transients. 
The control system comprises a Motorola MC68HCII-Fl QED microcontroller 
board, clocked at 16MHz. This receives commands from the surface via the RS485 
link, sets thruster powers accordingly and sends RAUVER system status information 
back to the surface. 
For AUV operation the power conversion module is simply removed and replaced 
with 12V batteries, these are connected to give 12/24Vdc as in ROV mode. In this 
way down time for changing between ROV and AUV modes is minimised, allowing 
more experiments to be carried out during expensive field trials. 
In both modes an electrically isolated and screened payload module is available, 
comprising a cylindrical volume of approximately 200mm x 200mm situated at the 
front of the starboard hull. All control and power voltages are available for use by 
the payload. 
RAUVER is very versatile and can easily be adapted for mission specific re- 
quirements. The specification below is for the standard RAUVER configuration, if 
you wish to discuss specific mission requirements please use the contact link at the 
bottom of the page. 
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Information on RAUVER is freely available, and includes a fully detailed 3d 
CAD model containing all internal and external components. 
Specifications: 
Maximum Diving Depth 70m (Sport Diver Limit) 
Overall Length Approximately 2m 
Overall Width Approximately 0.8m 
Weight in Air 120kg Maximum 
Weight in Water Approximately neutral, trimmed slightly buoyant. 
Trim Positive and negative, position adjustable 
Tether Length (ROV mode only) 90m 
Forward Speed Approximately 3 knots 
Lifting capacity Up to 10kg in standard configuration 
Main-Thruster Units: 
2x Bosch dc motors, 
12Vdc 
20OW 
Coupled to 300mm diameter nozzled propeller via a 5: 1 gearbox. 
Each thruster provides in excess of 10kg thrust. 
Ramp rates set to 2 seconds for zero to full speed 
Lift-Thruster Units: 
(Up to 4) Hydrovision 'Hyball' thrusters 
24Vdc 
380W 
Coupled to 130mm diameter propeller in Kort nozzle via a 10.5: 1 gearbox 
Each thruster provides in excess of 13kg thrust. 
Ramp rates set to 2 seconds for zero to full speed 
Thruster Control: 
Penny & Giles 'Solo 60' 24Vdc 60A programmable digital motor control units, soft- 
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ware limited to 22A. 
Speed control signal derived from an Analog Devices AD8403AN10 digital poten- 
tiometer controlled by RAUVER's system MC68HCHFI. 
On Board Power: 
AUV mode has; 
5Vdc regulated, 750mA 
5Vdc regulated, 10mA, for analogue signals 
12Vdc regulated, 2A 
24Vdc regulated, 2A 
+ 15Vdc regulated 
-15Vdc regulated 
12Vdc main battery 
24Vdc main battery 
ROV mode has; 
5Vdc regulated, 750mA 
5Vdc regulated, 10mA, for analogue signals 
12Vdc regulated, 2A 
24Vdc regulated, 2A 
+15Vdc regulated 
-15Vdc regulated 
24Vdc unregulated 
230Vac 'mains', 3A min. available 
ROV Mode Power Conversion: 
4x 500VA 24V toroidal transformers 
International Rectifier 35A Bridge Rectifiers 
68,000tiF smoothing capacitors 
Lighting: 
2x 71ONN' T'ungsten Halogen Lamps situated at the front of each hull. Illumination 
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adjustable independently using Digilog dimmers 
Fault Protection: 
Electrical - Zone 2 Residual Current Circuit Breaker plus various fuses 
Hull breach - Water detector at front of each hull and in junction box. 
Thermal Protection - 50'C / 60'C / 90'C thermostats at relevant locations in each 
hull, plus analogue power/ control- stack temperature signals 
Impact Protection - Full stainless-steel 316L (non-magnetic) 25mm diameter cage 
Cameras: 
Ix3 Lux Colour TV Camera, soon to be attached to a micro pan and tilt unit 
designed here in the Ocean Systems Laboratory 
Sensors: 
Sonar - 'SeaKing' Mechanically Scanned Forward Looking SOINAR 
Depth - Lucas Schaevitz 70m Absolute type, +- 0.05% Accuracy 
Heading - AOSI EZ-Compass 3 
M agneto- inductive/ capacitive 
Attitude compensated 
0.5 degree resolution 
Gyros -3x Murata 'Camcorder' type gyroscopes. Also investigating advanced fibre- 
optic gyroscopes. 
x-y positioning - Under review as vehicle too slow for an Inertial Navigation System. 
Will possibly use a Doppler log with flow sensors used in the meantime. 
Spare Tether Cores: 
2x twisted pair 
1 co-ax 
221 
Appendix D 
Sample RAUVEIR, Evaluation 
Mission Log File 
I 
Shown below is a sample from the RAUVER mission log file generated and stored by 
RAUVER during the course of the Faulty Port Lift-Thruster Experiment (Section 
7.2.7). Each line represents one sample of all status data. It loosely follows the 
NMEA format, with a start and finish character of $ and * respectively. Each data 
field is preceded by a unique identifier, for instance A196 shows 196 seconds since 
vehicle power-up, B415 shows the milliseconds of the current second. 
Full copies of all mission files are included on the attached cd-rom. 
D. 1 Mission Log File from the Faulty Port Lift- 
Thruster Experiment 
"Ocean Systems Laboratory, Heriot-Watt University, UK" 
"( www. cee. hw. ac. uk/oceans )" 
"Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Mission Log" 
"Recorded from: RAUVER" 
"Logging Started At: Fýi Nov 24 11: 25: 29 2000 
71 
"Mission Location: " 
"Mission Type: " 
"Mission Objectives: " 
" Comments: " 
jAl96B415al28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h597zOr2O7ls2OlOt2O52ztl24OvOw5xOyOR5.17P4.8OT4.7X- 
151.8Y263. OZ-401.3C83. I* 
j... 1197Bl6Oal28bl28cl28(1128e255f 255g255h595iOr2O7Os2Ollt2O49u I 2-IlvOw5xOyOR5.62P4.61T, 1.6X- 
150.2Y263.7Z-40 1.0C83.0* 
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jAl97B355al28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h596iOr2O7Os2OlOt2O73ul24OvOw5xOyOR5.62P4.6lT4.6X- 
150.2Y263.7Z-401. OC83.0* 
jAl97B615al28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h594iOr2O69sl992t2O47ul24OvOw5xOyOR5.55P4.54T4.6X- 
149.8Y263. OZ-401.6C83.0* 
jAl97B825al28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h597iOr2O68sl986t2O4Oul24OvOw5xOyOR5.55P4.54T4.6X- 
149.8Y263-OZ-401.6C83.0* 
jAl98B85al28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h597iOr2O68s2OO4t2O82ul239vOw5xOyOR5.55P4.54T4.6X- 
149.8Y263. OZ-401.6C83.0* 
jAl98B365al28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h593iOr2O7Os2Ollt2O36ul24OvOw5xOyOR5.55P4.54T4.6X- 
149.8Y263. OZ-401.6C83.0* 
jAl98B63Oal28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h593iOr2O72sl994t2O5Oul239vOw5xOyOR5.59P4.59T4.7X- 
150.5Y262.4Z-4Ol. 9C83.0* 
jAl98B825al28bl28cl28dl28e255f 255g255h593iOr2O69sl994t2O96ul24OvOw5xOyOR5.59P4.59T4.7X- 
150.5Y262.4Z-401.9C83.0* 
.. continues 
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Appendix E 
RECOVERY's Diagnostic Output 
Files (Full Text) 
Shown below is a sample RECOVERY diagnostic log file generated and stored during 
the course of the Faulty Port Lift-Thruster Experiment (Section 7.2.7). 
Full copies of all RECOVERY output is included on the attached cd-rom. 
E. 1 Bad Port Lift-Thruster, No Denomination 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 452 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 252.33 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 0 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 452 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 452 
Invoked at Mission Time: 252.33 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta Matches: 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
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Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 462 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 472 
Engines invoked at: 252.33 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 852 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 252.33 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 0 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 2 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 1 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 1 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 0 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 862 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
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Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 872 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 923 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 252.595 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 1 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 2 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 2 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 1 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 1 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 933 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 933 
Invoked at Mission Time: 252.595 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 943 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
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Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 15 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 943 
Engines invoked at: 252.595 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 323 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 252.595 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 1 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 4 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 2 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 2 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 2 
Diagnostic Iteration 1 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 333 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 333 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 393 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 252.865 
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Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 2 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 4 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 3 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 2 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 2 
Diagnostic Iteration 2 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 403 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 403 
Invoked at Mission Time: 252.865 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
GYRO-PITCH 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 413 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 413 
Engines invoked at: 252.865 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
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Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 814 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 252.865 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 2 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 6 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 3 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 3 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 3 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 2 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 824 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 824 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 894 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.13 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 3 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 6 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 4 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 3 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 3 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 3 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
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Plus milliseconds: 894 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 904 
Invoked at Mission Time: 253.13 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
GYRO-PITCH 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 904 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 16 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 904 
Engines invoked at: 253.13 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 304 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.13 
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Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 3 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 4 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 4 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 2 
Diagnostic Iteration 3 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 315 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 315 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 375 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.33 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 4 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 5 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 4 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 2 
Diagnostic Iteration 4 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 385 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 385 
Invoked at Mission Time: 253.33 
Delta-Correlations: 
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Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
GYRO-PITCH 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 395 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 395 
Engines invoked at: 253.33 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 805 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.33 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 4 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 9 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 5 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 5 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 4 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 3 
Diagnostic Iteration 4 Finished At: 
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Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 815 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 815 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 875 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 875 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.61 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 5 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 9 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 6 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 5 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 4 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 3 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 5 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 875 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 885 
Invoked at Mission Time: 253.61 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
233 
GYRO-PITCH 
Bad-Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Delta-Matches: 
PORT-LAMP 
STBD-LAMP 
PORT-DIODE-TEMP 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 895 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 17 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 895 
Engines invoked at: 253.61 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 406 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.61 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 5 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 11 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 7 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 6 
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STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 5 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 4 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 1 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 1 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 5 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 416 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 416 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 476 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 476 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.88 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 6 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 11 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 7 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 7 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 5 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 4 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 2 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 1 
PORT-POWERSTACK_TEMP-SENSOR: 1 
Diagnostic Iteration 6 Started At: 
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Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 486 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 486 
Invoked at Mission Time: 253.88 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
GYRO-PITCH 
Bad-Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Delta-Matches: 
PORT-LAMP 
STBD_LAMP 
GYRO-PITCH 
PORT-DIODE-TEMP 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 496 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 18 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 506 
Engines invoked at: 253.88 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
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Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 27 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 253.88 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 6 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 13 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 9 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 7 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 6 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 6 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 2 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 2 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 2 
Diagnostic Iteration 6 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 37 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 37 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 97 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 97 
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Number of Hits at Mission Time: 254.085 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 7 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 13 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 9 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 8 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 6 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 6 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 3 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 2 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 2 
Diagnostic Iteration 7 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 97 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 107 
Invoked at Mission Time: 254.085 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
Bad-Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Delta-Matches: 
PORT-LAMP 
STBD-LAMP 
GYRO-PITCH 
PORT-DIODE-TEMP 
Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 117 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
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Plus milliseconds: 117 
Engines invoked at: 254.085 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 648 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 254.085 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 7 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 15 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 11 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 8 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 7 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 7 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 3 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 3 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 3 
Diagnostic Iteration 7 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 658 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 668 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
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and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 718 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 718 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 254.29 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 8 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 15 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 11 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 9 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 7 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 7 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 4 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 3 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 3 
Diagnostic Iteration 8 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 728 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 728 
Invoked at Mission Time: 254.29 
Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
Bad-Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Delta_Matches: 
PORT-LAMP 
STBD-LAMP 
GYRO-PITCH 
PORT-DIODE-TEMP 
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Similar-Alarm-Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 738 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 19 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 748 
Engines invoked at: 254.29 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 249 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 254.29 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 8 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 17 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 13 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 9 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 8 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 4 
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Diagnostic Iteration 8 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 289 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 289 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: PORT-NAV-POWER-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: PORT-LEM at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 349 
Residual detected between 
Modelled Node: ROLL-MODEL 
and Sensed Node: AOSI-ROLL at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 349 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 254.565 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 9 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 17 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 13 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 8 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 8 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 5 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
Diagnostic Iteration 9 Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 359 
Correlator Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 359 
Invoked at Mission Time: 254.565 
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Delta-Correlations: 
Bad-Node: PORT-LEM 
Delta-Matches: 
Bad-Node: AOSI-ROLL 
Delta-Matches: 
GYRO-PITCH 
Similar-Alarm_Correlations: 
Recent-Comp-Correlations: 
Correlator Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 369 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Started at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 369 
Engines invoked at: 254.565 
Roll Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER 
Port Power Engine Proposes: 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL 
Stbd Power Engine Proposes: 
Model Based Diagnosis Engines Finished at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 910 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 254.565 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 9 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 19 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 14 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
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STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 9 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 9 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 5 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
Diagnostic Iteration 9 Finished At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 920 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) Started at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 920 
Nodal Power Supply Diagnosis: 
PORT-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
STBD-BATTERY Fault Rating: 0. 
PORT-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 1. (nominated) 
STBD-NAV-POWER Fault Rating: 1. (nominated) 
TWELVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.5 
TWENTYFOUR-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0. 
COMMS-POWER Fault Rating: 0. 
FIVE-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.1 
FIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.5 
MINUSFIFTEEN-PCONTROL Fault Rating: 0.5 
Domain Independent Diagnostics (post iterations) Finished at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 930 
Number of Hits at Mission Time: 254.565 
Component Level Diagnostic Iteration: 10 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 19 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 14 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 9 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 9 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 5 
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STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
PORT-NAV-POWER: 1 
STBD-NAV-POWER: 1 
Component-Specific Diagnostic Level Entered at 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 930 
Adding Related Sub-Components to Suspicion Index: 
Final Suspicion Index at Mission Time: 254.565 
Sub-Component Diagnostics Level 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER: 19 
PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL: 0 
PORT-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
PORT-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
PORT-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
PORT-LAMP-CONTROL: 14 
PORT-LEM-SENSOR: 10 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER: 9 
STBD-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL: 0 
STBD-LIFT-MOTOR: 0 
STBD-LIFT-THRUSTER-BRUSH: 0 
STBD-LIFT-GBOX: 0 
STBD-LIFT-PROPELLER: 0 
PITCH-GYRO-SENSOR: 9 
AOSI-EZ3-COMPASS-SENSOR: 5 
STBD-LAMP-CONTROL: 4 
PORT-POWERSTACK-TEMP-SENSOR: 4 
PORT-NAV-POWER: 1 
STBD-NAV-POWER: 1 
Dynamic Rule Testing of Component: PORT-LIFT-THRUSTER Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 20 2001 
945 
Plus milliseconds: 940 
Scan finished (no match found) at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 21 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 771 
Dynamic Rule Testing of Component: PORT-LIFT-THRUST_CONTROL Started At: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 21 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 891 
Exact Match Found at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 22 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 482 
Dynamic Rule Attached to Component: PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL 
Component-Specific Information: 
Exact Match found with Component: PORT-LIFT-THRUST-CONTROL at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 22 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 482 
Exiting diagnostics at: 
Tue Jul 31 14: 13: 22 2001 
Plus milliseconds: 492 
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